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Introduction
Minoru Mio, Kazuya Nakamizo and 
Tatsuro Fujikura
This volume is an outcome of the symposium held in Kathmandu in January 
2018, which was co-organized by the INDAS (Integrated Area Studies on 
South Asia) project of Japan and Martin Chautari of Nepal under the title of 
“Peaceful Development of South Asia”. Peaceful social development is defined 
here in a broad sense as the conditions under which the maintenance of social 
order and social development is achieved not by violent compulsion but through 
the negotiation of intentions or interests among members of society. Maintain-
ing such conditions for long periods of time is a necessary requirement for the 
political, economic, and cultural development of a society and state. Through the 
post-colonial historical trajectory of South Asia, it has become commonly under-
stood that democracy is the better, if not the best, political system and value for 
that purpose. Indeed, every South Asian state, including monarchical Bhutan, is 
now espousing democracy as its principal political value.
While democratization and the deepening of democracy have been broadly dis-
cussed in this region, the peace that democracy is supposed to promote has been 
in serious danger, especially in the 21st century. For example, situations in which 
a social group has gained hegemonic state power through a democratic procedure 
and came to suppress minority groups have been widely observed in South Asian 
countries. Minority people, whether religious, ethnic, gender, socially discrimi-
nated, or another kind of minority, as a group or an individual, are often exposed 
to physical violence. Interference with free speech and the suppression of minor-
ity groups’ rights to live or rights to speak by state power have also frequently 
occurred in this region. Consequently, institutions or values related to peaceful 
social development have been hindered to a great degree. In addition, discourses 
and movements of resistance willing to use violent means such as Maoism and 
Islamic fundamentalism have spread, transcending the framework of states.
This region has been traditionally characterized by diversity and plurality of 
different social groups in terms of religion, caste, language, ethnic group, race, 
and so forth. However, the coexistence of diverse communities had been realized 
mostly within a traditional structure of hierarchy or imperial polity. Only if a 
community conceded hierarchical authority or imperial power could it be allowed 
to survive in a social niche. Insofar as the hierarchy or imperial polity was unwa-
vering, pluralism could be comparatively easily realized.
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Within a liberal democracy, however, various communities act as interest 
groups and/or are recognized as having certain political and social rights; as is the 
case in South Asia, where all communities and social groups compete with each 
other as equals for legal and constitutional recognition in all spheres of social, 
political, and public life. Without any clear hierarchy of power or arbitrators, 
negotiations and interactions among such groups are relatively more troublesome 
and can create potentially volatile situations (Mahajan 2005: 110). Recurrent vio-
lence between social groups and individuals can indeed co-occur with deepening 
democracy through this mechanism.
To promote peaceful development in contemporary South Asia, democracy 
itself should be reconsidered in terms of its concept, true value, and function 
against the background of real social conditions in this region. Deep-rooted 
thoughts and practical wisdom of coexistence of diverse social groups and com-
munities should also be revisited and reforged to fit contemporary social situa-
tions along with the reconsideration of democracy.
While majoritarian tendencies are indeed currently overwhelming democra-
cies in South Asia, strong popular challenges have nonetheless also emerged. 
For example, following the enactment of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 
2019 (CAA) by the Indian government in 2019, opposition movements were, 
in fact, mushrooming throughout India before the all-India lockdown due to the 
COVID-19 crushed it. The anti-CAA protests are arguably the first major oppo-
sition movement and campaign since the inauguration of the Modi government 
in 2014 at the time of writing. Their main claim is that the CAA initiative by 
the Indian government comprises a comprehensive attack on Indian democracy, 
which has for long cherished the values of cultural diversity and religious plural-
ity. An inclusive notion of democracy, in other words, is exactly the opposite of 
the concept of the ‘tyranny of majority’. There are other threats as well, such as 
the killing of journalists who are critical of the Hindutva (Hinduness) social and 
political agenda.1 The anti-CAA protests are thus based on the need for pursuing 
an inclusive and constitutional understanding of democracy rather than accepting 
a majoritarian version of democracy. In effect, what is happening in front of our 
eyes is precisely this fierce battle over how the notion of democracy is to be con-
ceptualized after 70 years of democratic practice in India.
One of the characteristics of current majoritarian democracy is the faith-based 
majoritarianism. As the Indian cases (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) indicate, 
Modi’s new strategy (two-sword strategy) is the attempt to combine Hindutva 
majoritarianism with economic development (Nakamizo 2020: 81–82). Although 
his main aim is to socially and politically rewire India as a Hindu Rashtra (nation), 
the aspiration for economic development (‘Gujarat model’) was one of the impor-
tant resources that helped gather support from the younger generation and the 
lower social strata in the 2014 and 2019 general elections. In this sense, eco-
nomic development served as the glue to draw in elements that were not entirely 
convinced by or aware of the implications for a ‘Hindu Rashtra’. Considering that 
the global tendency in recent years has involved the combining of neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies with authoritarian politics, the Indian case should not be treated 
as an exception nor a surprise. We, nonetheless, need to look into the function of 
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this new trend and how it is shaping political tendencies towards majoritarianism 
ever more closely. This book, in fact, aims to examine and explore how several 
kinds of political fault lines and vulnerabilities within this fast-evolving paradigm 
are now witnessing a surge in popular resistance movements alongside calls for 
peaceful development.
With this in mind, we organize 11 papers into three parts to reconsider peaceful 
development in this region. The first part directly examines the functioning of 
democracy, especially in India. We also look at problems of inter-communal, as 
well as state–community, relations in this region with special reference to Muslim 
communities in a broad sense. The second part focuses on various social move-
ments and the deepening of democracy based on examples from broad social 
strata and sites of South Asia. The final part specially considers the methods of 
peace reconstruction after violent conflicts. Through concrete cases of the peace 
recuperation process, we can witness creative imaginations for future democracy 
in the region. Key issues and summaries of all parts and chapters are as follows.
Part I Democracy, state, and religion
As a political institution that realizes the values of liberty and equality, democ-
racy has been regarded as a goal to be achieved by many countries. However, 
severe criticisms have been levelled at the malfunctions of democracy, for exam-
ple, as James C. Scott strongly states in his work, ‘[p]erhaps the greatest failure 
of liberal democracies is their historical failure to successfully protect the vital 
economic and security interests of their less advantaged citizens through their 
institutions’ (Scott 2012: 19).
In South Asia, democracy is not necessarily highly valued. For example, India, 
which has maintained a democratic system since its independence in 1947, except 
for the less-than-two-year emergency period, faces the problem of the tyranny of 
the majority Hindu community. Nepal, which overthrew royal rule, is struggling 
to establish stable democratic institutions. Pakistan, which removed a president 
with a military background from power, is tackling terrorism by dissidents. In 
Sri Lanka, which ended its prolonged civil war, Tamil and Muslim minorities 
continue to be repressed. In Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees are living under very 
tough circumstances, which are caused by the brutal repression of them by the 
Myanmar government, especially the military and private armies. How can dem-
ocratic institutions solve these serious problems?
One can first examine the tyranny of the majority, which has persisted along 
with democracy as a political issue since ancient Greek times. The idea of funda-
mental human rights and the mechanisms of separation of state powers has been 
devised over time to protect individuals and minority groups from the tyranny 
of the majority. However, the concept of rights and the mechanisms to protect 
them can be trampled on easily by pervasive state power. For example, in India, 
Muslim minorities are suppressed by vigilante groups such as Gau Rakshaks, 
who have tacit governmental support and allege that Muslims slaughter cows and 
eat beef, sometimes only based on rumours. Muslims are lynched in the worst 
cases. Indian democracy is in crisis.
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This crisis is not peculiar to India. The crisis of democracy, especially constitu-
tional liberalism, is taking place in countries that were thought to have established 
democracies, as evidenced by the election of Donald Trump in the US and the 
anti-immigrant demonstrations in European countries, which represent a bursting 
of the dike. This phenomenon, however, can be traced back to the post–Cold War 
era, though the context is different from the current situation.
Concretely, since the end of the Cold War, new forms of political regimes 
have emerged mainly from the former socialist bloc, which many scholars have 
strived to grasp. For example, Zakaria (1997) proposed the framework of illiberal 
democracy that has open, fair, competitive, and multiparty elections but with no 
constitutional liberalism, citing cases of countries in Latin America, Africa, and 
parts of Asia. According to him, ‘[d]emocracy is flourishing; constitutional liber-
alism is not’ (Zakaria 1997: 23). In the field of authoritarianism studies, Levitsky 
and Way (2002) proposed a framework of competitive authoritarianism that is 
situated between full-scale authoritarianism and democracy, citing cases such 
as Croatia under Tudjman, Serbia under Milosevic, and Russia under Putin (in 
2002). According to them, competitive authoritarianism has four arenas of dem-
ocratic contestation that present the possibility of overturning sitting authoritar-
ian regimes: the electoral arena, the legislative arena, the judicial arena, and the 
media (Levitsky and Way 2002: 54–58).
This means that the boundary between democracy and authoritarianism is 
becoming blurred. In this situation, how can we cope with the tyranny of the 
majority in a democratic setting? In the South Asian and South-East Asian con-
texts, religious minorities are the focus. Importantly, the states play a crucial role 
in oppressing religious minorities. In Part I, we deal with the relationship between 
democracy, state, and religion by analysing the case of the Muslim minority in 
India, the electoral victory of the Hindu majority in the largest Indian state of 
Uttar Pradesh, the phenomena of Islamophobia, and the situation of the Rohingya 
in Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Chapter 1, Nakamizo’s ‘Democracy and Vigilantism: Spread of Gau Rakshaks 
in India’, debates the recent spate of ‘vigilante justice’ in India, which is the new 
form of oppression against religious minorities. For example, vigilante groups 
such as ‘Gau Rakshaks’ are enforcing their norms against minorities with vio-
lence, although the extent of the violence is less than religious riots. The impor-
tant thing is that their activities have tacit but strong governmental support, which 
is quite different from the activities of past vigilante groups such as Ranvir Sena 
in Bihar. Ranvir Sena, for example, was formed because upper-caste landlords 
felt insecure as they could not secure governmental support, which was caused 
by ‘state deficit’ in 1990s’ Bihar.
At the same time, recent vigilantism also has a distinct character in the area of 
its activities compared to the 20th century. The Salwa Judam in Chhattisgarh, for 
example, had strong support from the state government, which justified govern-
mental support through several discourses about the need to contain terrorism or 
to neutralize ‘anti-state groups’ such as the Maoists. At best, however, the Salwa 
Judum could be conceptualized as being a type of a local experiment of sorts that 
was only relevant to the Chhattisgarh state. With the Gau Rakhsha, however, the 
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violence has been structured around pushing for an all-India type of an identity, 
which has, in turn, fed new attempts to institute the new type of ‘majority tyr-
anny’ as normal.
In this context, Nakamizo first classifies the type of vigilante groups and then 
specifies the character of recent vigilante groups such as the Gau Rakshaks. By 
focusing on Gau Rakshaks, he analyses the recent crisis of Indian democracy, that 
is, the politics of obedience under the new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) system.
Chapter 2, Kondo’s ‘Creating Majoritarian Democracy: Bharatiya Janata Party 
in the 2017 Legislative Assembly Election in Uttar Pradesh’, also analyse the rise 
of Hindu majoritarianism from different perspectives and methodologies, that is, 
by an election analysis. His work is based on solid statistical data analysis and 
explains the popularity of Narendra Modi, which is quite important for under-
standing the tyranny of the majority. Kondo specifies two factors that explain the 
victory of the BJP as follows.
The first factor is the anti-incumbency feeling. This cannot be ignored for 
the various communities that the previous governments did not attach a greater 
importance to. The core support communities have been, and are, the Jatav and 
Chamar in the case of Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), whereas in the 
case of the Samajwadi Party (SP), the Yadav and Muslim. Non-Jatav Dalits, 
namely, Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, and non-Yadav Other Backward 
Classes (OBCs) are said to have not benefitted enough under the BSP and SP 
governments, respectively. According to the preliminary report of a post-poll 
survey conducted by Lokniti, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 
non-Yadav OBCs supported the BJP more than the SP, and a fairly large number 
of non-Jatav Dalit voters went to the BJP. The feelings of relative deprivation 
among the weaker sections within the broad categories of Dalits or OBCs can be 
a reason for their changing their support for political parties in the economically 
backward Uttar Pradesh.
The second factor is the popularity of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. His 
popularity among the Hindu cannot be unimportant, since the 2017 legislative 
election could be understood as a continuation of the 2014 Lok Sabha election. In 
addition, the propagation of the party’s ideology “Hindutva” cannot be ignored. 
Several news outlets reported that workers of the BJP and its associate organiza-
tions, such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, propagated communal discourses 
among the Hindu. The combination of these factors and other pre-election contin-
gencies, such as a family feud in the SP, seem to have brought about the massive 
victory of BJP.
Based on these analyses, Kondo concludes that the ‘BJP is depending on 
“heterogeneous majority”, not “monolithic majority”’. To satisfy these hetero-
geneous social strata, the BJP government has to assign greater emphasis to its 
good governance and development agendas, which would make it easy for BJP to 
pursue its Hindutva agenda.
Then why is this kind of anti-Muslim feeling strong in India? How can we over-
come it? Chapter 3, Gottschalk’s ‘Practicing the Right to Indifference: Secularism, 
Toleration, and Islamophobia’, analyses the emergence of Islamophobia by 
comparing the case of India with the US and suggests embracing ‘the right to 
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indifference’. According to him, both India and the US have colonial experience 
under the British rule and share the specific form of secularism that operates 
within the rubric of ‘toleration’. This toleration, he sharply analyses, allows both 
for the embrace of certain religious identities as part of a national subjectivity and 
for the exclusion of others as incompatible.
For example, in the case of India, the British introduced their understanding of 
the Indian society that views ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ as mutually exclusive species 
of Indians who are also inherently antagonistic to each other. Importantly, the 
Indian leaders of the independence movement accepted this stereotyped view. 
Gandhi’s emphasis on ‘tolerance’ was based on Hinduism, which shows that even 
the Congress formulated a normative nationalist subjectivity using the ‘Indian 
qualities’ most associated with Hindus. In this context, Muslims were supposedly 
regarded as ‘non-Indians who represented a threat’, though Gandhi vigorously 
opposed such views. As in Britain and the US, Muslims and the Islamic traditions 
were negatively used to define the nation of ‘India’ by Hindus.
How can we tackle such anti-Muslim sentiment? Gottschalk proposes intro-
ducing ‘the right to indifference’, which is beyond ‘a right to difference’. He 
concludes that ‘[o]nly when their neighbour and governments practice not 
“toleration” but this indifference will pluralism be self-determined instead of 
majoritarian- and state-established’.
Last, Chapter 4, Farzana’s ‘State and Violence in Burma/Myanmar: The 
Rohingya Crisis and Its Implication for South and Southeast Asia’, extends the 
analysis of Islamophobia to Southeast Asia. Undergoing the process of democra-
tization, Myanmar still has a strong military presence, which has caused attacks 
on the Rohingya Muslim ethnic minority by the Buddhist majority in the Rakhine 
state of Myanmar. Their citizenship has been taken away through constitutional 
changes and has made the Rohingya stateless within their own country.
This particular structural inequality resulted in much brutal structural violence 
by the state to suppress the group’s right to speak and even the right to live. As 
reported by the United Nations team, approximately 420,000 Rohingya have been 
forced to enter into Bangladesh from the Rakhine state of Myanmar since August 
25, 2017. As in past forced migration, people are again fleeing to save their lives 
from arson, torture, arbitrary killing, gang rape, and other grave human rights 
violations by the military and other security and non-security forces in Myanmar. 
This situation will soon have regional implications with more refugees coming 
to India, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and other parts of the world, many by 
taking illegal routes, thus leading to human trafficking and social insecurity.
Farzana’s article investigates the current situation of the Rohingya crisis and 
its implications for South and South-East Asian regions. By using the theory of 
statelessness, it criticizes the state institution that creates a stateless community 
within its boundary. It argues that as a state, Myanmar again failed to realize that 
‘state unity’ cannot be achieved by violent compulsion; rather, it should be by 
respecting diversity and coexistence among diverse groups. Apparently, regional 
organizations such as South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation and 
Association of South-East Asian Nations have also failed to take actions against 
Myanmar to stop violence in the Rakhine state. Considering such harsh reality, 
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she concludes that the consequences of the Rohingya crisis will hinder peaceful 
development of South and Southeast Asia; therefore, it is imperative to revisit the 
root causes and find sustainable peaceful solutions to this issue.
As mentioned, these four chapters in Part I make contributions to understand-
ing the current oppression of religious minorities in terms of the relationships 
among democracy, state, and religion from various approaches.
Part II Democratization and social movements
For the last 20 years, democratization and the deepening of democracy in South 
Asia have been widely discussed. Various activities by social movements facil-
itate or hinder democratization in South Asian countries. Anti-discrimination 
movements by Dalits, women’s movements, and various ethnic movements 
have promoted the political participation of those who had been excluded from 
the public sphere. In India, Nepal, and other countries, movements demanding 
anti-corruption and “good governance” have attracted attention in recent years. 
However, exclusive social movements are also deeply involved in state power and 
have spread through grassroots support, such as Hindu nationalism in India and 
Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka. At a theoretical level, some take a positive 
stance in relation to the tradition of civil society and citizens’ movements in South 
Asia and its modern developments, making full use of transnational networks 
(e.g., Appadurai 2013). Conversely, others argue that in places such as South 
Asia, only a few elites can participate in ‘civil society’, while a vast majority of 
people who are not ‘citizens’ but ‘the population’ are targets of the government 
by the state. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate the concept of democracy 
afresh from various sites of practices in mass politics, including illegal acts, 
which are conducted from the position of “the governed” (e.g., Chatterjee 2004). 
Such problems are also related to the issue of what patterns of sociality and inter-
action democracy was supposed to entail in post-colonial South Asia (e.g., Hull 
2010). In this section, we examine specific cases of social movements from India, 
Nepal and Pakistan. They involve Dalit and ethnic movements, large-scale phi-
lanthropy, and urban cleanliness campaigns. From their different perspectives, 
they all engage with the issues of civil society and political society, as well as the 
changing patterns of sociality and interaction in contemporary South Asia.
The first two chapters in this part directly engage with the issue of the interface 
between the state and social movements. They are interactions between repre-
sentative and procedural democracies as an institution, on one hand, and social 
movements that seek to put forth demands that tend to fall outside of the nor-
mal procedures of representation, on the other hand. The classical forms of these 
movements are ‘direct action’, involving demonstrations, strikes, road blockages, 
and so forth. However, the two chapters identify new developments in these 
social movements.
Chapter 5 by Maya Suzuki discusses recent developments in the Dalit move-
ment in India. In particular, she focuses on ‘judicial activism’ within Dalit move-
ments. With the increase in educational, economic, and political empowerment, 
there is an increasing number of Dalit activists in the legal profession. This is 
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true even for the Balmikis, the focus of the ethnography, who have been socially 
and economically disadvantaged even among the Dalit communities. The new 
generation of Dalit lawyer-activists say that they are inspired by the great Dalit 
leader of the 20th century B. R. Ambedkar, who was a lawyer himself. They seek 
to improve the conditions of Dalits, not necessarily through mass movements, but 
through filing Public Interest Litigations in the court. Suzuki relates this to a more 
general tendency of ‘judicialization of politics’ in contemporary India. This ten-
dency has attracted some criticisms, suspecting it of having elite biases. Suzuki’s 
description of the self-understandings of the lawyer-activists reveals that they 
feel that they should be ‘role models’ for others in the same community and thus 
behave as exemplary citizens, forsaking ‘vices’ such as drinking and meat-eat-
ing, which are prevalent in the community. This chapter thus engages with the 
issue of civility and democratic politics mentioned earlier. Moreover, through 
her ethnography, Suzuki shows that a more classical issue of modernization and 
sanskritization, raised decades ago by M. N. Srinivas (1969), is still alive within 
contemporary social movements.
Chapter 6 by Lokranjan Parajuli surveys the trajectories of major social 
movements in Nepal between 2007 and 2012. With the success of the massive 
democracy movement and the conclusion of a decade-long civil war in 2006, 
there was a large upsurge in the number of social movements making demands 
on the Nepali state. These movements were spearheaded by ethnic and indige-
nous groups demanding recognition and their share of resources from the state. 
There were also movements by Dalits and other ‘backward’ classes. There was 
a Muslim movement. Last, there were movements led by Brahmans and Chettris 
(Kshatriyas), widely considered to be the dominant members of society, defen-
sively demanding that they too should be recognized as ‘indigenous’ peoples of 
Nepal. All these movements employed classical protest genres, such as protest 
rallies, sit-ins, bandh (strikes), and chakka jam (road blockades). Moreover, all 18 
movements that Parajuli surveys were deemed ‘successful’ by the activists them-
selves. The reason is that all made the government sign ‘agreements’ acknowl-
edging their demands. One might be tempted to explain this using the notion of 
a ‘weak state’—that is, the Nepali state was weak because it was in a transitional 
period and had no choice but to yield. However, Parajuli argues otherwise. The 
agreements that the Nepali state signed were vaguely worded with regard to the 
core demands of the movements and did not lead to substantial action on the part 
of the state, while the activists claimed their victory and withdrew the protest 
activities. The state was not ‘weak’ but ‘clever’. The chapter thus presents a new 
mode of interaction within the political society in Nepal that does not appear to 
lead to substantial changes. This should also make the readers wonder how much 
of the judicial activism in India described in the preceding chapter leads to sub-
stantial change or the gaining of only a ‘formal’ victory.
In Chapter 7, Tahir Kamran discusses the life and work of Abdul Sattar Edhi, 
one of the most prominent philanthropic figures in Pakistan. Edhi, who was born 
in 1928 in Gujarat, India, established the Edhi Foundation, the largest welfare 
network in Pakistan in the 1950s. The foundation is a home for more than 6,000 
destitute, runaway, and mentally ill people, and it provides free dispensary and 
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hospital services to over 1,000,000 persons annually. The organization has held 
the Guinness record for the world’s ‘largest volunteer ambulance organization’, 
operating a fleet of over 400 ambulances. Abdul Edhi was a thoroughly mod-
ern person who brought to the poor and destitute modern medical care for free. 
Kamran describes how Edhi was influenced by socialist ideologies from his 
youth. However, Kamran notes that Edhi read Marxist writings alongside the 
history of Islam. Thus, for Edhi, the history of Islam also showed the struggle 
between the haves and the have-nots. He found in its history the true reform-
ers who renounced their own comforts and never sought to accumulate wealth 
on their own behalf. Kamran argues that Edhi’s simple lifestyle was that of a 
Sufi and that the hospices that he created were a modern-day reincarnation of 
pre-colonial dargahs (shrines of saints that also served as hospices). In this way, 
this chapter engages the debate on civility and civil society in modern South Asia. 
For Chatterjee, civil society is a notion that is developed in the West and has its 
ultimate root in Protestant Christianity. It cannot be applied to the vast majority 
of the world’s population, whose subjectivities were formed outside that Western 
tradition. However, Kamran insists that Edhi embodied the values and the life-
style of a Sufi. It is by embodying this traditional value that Edhi could transcend 
parochial religious divides that characterize so much of modern South Asia and 
become a true humanist. Karman’s emphasis on virtues, such as ‘simplicity’, 
associated with Sufism also contributes to the discussion of modes of sociality 
that are respectable and effective in modern South Asia.
Chapter 8, in a way, ties all the threads of the preceding discussions together, 
as it engages with the problems of what it means to be a ‘citizen’ in contemporary 
India and how those modes of being a citizen entail being ‘political’ or ‘apoliti-
cal’. In this chapter, Yoko Taguchi describes a case of citizens’ participation in the 
improvement of the urban environment. She points out that contemporary public–
private partnerships are characterized by an emphasis on ‘depoliticization’ and 
market-oriented reforms. She argues that this reflects a tension between ‘political 
society’ and ‘civil society’, whereby ‘civil society’ often decries the corruption 
and nepotism of ‘political society’ by upholding the logic of the free market and 
promoting its own positions as ‘apolitical’. This chapter examines the practices 
and effects of these ‘apolitical’ politics of citizens in relation to urban space and 
personhood. She locates the conception of citizen participation within broader 
middle-class activism in contemporary India. Contrary to pro-poor social move-
ments, this trend has been criticized as facilitating increased control over the 
city’s public space. Criticism of the new middle class in India, in turn, employs 
the dualism of the ‘global’ (colonialism and predatory capitalism) and the ‘local’ 
(the resistance of the subaltern). Taguchi argues that, within this framework, mid-
dle-class urban activism appears to represent the irresistible power of world-class 
aesthetics and the global logic of neo-liberalism oppressing the local subalterns. 
However, she argues, when examined closely, practices of civic activism do not 
fit the dichotomous framework. Through the case study of Mumbai citizens’ 
groups called Advanced Locality Management, she explores how concepts and 
practices of public and private spaces are negotiated when different realms of 
power and control are entangled. Taguchi shows that while the new type of urban 
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development was informed by the ‘global’ notion of the public and private, it was 
also entwined with the ‘local’ notion of inside and outside. She argues that citizen 
participation in urban development, despite its apolitical appearance, is a site in 
which notions of public/private as well as of the sense of self and proper sociality 
are actively negotiated in contemporary South Asia.
Part III How does a conflict end?
How is the end of conflict attained in a society that has experienced civil war or 
large-scale violence among groups? In the ‘post-conflict’ society, how are violence 
and those lost to violence remembered and mourned? How are the illegal acts in 
the conflict period treated and how are the damages to the victims redressed? In 
addition, how is a society divided by the conflict restored and reorganized? In the 
standardized notion of ‘post-conflict’ used by international organizations such 
as the United Nations, codified according to the perspective of a peace-build-
ing intervention, the post-conflict period begins with a negotiated settlement of 
conflict. Its end is marked by the successful conduct of post-conflict elections 
and the establishment of liberal democratic state institutions. Sara Shneiderman 
and Amanda Snellinger (2014) have criticized this bureaucratic periodization that 
rarely reflects complex local realities. The chapters in this last section seek to 
present a complex picture of ‘post-conflict’ situations that goes beyond the sim-
plified conflict/peace dichotomy.
In Sri Lanka, the civil war between government forces and Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1983 to 2009 ended with the government military put-
ting the LTTE to rout. The Sri Lankan government deems it a successful example 
of war against terrorism. The government prohibits the mourning of LTTE com-
batants while attempting to unify the people by mourning the (selected) war dead 
with memorial ceremonies and the construction of monuments led by the state. 
The government seems to be attempting to achieve restoration by ‘top-down’ 
reconciliation and development programmes. In Nepal, which experienced armed 
conflict between Maoists and the government from 1996 to 2006, peace was real-
ized in the form of democratization and abolishment of the monarchy. However, 
similar to Sri Lanka, it is difficult to say that the procedures of transitional justice 
are truly reflective of the voices of diverse victims. The new constitution prom-
ulgated in 2015 has also sparked fierce protest movements. In Bangladesh, the 
Jumma people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) have been progressively mar-
ginalized since the time of the British colonial rule when they were first defined 
as ‘primitive’ tribes. After the partition, between 1957 and 1963, at least 54,000 
acres of CHT were flooded by a hydroelectric dam project. After the independ-
ence of Bangladesh in 1971, the denial of autonomy of the indigenous people by 
the government led to the formation among the Jumma people of the political 
party called Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) in 1973, with 
a military wing called Shanti Bahini (Peace Brigade). The government placed 
CHT under military occupation while encouraging the migration and settlement 
of Bengalis into the area. Violent conflict continued until the signing of a peace 
accord between PCJSS and the Bangladesh government in 1997, but there are 
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still many unsettled issues. In India, religious and caste conflicts have occurred 
frequently since the 1980s, causing heavy casualties and internally displacing 
people. Although the social and political rise of lower castes and its suppression 
by upper castes has developed into caste conflicts, Hindu ideologists insist on the 
unity of the nation beyond castes, partly by ‘othering’ Muslims and Christians. 
Under the current administration, India aims at an authoritarian rule led by the 
majority (caste Hindus) and top-down economic development. The three chapters 
in this section concern situations after violent conflicts in Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Sri Lanka. Each chapter, in its own manner, goes beyond the simplified dichoto-
mization of conflict and peace mentioned earlier.
Chapter 9 by Ranjan Saha Partha on everyday life in CHT in Bangladesh seeks 
to problematize a series of dichotomies, including conflict versus peace and 
Jumma versus Bengali. As mentioned, violent conflict in CHT formally ended 
in 1997, with the signing of the peace treaty between the political party PCJSS 
and the Bengali government. However, Partha argues, the peace accord failed to 
address the basic demands of the Jumma, which included regional autonomy, 
constitutional recognition of the indigenous Jumma people, restoration of land 
rights, withdrawal of the military, and withdrawal of the Bengali settlers from the 
CHT. Additionally, the accord contains no mention of the human rights abuses 
during the armed conflict. This has led, among other things, to conflict within the 
Jumma. The United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) emerged as an alternative 
to the PCJSS, questioning the latter’s failure to secure the rights of the Jumma 
people. The PCJSS and UPDF compete with each other, and ordinary Jummas are 
caught in between and forced to live in fear. The Bengalis in CHT are not homo-
geneous either. There are Bengalis who resettled through official programmes 
and those who resettled voluntarily or without legal documentation. The accord 
does not address the latter, and there is an increasing number of Bengali organi-
zations to express their respective demands. Ranjan argues that the continuation 
of conflicts in everyday life in CHT is due to the failure of the peace accord to 
address the root causes of the conflict, which he traces back to the colonial era.
In the next chapter, Tatsuro Fujikura also discusses a situation in which a peace 
settlement failed to address the grievances of a party to the conflict. The chapter 
discusses the fate of the Tharuhat movement that demanded an ‘identity-based’ 
federal state in the western plains of Nepal. According to some of the contem-
porary political discourses in Nepal, ‘identity politics’, which has gained strong 
momentum after the conclusion of the armed conflict in 2006 and which threat-
ened national integrity, has been defeated in recent years. After the promulgation 
of the new constitution in 2015 and with the conduct of local and federal elec-
tions, the key words seem to have shifted from ‘identity’ and ‘class’ to ‘stabil-
ity’, ‘development’, and ‘prosperity’. Given this background, Fujikura focuses 
on some of the recent moments in the Tharuhat movement, including the Tikapur 
incident in August 2015, in which eight police officers were killed during a large 
demonstration, and the actions of some of the Tharu activists who now live under 
the new constitution which they once deemed so ‘unacceptable’ that they had 
to burn it. The chapter tries to appreciate what is at stake in the actions that the 
Tharu activists take in the context of a federal setup that they did not wish for. 
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In trying to interpret Tharu activists’ attempts to insert their traditional institu-
tion of self-governance called barghar into the formal local governance system, 
Fujikura uses an expanded conception of ‘mediation’ as proposed by William 
Mazzarella (2006). This conception of mediation includes not only attempts to 
harmonize diverging interests but also, more broadly, social practices that reduce 
particularities of diverse experience and render them provisionally commensura-
ble and communicable and, in doing so, become the basis of self-consciousness 
and desire.
Finally, in the last chapter, Pradeep Jeganathan grapples with the issue of loss 
and reimagination. He focuses on maps as objects that intersect with the lived 
worlds of migrants and on the notion of region as imbricated with migration. 
He conceptualizes the intensity and horizon of migrants in lost and reimagined 
objects as melancholia, engaging with and expanding on Freud’s notions of the 
work of mourning and melancholia. Jeganathan begins with a personal account of 
his first visit to a dwelling of his great-grandfather in Jaffna, on the northern tip of 
Sri Lanka. This is followed by a discussion of the history of the Jaffna Tamil Vel-
lalar community from the 17th century to the 1950s. The dominant status of the 
Vellalar was enhanced under both the Dutch and the British colonial rule. Many of 
them eventually became prestigious civil servants as well as professionals in the 
fields of medicine, law, and engineering and migrated all over the island, includ-
ing the Sinhala South. In the 1950s, the Sinhala leader Bandaranaike started the 
‘Sinhala only’ campaign, which gave rise to two competing linguistic national-
isms in Sri Lanka, and the Vellalar were folded into the idea of ‘Tamil-speaking 
people’, occluding caste and class distinctions. The violence of this competition 
culminated in the massive pogrom of July 1983, and a long civil war ensued. The 
war ended by the Sri Lankan armed forces routing the Liberation Army of Tamil 
Eelam in May 2009. Jeganathan explicates the divisive maps created through the 
violent conflict by discussing three fictional characters from literature and film. 
One shows the impossibility of life for a Tamil who is neither a separatist nor a 
militant in the Sinhala South. Another concerns the viability of a Sinhala–Tamil 
marriage in the post-conflict time, made impossible by prior atrocities during the 
conflict. The third shows a Tamil asylum seeker in France who acts out a repressed 
violence in a Parisian neighbourhood. Jeganathan discusses these examples as 
well as different maps that were produced of Tamil Eelam. He considers them in 
terms of the ‘work of melancholia,’ which is also a form of ‘inhabitation’ in this 
world (Das 1997). These maps show the horizons of a person’s psychic and social 
investments in what is lost after a violent conflict.
Note
 1 Protest demonstrations took place throughout India following the assassination of Gauri 
Lankesh, a journalist and social activist who had argued against Hindu supremacism. 
See ‘Activist in Mumbai Protest Scribe Gauri Lankesh’s Murder’, The Hindu, 7 September 
2017. For reference, https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/mumbai/activists-protest-
scribes-murder/article19632713.ece, last accessed on 20 January 2020). And also see 
Siddiqui (2017) for other cases.
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Part I
Democracy, state and religion

1 Democracy and vigilantism
The spread of Gau Rakshaks in India
Kazuya Nakamizo
The question: Indian democracy in crisis
Indian democracy is in crisis. Almost 30 years ago, Atul Kohli, an eminent polit-
ical scientist, pointed out in his Democracy and Discontent that India was facing 
a crisis of governability (Kohli 1992). What we are witnessing now is not only a 
crisis of governability but also a crisis of democracy: the suppression of freedom 
of speech via the arrest of social activists who are critical of the government,1 the 
oppression of freedom of thought and creed via control of educational institutions 
and the media,2 and the violation of the separation of powers by interference in 
the judiciary.3 A human rights advocate describes these actions of the present 
government as worse than Indira Gandhi’s declaration of a state of emergency 
in 1975.4
Under this egregious situation, the activities of vigilante groups are gaining 
attention. In particular, Gau Rakshaks (cow protection groups) lynch Muslims, 
sometimes based only on rumours that they slaughter cows and eat beef.5 As 
Figure 1.1 shows, the number of violent cow-related incidents increased from 
3 to 37 between 2014 and 2017, which is a change resulting from the accession to 
power of the Narendra Modi–led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) govern-
ment after the 2014 general election.
The emergence of vigilante groups, however, is not new in the history of 
post-independence India. In 1967, a group of radical leftists started a land grab 
movement at Naxalbari in West Bengal, which they believed would be the begin-
ning of a violent revolution sweeping away poverty, inequality, and injustice. 
Referred to widely as Naxalites, their violent tactics and militarized actions 
spread to other regions within India. In response, non-state actors, such as land-
lords, formed their own private armies to defend their land ownership and pres-
tige and defeat the ‘Naxalite menace’. Perhaps the most notorious of these private 
armies was that of the Ranvir Sena, which was formed in the north Indian state 
of Bihar in 1994.
However, recent vigilante groups are distinct in character from these earlier 
militant groups of the 20th century. In the 21st century, vigilantism now appears 
to have created new relationships with the state by not only drawing on the latter 
for support but also increasingly targeting the Indian constitution and pressing for 
extra-legal actions.
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How can we understand this changing character of vigilantism? What does 
it mean for Indian democracy? These are the questions I seek to explore in this 
chapter by examining the development of vigilantism in India.
Arguments on vigilantism in India
Before discussing the development of vigilantism, we need to define the term vig-
ilantism. Defining vigilantism is quite a difficult task due to its complex, changing 
characteristics and varied range of activities, as noted by Ray Abrahams (1998: 
6–10). After carefully examining this definitional problem, Abrahams, an anthro-
pologist who pioneered work on vigilantism, defined vigilante and vigilantism as 
follows:
‘vigilante’ and ‘vigilantism’ have seemed to me ‘ideally’ to involve an organ-
ized attempt by a group of ‘ordinary citizens’ to enforce norms and maintain 
law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resort to violence, in the 
perceived absence of effective official state action through police and courts.
(Abrahams 2007: 423)
Figure 1.1 Cow-related hate crime in India (2012–18).
Source: Compiled by author based on IndiaSpend database, quated in Alison Saldanha, 
‘Cow-Related Hate Crimes Peaked in 2017, 86% of Those Killed Muslim’, The Wire, 8 
December 2017, https://thewire.in/203103/cow-vigilantism-violence-2017-muslims-hate-
crime/ (last accessed on 8 December 2017) for 2012-17 data and Varun B. Krishnan, ‘The 
Cow vigilante menace: U.P. records highest number of incidents’, The Hindu, 5 December 
2018, https://www.thehindu.com/data/data-point-the-cow-vigilante-menace/article25666 
768.ece (last accessed on 19 January 2020). Date for December 2018 is up to 4 December 
2018. Articles of the Wire and the Hindu are based on same data set which was published 
by IndiaSpend. Now this data set is deleted from IndiaSpend. See, ‘FactChecker pulls 
down hate crime database, IndiaSpend editor Samar Halarnkar resigns’, Scroll.in, 12 
September  2019. https://scroll.in/latest/937076/factchecker-pulls-down-hate-crime-
watch-database-sister-websites-editor-resigns (last accessed on 19 January 2020). 
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Emphasizing this last point, he added, ‘Vigilantism cannot exist alone but 
only alongside and, typically, on the frontiers—structural and/or cultural—of 
state power’ (Abrahams 2007: 423). In short, vigilantism can be described as (1) 
involving ‘ordinary citizens’, (2) taking place through organized actions and often 
violent means, (3) enforcing norms and maintaining law and order on behalf of 
citizens’ communities, and (4) being situated on the frontiers of state power. This 
chapter basically follows his definitions of vigilante and vigilantism.
In India, the emergence of these militant vigilante groups has been a subject of 
considerable academic debate and discussion. The most compelling arguments, 
however, have sought to suggest that violence has been a result of the failure of 
the state to perform its expected roles, which I would prefer to term as ‘state 
deficit’.6 In brief, state deficit means that the state fails to deliver the political 
goods of security, like the protection of life and property, economic welfare, 
and basic infrastructure like health services, educational institutions, and social 
welfare schemes – whether by design or otherwise. For instance, the emergence 
of Naxalite/Maoist movements could be potentially traced to the Indian states’ 
inability to meet a number of popular expectations and responsibilities to solve 
socio-economic problems, such as actions disregarding the social oppression of 
disempowered castes, aggravating the economic oppression of marginal commu-
nities by not implementing land reforms, and failing to implement meaningful 
schemes to promote economic development, in addition to the disinterest of par-
liamentary parties in solving these problems (Louis 2002; Banerjee 2006; Gupta 
2006; Mohanty 2006; Sagar 2006; Singh 2006).
The links between such kinds of state deficit frameworks and growth in 
anti-Naxalite/Maoist vigilantism was also suggested in studies analysing the 
role and emergence of landlord militias in Bihar in the 1980s. Prasad’s excel-
lent work on the subject, in fact, revealed how the prevalence of semi-feudal 
agricultural relations in Bihar was not solved due to the inaction of the state 
government to implement land reform laws (Prasad 1987). In a subsequent study, 
Kolhi illustrated how the declining capacity of political parties, especially the 
once-dominant Congress Party, further aggravated the political violence involv-
ing militant vigilante groups in the region (Kohli 1992: 205–237). Kumar’s 
(2008: 170–171) analysis of the Ranvir Sena similarly follows the state deficit 
framework.
However, recent vigilante groups have characteristics that are markedly different 
from those of past militant vigilante groups in the 20th century. In the 21st century, 
these vigilante groups appear to be acquiring their momentum and strength from 
tacit governmental support. That is, rather than state deficit, we are now witnessing 
a reversal in the sense that vigilante groups in India are increasingly drawing their 
impetus from state support. The Salwa Judum (Purification Hunt), for example, 
was organized by a local member of the state legislative assembly and had the 
strong support of the Indian state. The recent Gau Rakshaks have a similarly close 
relationship with the state machinery, such as the ruling parties at both the central 
and state levels and the police. Recent vigilante groups, in other words, appear to 
have emerged not only to fill the vacuum created by state deficit but also to act as 
de facto ‘agents of the state’. This is the new tendency in the history of militant 
vigilante groups in India. Let us next examine their development in detail.
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Development of militant vigilante groups
Typology of militant vigilante groups
First, I classify these militant groups into four categories using two indicators: 
their relationship with the state and the degree of their ideological commitment. 
The relationship with the state has two directions: ‘strong or agent of the state’ 
and ‘weak or hostile relationship with the state’. The degree of ideological com-
mitment also has two directions: ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ (Figure 1.2).
Gau Rakshaks are located in the first quadrant, that is, the ‘strong or agent of 
the state and strong ideological commitment’ quadrant. The second quadrant, 
that is, the ‘weak or hostile relationship with the state and strong ideological 
commitment’ quadrant, includes organizations such as the Maoists/Naxalites. In 
the third quadrant, the Ranvir Sena is the typical case, having a ‘weak or hos-
tile relationship with the state and weak ideological commitment’. In the fourth 
quadrant, that is, ‘strong or agent of the state and weak ideological commitment’, 
the typical example is the Sarwa Judam, which was formed by a local Congress 
leader and was supported by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 
Chhattisgarh to crush the Maoists. First, I want to explain the Maoist movements 
in the second quadrant, then the Ranvir Sena in the third quadrant, Sarwa Judam 
in the fourth quadrant, and, finally, Gau Rakshaks in the first quadrant based on 
their chronological order to show the changing characteristics of vigilantism.
Maoist/Naxalite movements
Maoist movements may arguably be regarded as militant vigilante groups. 
According to Abrahams’s definition, Maoist movements fulfil the requirements 
of (2) using violent means and (4) being situated on the frontiers of state power; 
however, we need to consider the requirements of (1) subject and (3) purpose.
Figure 1.2 Classification of militant groups in India.
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Regarding the subject of such movements, the activists in Maoist movements 
are literally not ordinary citizens. Abrahams repeatedly reminds us that his defi-
nition concerns ideal types and that his analysis of vigilantism includes polit-
ical activities in the case of South Africa (Abrahams 1998: 90); therefore, we 
can include Maoists in his definition. Regarding the purpose of their activities, 
Maoist movements are revolutionary movements that aim to realize justice in 
India, which has severe poverty and inequality. In this sense, their aim is not to 
protect existing norms or to maintain law and order but instead can be interpreted 
as realising new norms for an ideal society. In this respect, we find commonality 
with Abrahams’s definition. Moreover, in practice, Alpa Shah reveals that the 
activities of Maoist movements include vigilante actions based on a study of 
the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), a Maoist group (Shah 2007: 295–296).
Maoist movements started as Naxalite movements in the late 1960s. In West 
Bengal, the Indian National Congress lost the assembly election held in 1967, and 
the United Front government was established and included the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist; hereafter CPM) as one of its main components. The leader of 
the CPM, Hare Krishna Konar, who came into office as the minister in charge of 
land reform, presented a proactive policy promoting land reform. CPM radicals 
responded by forming farmer committees in the Naxalbari area of the Darjeeling 
district and began a redistribution of agricultural lands. At first the United Front 
government asked the radicals to strictly observe legal procedures, the govern-
ment eventually changed direction and began suppressing them when the radicals 
rejected mediation and escalated their activities. The radicals formed the Com-
munist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) to resist this attempt at suppression, and 
as a result, the CPM was split. Their movement was called the Naxalite move-
ment, which takes its name from the starting location of the movement (Louis 
2002: 51–56).
The Naxalite movement has existed since that time. The Naxalites, as with all rad-
ical leftist movements, have repeatedly been beset by the development of very com-
plicated competing factions based on differences in ideology and strategy.7 Those 
factions that still exist as the main groups in the movement are as follows: first, the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist and Leninist) Liberation (hereafter ML); sec-
ond, the Communist Party of India (Maoist; hereafter, Maoist); and, finally, other 
parties that are associated with the CPI (ML) (Mohanty 2006: 3165-3167).
Focusing on these movements’ strategy and organizational form, we can divide 
the stages of development into three phases (Louis 2002: 4–8; Bhatia 2005: 1536–
1537; Mohanty 2006: 3165–3167; Singh 2006: 163). The first phase extends from 
the armed uprising in 1967 to the end of the Emergency in 1977. During this 
time, the strategy of ‘annihilation of class enemies’, in which violent struggle was 
the main activity, was the mainstream position. The second phase extended from 
1977 to 1998. It was during this period that the ML switched to an electoral strat-
egy. On another front, the MCC and People’s War Group (PWG) continued during 
this time to develop the violent revolutionary strategy pioneered in the first period. 
The third period extends from 1998 to the present. During this time, the Commu-
nist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Party Unity (CPI-ML [PU]) merged with 
the PWG, and other parties that pursue a violent revolutionary strategy also grad-
ually merged and reinforced the ongoing militant struggle. In 2004, the MCC and 
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PWG merged and formed a new party, the Communist Party of India (Maoist). 
The faction pursuing the strategy of violent revolution was revived by this merger.
In these Maoist/Naxalite movements, there are two characteristics of note. 
First, they have strong ideological commitments. The strategies and styles of 
these movements are basically based on interpretations of communist ideologies, 
which mainly explain the internal conflicts among Maoist/Naxalite movements. 
As Shah points out in the case of the MCC in Jharkhand, support for the MCC is 
not necessarily ideologically bounded; rather, protection from them is expected 
to capture state resources (Shah 2007: 310). Although it is real, it is also certain 
that activists have a firm ideological commitment.
Second, their relationship with the state has been hostile in the case of Mao-
ist, although, in some cases, the situation is more complex. Indian governments, 
regardless of whether they are central/state governments ruled by the Congress, 
BJP, or other parties, have suppressed Maoist movements in a very harsh manner 
using extra-judiciary measures, such as ‘crackdowns’, ‘encounters’, ‘enforced 
disappearances’, and the employment of special police officers (SPOs).8 Oper-
ation Green Hunt, which started in 2009, is a typical case of severe oppression 
by the state (Sundar 2016: 16). On the other hand, Shah (2007) made clear the 
cooperative relationship between the lower strata of state machinery and the MCC 
in the informal economy and politics. The MCC engaged in business extortion, 
and local politicians used the influence of the MCC for their electoral victories in 
Jharkhand. These kinds of symbiotic relationships are not necessarily applicable 
to all areas of Maoist movements, but we need to keep these complex relation-
ships between such movements and the state in mind. Additionally, in the case 
of the ML, their relationship with the state is not as harsh as that of Maoist due to 
their base in legislative bodies. However, they are generally unable to expect gov-
ernment protection because of their critical stances against sitting governments. 
Thus, Maoist/Naxalite movements can be located in the second quadrant.
Ranvir Sena
The Ranvir Sena was formed in 1994 in the village of Belaur in the Bhojpur district 
in one of the poorest states, Bihar.9 Using the name of Ranvir Choudhary, who was 
a legendary fighter against Rajput landlords in the 19th century, they claimed to be 
an army composed of upper castes. From 1995 to 2005, the Ranvir Sena massa-
cred almost 300 lower castes and poor farmers (Kumar 2008: 188, Table 8). It fits 
Abrahams’s ideal definition mentioned earlier. How was the Ranvir Sena formed?
We can point out three factors for the emergence of the Ranvir Sena. First, as 
a precondition, there was harsh oppression of lower-caste farmers by upper-caste 
Bhumihar landlords in Belaur before 1990. These lower-caste farmers suffered 
humiliation, including violence in several cases, but they did not have any means 
of expressing their anger.
Second, the radical leftist party, the ML, succeeded in uniting and mobilizing 
these lower-caste farmers, who began protesting against oppression by upper-
caste Bhumihar landlords. In 1994, they held several demonstrations against 
the misdeeds of Bhumihar landlords by blocking roads. More important, they 
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succeeded in raising agricultural wages during the peak season of transplant-
ing in July 1994, which caused Bhumihar landlords to perceive them as grave 
threats. After this negotiation of the wage increase, Bhumihar landlords beat 
an ML leader who had led protest movements among the lower castes since 
1990, which resulted in clashes between lower-caste farmers and Bhumihar 
landlords.
Finally, and most important, the state government at the time was somehow 
neutral in this conflict. In Bihar, radical political change occurred with the for-
mation of the Laloo Prasad Yadav–led Janata Dal government. Under his gov-
ernment, the backward castes, especially the upper-backward castes, succeeded 
in gaining and consolidating political power in place of upper castes, who had 
enjoyed political dominance under the Congress governments since independ-
ence (Nakamizo 2020a: 233–336). Laloo Yadav himself has expressed sympa-
thy for the cause of lower castes, stating in the assembly that ‘if the agricultural 
labourers and landless grab land, police will not fire at them’ (Louis 2002: 139). 
As if to honour this sympathy, local police did not actively intervene to support 
upper castes in this fight, which would have been unimaginable under the previ-
ous Congress regime. Upper castes, feeling very insecure, then decided to form 
their own private army to defend themselves. In an interview, the commander 
Brahmeshwar Singh told me, ‘The police under Laloo’s control would not protect 
us; that’s why we had to protect ourselves’.10 One Dalit (scheduled caste, for-
merly untouchable) villager also told me, ‘The Rashtriya Janata Dal was there for 
the Yadavs, and the ML was there for us. There was nothing for the Bhumihars, 
and that’s why they created the Ranvir Sena’.11 We can confirm that the Ranvir 
Sena was formed from this kind of threat perception. In its perception, the state 
is not completely reliable, and for this reason, the Ranvir Sena was formed—to 
realize its own ‘justice’ by killing lower-caste farmers, thereby filling the power 
vacuum within the state.
Considering these three factors of emergence, we can point out two charac-
teristics of the Ranvir Sena. First, its ideological commitment is weak. It was 
formed in opposition to the menace of radical leftist parties, which means that 
the organization is defensive by nature. It is said that most members of the Ranvir 
Sena are criminal gang members who are employed by upper-caste landlords. 
According to my interview, some members of the Ranvir Sena worked as the 
private security guards of apartment houses in normal times and were then sum-
moned to perpetrate attacks and to kill poor farmers at the requests of landlords.12 
In my interview, the organization’s commander, Brahmeshwar Singh, claimed 
that the Ranvir Sena is fighting for the cause of farmers, but it does not have a 
clear ideology of its own.
Second, the organization’s relationship with the state is not as hostile as that 
of the Maoists, but it is weak. As the process of formation shows, the Ranvir 
Sena was formed as a reaction to the inaction of the state. It had been acting for 
an extraordinarily long period of eight years from 1994 to 2002 when its com-
mander, Brahmeshwar Singh, was arrested, but its longevity was not the result of 
tacit governmental support. Rather, it was the result of the ineffectiveness of the 
state, as the Laloo government had always been severely criticized for the ‘jungle 
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raj’, that is, the lack of ‘law and order’. The case of the Ranvir Sena fits well with 
the state deficit thesis, which can be positioned in the third quadrant.
Salwa Judam
Salwa Judam (Purification Hunt) was formed in June 2005 to crush the Maoist 
movements in the Dantewada district in the central state of Chhattisgarh.13 
According to Nandini Sundar, who has performed thorough and extensive work 
on this topic, preparation for the formation of Salwa Judam can be traced back to 
early 2005, and its original form can be found in the Jan Jagran Abhiyan (Public 
Awakening Campaign) of 1990–1991. Jan Jagran Abhiyan was a ‘local resistance 
group’ fighting Maoist that beat sangham members (members of village-level 
organizations set up by Maoist), raped women, and forced the sangham members 
to surrender. However, there is a dispute about whether it was created by the 
police or as an initiative of the local village elite. Following the BJP-led NDA 
central government’s policy of forming a ‘local resistance group’ in 2003–2004, 
the Chhattisgarh government decided to revive Jan Jagran Abhiyan under the 
cover of a new name: Salwa Judam (Sundar 2016: 91–99).
To annihilate Maoist, Salwa Judam employed every means possible: beating, 
killing, and raping sangham members and even tribal people who did not have 
any relationship with the Maoists; burning the entire villages of sangham mem-
bers; and forcing them to migrate to ‘camps’ to sever their supposed connec-
tions with Maoist (Sundar 2006: 3187–3188, 2016; Chenoy and Chenoy 2010: 
101–104). This ‘strategic hamletting’ originated in the ‘New Villages’ strategy 
against the Communist Party of Malaya during the British Malaya period. Salwa 
Judam continued its activity until the Supreme Court declared that it was illegal 
and unconstitutional to deploy tribal youth as SPOs and ordered their immediate 
disarming.14 After this order, the Chhattisgarh state government changed its name 
and has been continuing its counter-Maoist operations in different forms.
Salwa Judam has two characteristics. First, although the government claimed 
that it was a ‘spontaneous, self-initiated people’s movement against the Naxalites’, 
it was organized by the police and politicians (Sundar 2016: 15–16). Congress 
leader Mahendra Karma, who was later killed by Maoists in 2013,15 was widely 
considered the leader of Salwa Judam, and then BJP chief minister Raman Singh 
and his government supported it. BJP ministers and Mahendra Karma held many 
public meetings and rallies as a form of Jan Jagran Abhiyans to target Maoist 
(Chenoy and Chenoy 2010: 101; Sundar 2016: 16, 103). According to Chenoy 
and Chenoy (2010: 105), ‘Local officials admitted off the record that it was the 
state government that armed people to fight militants and protect themselves’. 
The deputy superintendent of the police testified that they gave the arms licenses. 
The district collectors also confirmed governmental support for Salwa Judam by 
sponsoring and training SPOs (Chenoy and Chenoy 2010: 104–105).
Adding to the testimonies described earlier, the state-supported Salwa Judam 
used a variety of means, as Sundar’s study (2006, 2016) reveals. Salwa Judam’s 
operations were accompanied by police and paramilitary forces. The government 
set up camps for tribes as mentioned in the activities of Salwa Judam and allotted 
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a sizable budget to their operation.16 Their attacks on villages were thoroughly 
and comprehensively organized. Based on the scope and the impunity of Salwa 
Judam, the organization is a de facto government agent; indeed, its members 
constitute ‘death squads’, in Abrahams’s (1998: 122–136) term, even though they 
pretend to be ordinary citizens. Thus, its relationship with the state is remarkably 
different from that of the Ranvir Sena. The state deficit thesis does not fit in the 
case of Salwa Judam.
Second, regarding ideology, it does not have a clear ideology. It was formed 
against the Maoist movements, which is the entire reason for its formation. 
Similar to the Ranvir Sena in Bihar, it is defensive by nature.
Considering these characteristics, Salwa Judam can be placed in the third quad-
rant. As Sundar (2016: 345) rightly pointed out, ‘[t]he biggest problem in Indian 
law, however, is that the masterminds of the Salwa Judam strategy — both at the 
Centre and in the state — cannot be held to account for command responsibility’. 
This evasion of responsibility is exactly the main purpose of the organization.
At best, however, Salwa Judam can be conceptualized as a local experiment 
of sorts that was only relevant to the Chhattisgarh state. As Sundar (2016: 16) 
pointed out, state-sponsored vigilantism has spread throughout all of India under 
the current Modi government.
Gau Rakshaks
The Gau Rakshaks represent a new form of vigilantism that has a tacit and strong 
relationship with the state. Their main aim is to oppress the Muslim minority and 
secure their obedience to realize the ‘Hindu rashtra’ (Hindu nation).17 As men-
tioned earlier, they lynch Muslims, but the number of victims is less than that due 
to attacks by Salwa Judam. Gau Rakshaks are not death squads in the sense that 
killing is not their primary purpose. However, they have many similarities with 
Salwa Judam, especially regarding their relationship with the state, even though 
their relationship is more implicit. In fact, they constitute an advanced form of 
Salwa Judam, inviting less criticism and spreading their ideology throughout all 
of India. They represent Modi’s new two-sword strategy, which worked well in 
Modi’s victory in the 2019 general election (Nakamizo 2020b: 77–84). Here, 
I select two cases of Gau Rakshaks to identify their characteristics.18
Case 1: cow protection group
This group is based in the western state of Maharashtra. It began its activities in 
2000, aiming to protect the Hindu community from ‘the attacks of Muslims’. Its 
founder stated that
Muslims are killing and eating cows not to obtain nutrition but to humiliate 
Hindus. By slaughtering cows, they try to show that Hindus are weak.
(When I asked about the criticism that the activities of the cow protection 
groups threatened the lives of muslims) It is a total lie. Their aim is only to 
insult Hindus.19
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This organization has two main characteristics. First, it has a strong ideology, 
basically following Hindutva ideology, which worships cows as sacred animals 
and regards Muslims as ‘Others’ and, more explicitly, as enemies. In fact, the 
founder himself and his organization have strong connections with the Sangh 
Parivar.20 The founder belonged to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and 
received training as a cadre. For various reasons, he is not an RSS member, but 
his brother was a member of the RSS at the time of the interview. Since his father 
was also an active member of the RSS, the organization’s relationship with the 
RSS runs deep. This strong ideological inclination is quite different from the 
Ranvir Sena and Salwa Judam.
Second, it has a strong relationship with the state. Regarding this second point, 
we can identify two characteristics. First, this organization recognizes itself as 
an arm of the state. In the case of Maharashtra, the state government enacted 
‘The Maharashtra Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 1995’ and received 
the assent of the president in 2015.21 Following this enactment in 1995, the organ-
ization began its activities long before the assent of the president, and its mem-
bers had captured almost 800 trucks by the time of my interview. After seizing 
trucks that carry cows, buffalos, or beef, the police are instantly informed, and the 
cases are handed over to them. In this sense, the organization is a de facto agent 
of the state. Second, the commander is active in politics and has the protection of 
the state. He has been a long-time elected member of the municipal corporation, 
and he tried to obtain a BJP ticket for the 2014 Maharashtra state assembly elec-
tion. He failed to do so but managed to run as a Shiv Sena candidate, which did 
not bring him success in winning a seat. When I visited his home, at least three 
policemen were protecting him as security guards. At the time of the interview, 
his sister-in-law was a member of the municipal corporation representing the 
BJP; thus, the BJP flag was hoisted at the gate in front of his house.
Its relationship with the state is naturally in stark contrast with that of the Maoists 
and that of the Ranvir Sena. In the case of the Maoists, the states obviously oppress 
them harshly. In the case of the Ranvir Sena, when I met with its commander, 
Brahmeshwar Singh, he was detained in the prisoner’s quarters of Patna Medical 
College and Hospital, which is like a smaller version of London Tower. Of course, 
the activities of the organization are quite different from those of the Ranvir Sena 
in terms of its mode of operation and number of victims. Even considering this 
difference, its close relationship with the state is remarkable. This organization is a 
developed form of state-sponsored vigilante groups such as Sarwa Judam.
Case 2: Hindu Yuva Vahini
The Hindu Yuva Vahini (HYV) was formed in 2002 by the current chief minister 
of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Yogi Adityanath, who is the Mahant (chief priest) of Gora-
khnath Temple and is well known for disseminating anti-Muslim propaganda (Jha 
2017: 35–58). The formal aim of the HYV is to protect Hindus from the men-
ace of Muslim terrorists and Maoists and from conversion to other religions.22 
However, the organization’s covert (or, rather, overt) aim is to engineer support 
for Yogi Adityanath by creating communal division.23 The general secretary of 
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the HYV told me that the HYV is working for Hinduism: ‘We cannot be Ram, 
but we can follow the practice of Ram’.24 Gau Raksha is one of the main activ-
ities among the organization’s numerous activities. Similar to Case 1, the HYV 
captures trucks carrying cattle and surrenders them to the police. The general 
secretary of the HYV said, ‘The cow is a sacred animal, so we cannot discard it’. 
When I asked about Muslims’ claim that Gau Rakshaks threaten their lives, he 
said, ‘They want to create a divide between Hindus and Muslims. We have a law 
prohibiting the slaughter of cows, so they should obey it’. I point out two charac-
teristics of this organization.
First, it has an ideological inclination, although its commitment is rather 
weaker than that of Case 1, in the sense that its main aim is to mobilize support 
for Yogi. However, its founder, Yogi Aditiyanat, is the Mahant of Gorakhnath 
Temple, which has been politicized from the time of Digvijay Nath, who was the 
leader of Hindu Maha Sabha and was arrested as part of the conspiracy to assas-
sinate M. K. Gandhi. Yogi Aditiyanat follows this ideological line, and he himself 
is notorious for his harsh anti-Muslim propaganda. According to Harris, Jeffrey, 
and Corbridge (2017: 6), he is reported to have said, ‘I will not stop until I turn 
the UP and India into the Hindu rashtra’.
Second, this organization has a strong relationship with the state. Regarding 
this second point, there are two characteristics. First, the HYV regards itself as 
an agent of the state, especially in relation to Gau Raksha activities. The organ-
ization’s style of activities is the same as that of other Gau Raksha groups, such 
as those of Case 1. Second, the HYV’s relationship with politics is very strong; 
in fact, it is a political group (Jha 2017: 43). As mentioned, the covert aim of the 
HYV is to engineer support for Yogi, and its members have political ambitions. 
Although the founding members of the HYV left the organization and themselves 
fought election after they were not allowed to obtain BJP tickets in the 2017 UP 
state assembly election, its founder Yogi Aditiyanath is now the chief minister of 
UP. Its close relationship with the state is without doubt, although its relationship 
with the Sangh Parivar is unclear.
In short, the HYV has an ideology of Hindutva and a strong connection with the 
state. At present, it has become a state-sponsored vigilante group, as its founder, 
Yogi Aditiyanat, is the chief minister of India’s largest state.
As shown by these two cases, they are de facto and hidden agents of the state. 
Their activities are actually acts of the state and do not result from state deficit. 
Thus, the emergence of the Gau Rakshaks is the result of state action to spread 
Hindutva ideology, placing Gau Rakshaks in the first quadrant.
Conclusion: the meaning for Indian democracy
How can we understand this changing character of vigilantism? What does it 
mean for Indian democracy? By focusing on the development of vigilante 
groups, this chapter specifies the changing characteristics of vigilantism, from 
initially emerging as the outcome of ‘state deficit’ to evolving into a capacity for 
extra-constitutional violence that is harnessed by ‘state support’. How can we 
understand this discernible shift and transition in vigilante violence?
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By using vigilante groups, the state can evade direct responsibility as Sundar 
points out in the case of Salwa Judam (Sundar 2016: 345). In the same way, the 
ferocity and regularity of Gau Rakshak attacks reflect the ‘two-sword strategy’ of 
Narendra Modi's government, which mixes economic development with the real-
ization of the Hindutva agenda (Nakamizo 2020b: 81–82). In this new strategy, 
the state can terrorize Muslim minorities by inspiring fear until they feel their 
lives are precarious due to their inability to predict when, where, and how they 
might be attacked. The Gau Rakshak violence, moreover, has avoided the harsh 
criticism and systematic scrutiny that followed the 2002 Gujarat carnage. This is 
the devious invention of oppression that characterises the politics of obedience 
under the new BJP system.25
What does this shift and transition in the capacity for violence mean for Indian 
democracy? As the Introduction points out, the demarcation between democracy 
and authoritarianism is becoming blurred both in the contemporary world and in 
India. To understand the current spread of Hindu majoritarianism, various ana-
lytical frameworks have been proposed, such as authoritarian populism (Harris, 
Jeffrey, and Corbridge 2017), illiberal democracy (Hansen 2019), and ethnic 
democracy (Singh 2000: 35–55, 2019; Jaffrelot 2017, 2019). Apart from these 
typological frameworks, Chandra proposed exploring authoritarian elements in 
democracy (Chandra 2017). Although their approaches are different, they share a 
common perception: what is happening right now is a systematic infringement on 
and steady undermining of constitutional liberalism. Interestingly, Fareed Zaka-
ria, the proponent of the notion of illiberal democracy, declared at the end of the 
1990s that ‘[d]emocracy is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not’ (Zakaria 
1997: 23).
Although Zakaria’s framework seems to be applicable to India, this analytical 
demarcation between constitutional liberalism and democracy is misleading and 
dangerous in a sense because it provides a democratic disguise to an undemocratic 
regime and possibly justifies it. As Müller rightly points out (Müller 2017: 49–60), 
constitutional liberalism is integral to democracy, even though their respective 
historic origins draw from different trajectories. Democracy can function well due 
to the existence of the protection of fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, 
thought, religion, and association, personal liberty and ‘checks and balances’, 
represented by the separation of powers. Without constitutional liberalism, not all 
citizens can elect their own government at their own will. In this sense, the sepa-
ration of liberalism and democracy is misleading. Thus, the crisis of constitutional 
liberalism is itself the crisis of democracy. The increasing shift and transition in 
India from state deficit–caused vigilantism towards a state-supported mode of 
violence, I argue, indicate and strongly suggest a crisis in democracy rather than 
a mere qualification of democracy. This strong use of the term crisis for India’s 
current situation is, in fact, in sync with the recent study of Levitsky and Ziblatt 
(2018) of mainly American cases in their How Democracies Die.
Is democracy in India dying? We still have a ray of hope. As examined above, 
the activities of Salwa Judam were restrained through public interest litigation, 
in which a civil rights group that included Nandini Sundar as a core member 
sued in Indian courts (Sundar 2016: 310–331). The Anti-CAA (Citizenship 
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[Amendment] Act, 2019) movement was the largest civil society movement since 
the inauguration of the Modi government at the time of writing, although it was 
crushed by the all-India lockdown related to COVID-19. Although the situation 
is very tough under the ‘politics of obedience’ of the BJP system, Indian democ-
racy still lives. Citizens’ tenacious initiatives and courageous actions are urgently 
necessary to prevent Indian democracy from dying.
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Notes
 1 Many social activists, lawyers and academics who are critical of the Modi government have 
been arrested. For instance, 10 activists, lawyers, and academics have been arrested and 
charged under several sections of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), an anti-
terror law. They are alleged to have instigated violence in Bhima Koregaon in January 2018 
and to have collaborated with the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist) in a plot to 
assassinate the prime minister. See Rajshree Chandra, ‘Activists’ Arrests: The Exceptional 
Has Been Made the New Normal’, The Wire, 1 November 2018. (https://thewire.in/rights/
activists-arrests-the-exceptional-has-been-made-the-new-normal, last accessed on 14 July 
2020). Nandini Sundar concludes that the recent arrests of the anti-CAA (Citizenship 
[Amendment] Act, 2019) activists is the developed form of the ‘Bhima Koregaon’ model. 
See Nandini Sundar, ‘Amit Shah's “Bhima Koregaon Model” Used for Anti-CAA Protests’, 
NDTV, 26 May 2020. (https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/amit-shahs-bhim-koregaon-model-
used-for-anti-caa-protests-2234716, last accessed on 14 July 2020).
 2 For intervention in educational institutions, see D’Souza (2018) and Sundar (2018). For 
oppression against journalists, see Siddiqui (2017).
 3 For instance, the Modi government transferred the High Court judge who directed the 
police to take ‘conscious decision’ with respect to the lodging of first information reports 
against alleged hate speeches by three BJP leaders that caused the 2020 Delhi riots. Former 
Assam chief minister Tarun Gogoi denounced this decision, saying, ‘[T]he Modi govern-
ment has not allowed the judiciary to function independently which is dangerous to the 
democracy of the country’. See Hemanta Kumar Nath, ‘Modi Government Interfering with 
Judiciary Puts Democracy at Peril: Former Assam CM Tarum Gogoi’, India Today, 27 
February 2020. (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/modi-government-interfering-with-
judiciary-puts-democracy-at-peril-former-assam-cm-tarum-gogoi-1650567-2020-02-27, 
last accessed on 12 July 2020). Also see ‘Take Decision on Lodging FIRs for Hate Speeches 
by 3 BJP Leaders, Delhi HC Tells Police’, The Hindu, 26 February 2020. (https://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/take-decision-on-lodging-firs-for-hate-speeches-by-3-bjp-
leaders-delhi-hc-tells-police/article30922359.ece, last accessed on 12 July 2020).
 4 Prashant Bhushan, ‘Worse Than Emergency’, The Indian Express, 30 August 2018. (https://
indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/worse-than-emergency-activists-arrest-elgar-
parishad-sudha-bhardwaj-indian-express-columns-5331634/, last accessed on 5 September 
2018).
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 5 See Puniyani (2015, 2017) and Dabhade (2017). Cows are considered holy in several inter-
pretations of Hinduism, and therefore, slaughtering cows is treated as a religious taboo. See 
Nakamizo (2020b: 77).
 6 I would like to thank Prof. Rohan D’Souza for formulating the framework of state deficit. 
In fact, he proposed this concept in our discussion for refining the analytical framework.
 7 For instance, please see Louis (2002: 198–199, Chart 7.1).
 8 The legal proviso for appointing an SPO is stipulated by Article 17 in The Police Act (1861), 
which is still valid in India. According to Article 17, it is stated that ‘When it shall appear 
that any unlawful assembly, or riot or disturbance of the peace has taken place, or may be 
reasonably apprehended, and that the police-force ordinarily employed for preserving the 
peace is not sufficient for its preservation and for the protection of the inhabitants and the 
security of property in the place where such unlawful assembly or riot or disturbance of the 
peace has occurred, or is apprehended, it shall be lawful for any police-officer not below 
the rank of Inspector to apply to the nearest Magistrate to appoint so many of the residents 
of the neighbourhood as such police-officers may require to act as special police-officers for 
such time and within such limits as he shall deem necessary; and the Magistrate to whom 
such application is made shall, unless he see cause to the contrary, comply with the applica-
tion’ (pp. 9–10). In practice, the SPOs, it is often alleged, are mostly drawn ‘former insur-
gents’, who have quit their groups for a variety of reasons and become police informers 
(Chenoy and Chenoy 2010: 92–101). In the opinion of many human rights activists and 
observers on the ground, the police often use these SPOs, who are now salaried by the state, 
to then carry out a range of extra-judicial killings.
 9 I conducted fieldwork in Belaur village, the birthplace of the Ranvir Sena and where villag-
ers murdered each other, intermittently from November 2002 to September 2003. At the 
time of the interview, the deep divisions between the upper castes and the scheduled castes 
still remained, as it had been only eight years since the first clash in 1994. I interviewed 64 
villagers there. For details, see Nakamizo (2020a: 307–327).
 10 Interview with Ranvir Sena commander Brahmeshwar Singh, 5 November 2002.
 11 Interview with a Dalit agricultural labourer, 9 February 2003.
 12 Interview with Mr Kahniya Bhelari (senior correspondent, The Week, at the time of inter-
view), 30 January 2003.
 13 The explanation of Salwa Judam is based on Sundar (2006, 2016), Chenoy and Chenoy 
(2010: 101–107). The government translated ‘Salwa Judam’ as ‘peace march’; however, 
Sundar translated it as ‘purification hunt’ (Sundar 2016: 99).
 14 J. Venkatesan, ‘Salwa Judum Is Illegal, says Supreme Court’, The Hindu, 5 July 2011. 
(https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Salwa-Judum-is-illegal-says-Supreme-Court/
article13639702.ece, last accessed on 12 December 2018).
 15 Ejaz Kaiser, ‘Chhattisgarh Attack: Maoists Danced on Karma’s Body after Killing Him, say 
Survivors’, Hindustan Times, 27 May 2013 (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/chhat-
tisgarh-attack-maoists-danced-on-karma-s-body-after-killing-him-say-survivors/story-
gHbdngJ4vqaJ3U5jkLdXwN.html, last accessed on 12 December 2018).
 16 Chief Minister Raman Singh sanctioned nearly 860,000,000 rupees for Salwa Judam in 
November 2005. However, most of the budget was spent on banners, hoardings and leaflets 
praising Salwa Judam and condemning Maoists. They did not pay much attention to the 
living conditions of the camps. See Sundar (2006: 102).
 17 The goal of Hindu supremacists is to turn India into the ‘Hindu rashtra’. Their concept of 
‘Hindu’ can be traced back to Savarkar’s Hindutva (Hinduness) which describes Hindus as 
a people belonging to a common nation (rashtra), common race (jati) and common culture 
(sanskriti) and for whom India (Sindhusthan) is their fatherland (pitribhu) and holy land 
(punyabhu). For this reason, a person who has converted to Islam or Christianity cannot be 
a Hindu, even though this person shares the same fatherland and culture with Hindus, 
because this person’s holy land is outside of India. See Savarkar (1989: 113, 115–116). 
Vanaik points out that the Sangh Parivar upholds a highly exclusive form of Hindu national-
ism, which asserts that India must recognize itself as a Hindu nation and that it needs an 
effective Hindu state to gain national and international strength and prestige (Vanaik 2017: 
368). See also Nakamizo (2020b: 79).
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 18 The sources are anonymized due to the sensitivity of this issue.
 19 Interview with its founder, 5 September 2017.
 20 Sangh Parivar (family of organizations) is an umbrella organization for Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (national volunteer corps) and other affiliated groups, and the 
Bharatiya Janata Party forms its political arm. Their main purpose is to turn India into the 
Hindu rashtra, as mentioned in note 17. For details, see Nakamizo (2020a: 148–151).
 21 See A. G. Noorani, “The Ban on Cow Slaughter,” Frontline, 8 June 2016. (http:// 
www.frontline.in/social-issues/the-ban-on-cow-slaughter/article8700526.ece?css=print, last 
accessed on 26 November 2017). The Maharashtra government created the post of ‘honorary 
animal welfare officer’ and placed one in each district. All publicly known applicants for these 
posts have been Gau Rakshas. See Jaffrelot (2017: 56) and Sumita Nair, ‘Refrain in Sangh 
Turf: Cards Will Give Us Power’, Indian Express, 27 January 2017. (http://indianexpress.
com/article/india/india-news-india/maharashtra-government-beef-ban-gau-rakshak-id-cards-
animal-husbandry-modi-sangh-turf-2991489/, last accessed on 6 December 2017).
 22 Interview with senior local journalist Manoj Singh on 15 March 2018.
 23 See Jha (2017: 35–38). The general secretary of the HYV denies this charge and said that 
the group’s aim is to unite society by overcoming division.
 24 Interview with the general secretary on 15 March 2018.
 25 I analyse the current one-party/alliance dominance by the BJP as the ‘BJP system’. One 
characteristic of the BJP system is ‘the politics of obedience’, which contrasts with ‘the 
politics of consensus’ under the ‘Congress system’ (Kothari 1964). ‘The politics of obedi-
ence’ means that if people obey the BJP’s rule, they will receive rewards (the fruits of eco-
nomic development); otherwise, they will receive punishments (oppression). The BJP’s 
main agenda is the realization of the Hindu Rashtra, as mentioned earlier. Under this BJP 
system, three pillars can be identified to realize the Hindu rashtra. The first is economic 
development, which works as a bond to unite Hindus. The second is the institutionalization 
of the Hindu rashtra, for example, through the September 2019 abolition of Article 370, 
which gave special autonomous status to the Muslim-dominant states of Jammu and 
Kashmir, and the implementation of a national register of citizens and the Citizenship 
(Amendment) Act 2019, which aims to exclude religious minorities, especially Muslims. 
The third pillar is a new strategy for Hindu extremism such as vigilante activities, which is 
the topic of this chapter. I develop this argument in Nakamizo (2020b).
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2 Creating majoritarian democracy
Bharatiya Janata Party in the 2017 
Legislative Assembly election in 
Uttar Pradesh
Norio Kondo
The 2017 legislative election in Uttar Pradesh (UP) was apparently an 
epoch-making election. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a landslide victory, 
with 39.67% votes polled. The BJP were awarded 312 seats out of 403. The then 
ruling party, the Samajwadi Party (SP), won 47 seats, with 21.82% votes, whereas 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) won 19 seats with 22.23%; the Indian National 
Congress (Congress) won 7 seats with 6.25%. Although the SP and Congress 
made an electoral alliance, their combination was no match for the BJP’s ability to 
win the election. For the first time since June 1991, the BJP’s single-party rule was 
established in UP. The BJP’s sweeping victory in 2017 was apparently a repetition 
of the 2014 Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) election, which appar-
ently brought about a kind of majoritarian rule in UP, at least in party politics.
This chapter presents a look into the factors leading to the broad victory of the 
BJP in the 2017 Legislative Assembly election and offers some implications for 
political prospects in UP.
Electoral politics in UP and BJP victory in the 2017  
Legislative Assembly elections
The BJP victory in the 2017 Legislative Assembly election was expected in view 
of the BJP performance in the 2014 Lok Sabha election. The victory surprised 
many people and brought about substantial change in UP politics. Figure 2.1 pre-
sents changes in the percentage of votes polled by major parties in the Legislative 
Assembly and Lok Sabha elections after 1989. The rise of the BJP from 2014 
Lok Sabha election to the 2017 Legislative Assembly election was tremendous. 
Before analysing factors leading to the phenomenal victory of BJP, one must 
understand the trajectory of recent state politics.
Party politics in UP: 1989–2017
Party politics in the UP changed radically after 1989 when the Congress govern-
ment collapsed both in the centre and UP. Congress has shown no sign of revival 
in UP to date, as shown in Figure 2.1.
During the first half of the 1990s, the BJP retained about one-third of people’s 
support and came to power in 1991 without the support of other parties. However, 
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the BJP government was dismissed by the central government because of the 
communal disturbance caused by the destruction of Babri masjid in Ayodhya in 
December 1992. Another feature of party system evolution in the 1990s was the 
rise of SP led by Mulayam Sing Yadav and BSP led by Kanshi Ram and May-
awati. The rise of these parties is largely attributable to the churning of politi-
cal perception of people caused by the so-called Mandir and Mandal issues and 
others. The former refers to Hindu–Muslim communal conflicts related to the 
Ayodhya problem. The latter refers to social conflicts between Other Backward 
Classes (OBCs)1 and socially and economically advantaged groups among the 
populace, especially high castes, which resulted from the creation of reservations 
in the central government for OBCs. The social turmoil attributable to the Mandir 
and Mandal issues and other issues caused a strengthening of the caste/commu-
nity-consciousness of people in the party politics. The growth of the SP, after its 
separation in 1992 from Janata Dal (JD), was based on OBC support, especially 
the Yadav caste and Muslims after the 2010s. The growth of BSP, on the other 
hand, was based on the increasing support of Scheduled Castes (SCs: Dalit),2 
especially the Jatav/Chamar castes.
The growth of the SP and the BSP based on caste/community identity brought 
about the fragmentation of the party system and unstable government formation 
from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. There were eight chief ministers of differ-
ent parties between 1993 and 2007. However, in the 2007 Legislative Assembly 
Figure 2.1 Percentage of votes polled by major parties in Legislative Assembly and Lok 
Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh after 1989.
Source: Created by author on the basis of data in Election Commission of India (Legislative 
Assembly Election data: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, Lok Sabha 
Election data: 1998, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014) (http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/
ElectionStatistics.aspx, accessed November 23, 2017). 
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election, a stable single-party government was established by the BSP with 
Mayawati as chief minister. BSP won the election by attracting not only Dalits 
but also other sections of the populace such as Muslims, high-caste people, and 
others who had come to be dissatisfied with successive unstable governments. 
Although the Mayawati government came to power based on the support of fairly 
wide sections, its main beneficiaries were Dalits, especially the Chamar/Jatav 
castes, which dissatisfied other sections, leading to the defeat in the next election 
in 2012. During the Mayawati government, it was said that the perceptions of 
some sections of Dalits in evaluating government changed with more emphasis 
on development and governance (Heath and Kumar 2012), although caste/com-
munity-based identity continued to play an important role.
In the 2012 Legislative Assembly election, SP won a majority and came to 
power with Akhilesh Yadav, son of Mulayam Singh Yadav, as chief minister, and 
completed his full 5-year tenure. Although Akhilesh Yadav himself was said to 
be a clean and development-oriented chief minister, his government was per-
ceived as incompetent in administering law and order, and as corrupt, nepotistic, 
and casteist (Kang 2016: 16). Although the support of Yadav caste was stable, 
dissatisfaction was reflected in the 2014 Lok Sabha election when vast groups 
of people changed their allegiance to vote for the BJP. Increasingly, people have 
emphasized the government’s performance based on development and govern-
ance (Verma 2014). The 2017 Legislative Assembly elections demonstrated the 
people’s rising dissatisfaction leading to the great victory of the BJP.
Victory of the BJP in the 2017 Legislative Assembly Election
This section points out several factors leading to a broad victory of the BJP and 
the defeat of other parties based on election surveys and some descriptive anal-
yses of the election, which is necessary to decide the direction of the statistical 
analyses in the next section.
First, the anti-incumbency feelings against the BSP and the SP cannot be ignored 
among various communities which have not attached greater importance in earlier 
governments. According to several surveys, the core castes/communities support-
ing Mayawati’s BSP, are Jatav or Chamar3 among Dalits. It is often said that Jatav/
Chamar have received a larger share of benefits under the BSP government than 
other Dalits, which causes feelings of relative deprivation among non-Jatav/Chamar 
Dalits, resulting in their dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the intraparty feud and the 
exit of OBCs’ influential leader, S. P. Maurya in 2016, had adverse effects on BSP’s 
electoral prospect (Times of India 2016). The fact that BSP is nearly a Mayawa-
ti-centred party and that she controls the whole process of ticket distribution in the 
election is an important factor underlying his defection (Farooqui and Sridharan 
2015: 87).
The same might be said about the SP (Michelutti 2008: 162). The core castes/
communities supporting the SP are Yadav and Muslim. The non-Yadav OBCs 
have not benefitted sufficiently under the SP governments, which resulted in 
the dissatisfaction among non-Yadav OBCs. In addition, the SP’s internal feud 
between the development-oriented chief minister, Akhilesh Yadav, and his father 
and party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav (Kang 2016), seems to have worked 
against popularity of the SP.
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According to a survey conducted by the Lokniti, Centre for the Study of 
Developing Societies (CSDS), in January 2017,4 an overwhelming 79% of 
Jatav supported the BSP. However, related to other Dalits, although 47% of 
them supported the BSP, 24% supported the BJP and its allied parties, and 
21% supported the SP and its allied parties. A 2009 survey5 showed that 
64% of other Dalits supported the BSP. The support of non-Jatav Dalits has 
been diversified. Regarding the SP, in 2017 survey 73% of Yadav and 74% 
of Muslim supported the SP. However, only 20% of other OBCs (excluding 
Yadav and Kurmi) supported the SP, whereas 34% of other OBCs supported 
BJP and its allied parties; 16% of other OBCs supported the BSP. A 2009 
survey revealed that 25% OBCs other than Yadav, Kurmi and Lodh supported 
the SP, whereas 29% of them supported the BJP and its allied parties; 19% 
supported the BSP.
Consequently, the diversification of the support base had been recognized 
by the 2017 election among both other Dalits and other OBCs. Apparently, the 
castes/communities which were made light of in the BSP and SP governments, 
especially the non-Jatav/Chamar Dalits and non-Yadav OBCs and non-Muslims, 
had shifted their support to the BJP, which had been appealing to people for 
development under the Modi central government (Jha 2017).
Second, in connection to the first point, it must be pointed out that develop-
ment-conscious voters seem to emphasize government performance in terms of 
development and governance in selecting party in the election. Therefore, if peo-
ple do not evaluate the BSP and SP governments in development and govern-
ance, they will vote for another seemingly more development-oriented BJP. In 
fact, most parts of the BJP manifesto for the 2017 Legislative Assembly election 
were devoted to the statements of development and welfare schemes; only one 
sentence touched on the Ram temple and Ayodhya issue (Bharatiya Janata Party 
– Uttar Pradesh 2017: 20).
Third, the popularity and propagations of BJP are important. In particular, 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity among Hindus is an important factor 
because the 2017 Legislative Assembly election can be understood as a continua-
tion of the 2014 Lok Sabha election in which the popularity of Modi and the cam-
paign of BJP-associated groups, such as Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), 
were influential in attracting the votes of diverse voters.6
The propagation of the BJP ideology, “Hindutva,” also cannot be ignored. 
It might have worked effectively, especially in attracting the marginal castes/
communities associated with the BSP and SP described earlier (Ramaseshan 
2016). Several news sources reported that workers of the BJP and its associated 
organizations, such as the RSS, propagated communal discourse among Hindu, 
which was likely to increase the support of Hindus to the BJP.7 Furthermore, 
although a series of communal incidents such as the Muzaffarnagar commu-
nal riots between Muslims and Hindus in 2013, the Saharanpur Riots in 2014 
between Muslims and Sikhs, the lynching of an old Muslim man, suspected of 
storing beef, by a Hindu mob in Dadri of Gautam Buddha Nagar district in 2015 
has been further alienating Muslims from BJP, the communal tension, in turn, has 
been sensitizing communal sentiment of majority Hindu simultaneously, which 
was likely to raise Hindu support for the BJP.
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The next two sections present statistical analyses based on election data and 
population census data to look for the factors explaining major parties in UP. 
Although the survey data based on the interviews and their analyses paint a more 
detailed and accurate picture of the election, its coverage is narrow compared 
to the aggregated macro-election data. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain the 
influence of macro-scale structural factors such as urbanization, quantitatively. 
There are, of course, limitation of macro-scale aggregated data in analysing elec-
toral behaviours, such as the “ecological fallacy.” However, if interpreting the 
result while considering the survey data-based analyses of other studies, there 
would be no severe mistake in understanding the people’s behaviours. The anal-
yses explained in the following sections illustrate quantitatively what the survey 
data-based analysis said and gives a wider perspective of the party–people nexus.
Methodology
To analyse the election data on the basis of socio-economic data at macro/aggre-
gate level, the matching of election data and socio-economic data is necessary. 
According to electoral laws,8 a Lok Sabha constituency consists of several Leg-
islative Assembly Constituencies (LACs). The statistical records of Lok Sabha 
elections after the 2009 election are shown not only for each Lok Sabha constit-
uency but also for the LACs within the Lok Sabha constituency. Furthermore, 
no major delimitation of the constituencies occurred after 2008. Therefore, the 
data for the 2012 and 2017 Legislative Assembly elections and those of 2014 
Lok Sabha election can be dealt with as a set of a continuous panel data set based 
on LACs.
It is important that the geographical boundary of a specifically aggregated set 
of continuous LACs completely matches a specifically aggregated set of contin-
uous “tehsils”, a sub-district unit in UP. Most items of population census have 
tehsil-level data. Consequently, the geographical boundary matching between a 
set of continuous LACs and a set of continuous “tehsils” in the population cen-
sus was made for 2012, 2014, and 2017 elections. In this way, I have created 
143 aggregated sample units (hereinafter called “sample units”) all over UP. The 
matching made regression analyses possible between the two data sets. This is a 
method used by Paul Brass (1985).
Variables used for statistical analyses are presented in Table 2.1. The depend-
ent variables are the percentage of votes polled by major parties and the differ-
ences in the percentage of votes polled by parties between two elections. One can 
get a better understanding of UP electoral politics by examining the picture of 
a party in one election as well as the changes occurring between two elections.
The independent variables include the percentage of voter turnout and differ-
ences in voter turnout between the two elections, as well as variables created from 
the population census data. The former might be significant because voter turnout 
or an increase in the voter turnout might affect the support of a particular party. 
The latter variables related to ethnicity, economic class, and the level of modern 
life are created based on the population census. Ethnic and economic class varia-
bles, such as percentages of “Muslim,” “Scheduled Castes,” “Main Cultivators,” 
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and “Main Agricultural Labourers,” are regarded as important for examining 
the socioeconomic basis of party support in UP because of the close connection 
between major parties, on one hand, and castes or economic classes, on the other, 
as in the case of the BSP and the SP. In addition, a variable representing the over-
all level of modern life might be important because the rising level of modern life 
can be regarded as rendering people more sensitive to politics and changing their 
voting behaviours. Modern life is regarded as a variable having various aspects 
such as “urbanity,” “literacy,” “tap water,” and “electrical light.” Therefore, the 
author has created a composite variable of “level of modern life,” called “Mdnty”, 
consisting of the four variables in Table 2.1, through principal component analy-
sis. Thus, we can estimate the popular voting behaviours related to major parties 
in relation to castes, religious communities, economic classes, and standard of 
living based on the population census of 2011.
For statistical analyses, weighted least squares (WLS) regression was applied 
with the “Number of voters” in each sample unit 2014 Lok Sabha or 2017 
Legislative Assembly elections as weight variables. It is because the voter group 
sizes are widely different among sample units. It is attributable to the hetero-
geneous combinations of LACs and tehsils in matching the boundaries of both 
variables. A sample unit, for example, includes six LACs in one case while only 
one LAC included in another. Regarding the probable problem of “endogeneity,” 
it appears to be intractable.9 The problem of severe endogeneity can arise because 
of reasons such as the cyclical causation between dependent and independent 
variables. For example, the voter turnout, which is an independent variable, can 
be raised by the political mobilization of a particular party. However, actually in 
all the WLSs that follow, voter turnout or the difference of voter turnouts between 
two elections is statistically not significant in explaining the dependent variables, 
which most probably indicates the very low probability of the severe endogeneity 
caused by them. Furthermore, in the estimation, those sample units are excluded 
from the WLSs, which include LACs where there was no candidate of the party 
concerned to avoid the strong, biased estimation of coefficients.
Finally, it must be described that the interpretation of the results must be done 
carefully so that no mistake of “ecological fallacy” is committed. That would 
occur in misunderstanding the estimation based on aggregated macro-data as 
what would happen at the individual level. The risk of “ecological fallacy” can 
be minimized in two ways. First, the size of aggregated macro-data should be 
as small as possible. As described in this chapter, the level of aggregation, the 
sample unit, is smaller than the district, which ensures better estimation. Second, 
survey data based on the opinion poll should be taken into account for the inter-
pretation of estimation simultaneously.
Statistical analyses of the party performance in three elections
First, it must be described that the continuity of the elections between 2014 Lok 
Sabha election to 2017 Assembly election is stronger than that from 2012 to 
2014. The Pearson’s correlation of the BJP vote percentage between 2012 and 
2014 elections is 0.398 whereas that between 2014 and 2017 is 0.543.10
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Mdnty “Mdnty” shows the 
level of modern 
life. It is made by 
Principal Component 
Analysis (with weight 
of total population) 
using the following 
data: “Percentage 
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and “Percentage of 
Households which 
have electrical 
light (%).” The first 
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Source: “ECI” = Created by present author from the data of Election Commission of India. “Census” = 
Created by present author from data of the India Population Census 2011.
Note: An observation, namely sample unit, is the data of specifically aggregated and geographically 
continuous LACs, the boundary of which is exactly same as the boundary of a specifically aggregated 
set of geographically continuous tehsils.
* indicates that those samples are excluded which include Legislative Assembly constituencies where 
there was no candidate of the party concerned.
Table 2.1 (Continued)
Creating majoritarian democracy 29
Tables 2.2 through 2.14 present results of WLSs. In all the WLSs, the Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIFs) are sufficiently small that they show no severe multi-
collinearity among independent variables in the WLSs. Party-wise analyses are 
presented next.
BJP
In the 2017 election, according to Table 2.2, people living in the more modern 
areas are apparently more likely to vote for the BJP. Regarding castes/commu-
nities, the BJP received fewer votes where more Muslims and more SCs people 
live. Furthermore, the BJP won more votes where more cultivators and agricul-
tural labourers live. This is, in a sense, a static picture of the BJP support structure 
in 2017.
A somewhat different story is apparent when we examine the change of BJP 
vote percentage from 2012 to 2017 in Table 2.3 and that from 2014 to 2017 in 
Table 2.4. An analysis of the change in BJP vote percentages from 2012 to 2017 
reveals that BJP vote percentage increased less in the areas where more Muslim 
people live, but it increased more in the areas where more cultivators live. The 
analysis of the change in BJP vote percentage from 2014 to 2017 shows that the 
BJP vote percentage increased more in the areas where more cultivators and more 
SCs people live. These analyses are not contradictory to what the CSDS sur-
vey data and other data show, which means that we can interpret these statistical 
results, by and large, without fear of ecological fallacy.
Based on the three tables, first, it is clear that most Muslims do not support BJP, 
which did not change from 2012 to 2017.
Second, SCs are, by and large, unlikely to support BJP in the 2017 elections. 
However, some sections of SCs people probably support BJP, which is under-
standable because the agricultural labourers, whose main portion consists of SC 
people, tend to support BJP.11 Agricultural labourers are economically weakest 





t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
vote2017p 0.0948 0.104 0.91 0.363 1.52
Muslim −0.217 0.0502 −4.31 0.000 1.76
p_sc −0.333 0.103 −3.22 0.002 1.51
main_cl_p 0.501 0.205 2.44 0.016 2.54
main_al_p 1.11 0.342 3.24 0.002 2.16
Mdnty 2.48 0.412 6.02 0.000 2.84
constant 37.4 5.49 6.80 0.000
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 127, F(6, 120) = 9.13, Prob > F = 0.0000, R-squared = 0.3231
Source: Calculated by the author.
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section in India. Therefore, it can be inferred that economically weaker SCs tend 
to support the BJP. Such economically weaker SCs might be, most probably, 
Dalits other than Jatav if we incorporate the evidence from the CSDS surveys.
Third, cultivators tend to support the BJP and tend to have increased their sup-
port constantly between 2012 and 2017. In light of the fact that major groups of 
cultivators consist of OBC farmers and that the CSDS surveys show that Yadav 
people firmly support the SP, probably non-Yadav OBCs have increased their 
support for the BJP continuously.12
Finally, it is interesting that people in modernized areas tend to support the BJP 
in 2017. However, no such tendency is clear in the percentage changes of BJP 
votes from 2012 to 2017 and 2014 to 2017. The signs of the variable “Mdnty” in 






t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
votep17as12as −0.196 0.280 −0.70 0.486 1.04
muslim −0.178 0.0666 −2.67 0.009 1.35
p_sc 0.204 0.110 1.86 0.066 1.40
main_cl_p 0.738 0.254 2.91 0.004 2.21
main_al_p −0.277 0.485 −0.57 0.569 2.16
Mdnty 0.797 0.529 1.51 0.135 2.69
constant 21.2 3.56 5.94 0.000
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 126, F(6, 119) = 5.22, Prob > F = 0.0001, R-squared = 0.2498
Source: Calculated by the author.






t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
votep17as14ls −0.277 0.266 −1.04 0.300 1.22
muslim −0.0616 0.0459 −1.34 0.182 1.41
p_sc 0.221 0.0969 2.28 0.024 1.40
main_cl_p 0.537 0.194 2.77 0.007 2.27
main_al_p −0.209 0.459 −0.46 0.649 2.26
Mdnty −0.452 0.376 −1.20 0.232 2.71
constant −8.00 3.17 −2.52 0.013
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 125, F(6, 118) = 10.79, Prob > F = 0.0000, R-squared = 0.2457
Source: Calculated by the author.
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Table 2.3 are positive, whereas those of Table 2.4 are negative. Neither coefficient 
is statistically significant. Based on these facts, it can be inferred that modern life 
is a feature that accelerates change in the short run and that the accumulation of 
changes has contributed to the substantial increase in the BJP vote percentages in 
2017. To assess this idea, an indicator of the fluidity of the BJP vote percentage 
based on the changes of BJP vote percentage from 2012 to 2014 and 2014 to 2017 
is constructed as shown in Table 2.1 and regressed against independent variables. 
The result in Table 2.5 shows, with statistical significance of the 5% level, that 
modern life is likely to increase the fluidity of the BJP vote percentage between 
elections. Modern life has brought some fluidity into the people's support to the 
BJP, implying that the other parties have also been affected. That fluidity has 
cumulatively caused a substantial increase in the support to the BJP in the 2017 
election.
BSP
Results show that the BSP’s social base is still SCs in 2017 according to Table 2.6, 
which is presented in Figure 2.2. However, as discussed in the BJP analysis, the 
economically weaker SCs in the agricultural labourer category appear to be less 
supportive of the BSP. Cultivators, mainly consisting of OBCs, were less support-
ive of the BSP. Furthermore, people in modern areas are less likely to support the 
BSP. This pattern is a reverse of the case for the BJP, except for Muslims.
Related to the changes in the BSP vote percentages, the process of erosion 
of the BSP support base is apparent in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. Table 2.7 shows that, 
between 2012 and 2017, the BSP has lost the support of people in the more mod-
ern areas as well as the support of cultivators. Additionally, it is important that, 
according to Table 2.8, the BSP has tended to lose the support of SC people over-
all between 2014 and 2017. The erosion of SC support is a severe matter because 
SC people have been traditionally core supporters of the BSP. Furthermore, it 






t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
muslim −0.124 0.0832 −1.50 0.138 1.34
p_sc −0.0303 0.126 −0.24 0.811 1.39
main_cl_p 0.244 0.283 0.86 0.391 2.24
main_al_p −0.0751 0.587 −0.13 0.898 2.18
Mdnty 1.20 0.602 2.00 0.048 2.70
constant 30.5 4.04 7.54 0.000
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2014ls
Number of obs = 124, F(5, 118) = 2.03, Prob > F = 0.0790, R-squared = 0.0793
Source: Calculated by the author.
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must be noted that the Muslim position vis-à-vis the BSP is not clear in spite of 
the BSP efforts to gain Muslim support.
SP in the 2012 and 2014 elections
In the case of the SP and the Congress Party, statistical analyses involving the 
2017 Legislative Assembly election are difficult to conduct because both parties 
made electoral alliances against the BJP and its ally Apna Dal in the 2017 elec-
tion. Therefore, statistical analyses are conducted only for the 2012 Legislative 
Assembly and the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.





t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
vote2017p −0.00774 0.0842 −0.09 0.927 1.50
muslim 0.0364 0.0403 0.90 0.368 1.60
p_sc 0.473 0.0764 6.19 0.000 1.45
main_cl_p −0.390 0.161 −2.42 0.017 2.31
main_al_p −0.724 0.327 −2.21 0.029 2.09
Mdnty −1.237 0.380 −3.26 0.001 2.76
constant 18.8 4.51 4.17 0.000
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 143, F(6, 136) = 9.45, Prob > F = 0.0000, R-squared = 0.3016
Source: Calculated by the author.
Figure 2.2 Scheduled Castes population (%) and votes polled by BSP (%) in 2017 
Legislative Assembly elections.
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According to Table 2.9, the support base of the SP in 2014 is clearly cultiva-
tors among which the OBC population occupies a main portion. It is difficult 
for the SP to gain the support of SC groups, agricultural labourers, and people 
in modernized areas. Regarding the change between 2012 and 2014 when the 
SP vote percentage was reduced from 29.13% to 22.35%, the SP retained their 
votes among cultivators but lost votes where more SC people live, according to 
Table 2.10.
Regarding Muslims, who have been regarded as SP supporters,13 Table 2.9 can-
not clarify whether they supported the SP. However, clues indicate their increas-
ing support for the SP between the 2012 and 2014 elections, which is apparent in 
Table 2.10, although it is not statistically significant at the 5% level.






t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
votep17as12as 0.0340 0.223 0.15 0.879 1.04
muslim 0.0504 0.0394 1.28 0.202 1.28
p_sc 0.0163 0.0888 0.18 0.855 1.37
main_cl_p −0.588 0.137 −4.28 0.000 2.02
main_al_p −0.371 0.281 −1.32 0.189 2.05
Mdnty −1.82 0.413 −4.40 0.000 2.53
constant 1.42 2.24 0.63 0.528
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 143, F(6, 136) = 4.52, Prob > F = 0.0003, R-squared = 0.1837
Source: Calculated by the author.






t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
votep17as14ls 0.228 0.259 0.88 0.381 1.26
muslim −0.00889 0.0603 −0.15 0.883 1.37
p_sc −0.241 0.112 −2.15 0.033 1.37
main_cl_p 0.0765 0.172 0.44 0.658 2.07
main_al_p −0.428 0.428 −1.00 0.319 2.17
Mdnty 0.0158 0.404 0.04 0.969 2.56
constant 8.38 3.36 2.49 0.014
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 143, F(6, 136) = 1.42, Prob > F = 0.2109, R-squared = 0.0759
Source: Calculated by the author.
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Congress in 2012 and 2014 elections
In view of Table 2.11, Congress gained more support among SCs and people in 
the modernized area in 2014. It reduced its support among agricultural labourers 
between 2012 and 2014 according to Table 2.12. These pictures of Congress, 
however, are less clear in view of the generally lower levels of statistical signifi-
cance of coefficients.
SP and Congress in the 2014 and 2017 elections
As described already, in the 2017 election, the SP and Congress made an electoral 
alliance14 to cope with other parties, especially the BJP. Therefore, it is interesting 
to analyse the effects of the combination by examining the combined vote per-
centage of SP and Congress. Table 2.13 presents clearly that the SP and Congress 





t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
vote2014lsp 0.0429 0.216 0.20 0.843 1.55
Muslim 0.115 0.118 0.97 0.334 1.71
p_sc −0.338 0.155 −2.18 0.031 1.43
main_cl_p 1.33 0.404 3.30 0.001 2.41
main_al_p −1.40 0.503 −2.78 0.006 2.07
Mdnty −1.74 0.727 −2.39 0.018 2.82
Constant 21.5 9.04 2.38 0.019
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2014ls
Number of obs = 137, F(6, 130) = 9.26, Prob > F = 0.0000, R-squared = 0.3149
Source: Calculated by the author.






t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
votep14ls12as 0.267 0.250 1.07 0.288 1.23
Muslim 0.143 0.0834 1.72 0.088 1.36
p_sc −0.642 0.149 −4.31 0.000 1.37
main_cl_p 1.09 0.275 3.97 0.000 2.07
main_al_p 0.278 0.473 0.59 0.558 2.15
Mdnty 0.607 0.751 0.81 0.421 2.64
Constant −5.50 4.62 −1.19 0.236
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2014ls
Number of obs = 136, F(6, 129) = 10.18, Prob > F = 0.0000, R-squared = 0.2866
Source: Calculated by author.
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t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
vote2014lsp −0.356 0.221 −1.62 0.109 1.34
muslim 0.150 0.0990 1.52 0.132 1.36
p_sc 0.472 0.225 2.09 0.039 1.51
main_cl_p −0.0321 0.404 −0.08 0.937 2.37
main_al_p 0.826 0.558 1.48 0.141 1.97
Mdnty 1.79 0.72 2.47 0.015 2.18
constant 13.3 11.0 1.20 0.231
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2014ls
Number of obs = 114, F(6, 107) = 2.24, Prob > F = 0.0446, R-squared = 0.1172
Source: Calculated by the author.






t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
votep14ls12as −1.06 0.651 −1.63 0.106 1.17
muslim 0.0724 0.103 0.70 0.484 1.24
p_sc 0.416 0.212 1.96 0.053 1.45
main_cl_p −0.696 0.368 −1.89 0.061 2.02
main_al_p −1.36 0.660 −2.06 0.042 2.23
Mdnty −0.824 0.599 −1.38 0.172 2.14
constant −3.52 4.94 −0.71 0.478
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2014ls
Number of obs = 107, F(6, 100) = 1.61, Prob > F = 0.1523, R-squared = 0.1404
Source: Calculated by author.





t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
vote2017p −0.116 0.141 −0.83 0.410 1.51
muslim 0.249 0.0670 3.72 0.000 1.60
p_sc 0.110 0.101 1.09 0.280 1.44
main_cl_p 0.355 0.211 1.68 0.096 2.33
main_al_p −0.380 0.359 −1.06 0.292 2.11
Mdnty −0.102 0.519 −0.20 0.845 2.76
constant 27.2 6.54 4.16 0.000
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 142, F(6, 135) = 4.56, Prob > F = 0.0003, R-squared = 0.1541
Source: Calculated by the author.
36 Norio Kondo 
alliance attracted Muslim in 2017, which is presented in Figure 2.3. It might be 
that Muslims perceived the SP and Congress combination to be the most appro-
priate force to cope with the BJP. However, such a positive effect of the combi-
nation is apparently reduced by the decreasing support of cultivators between 
2014 and 2017 in view of Table 2.14. It is clear that many cultivators shifted their 
support to the BJP, if taking into account the preceding statistical analysis of the 
BJP’s votes.
Figure 2.3 Muslim population (%) and votes polled by SP and Congress (%) in the 2017 
Legislative Assembly elections.




















Table 2.14 Variables explaining the change in SP and Congress joint vote percentage 





t P > t Variance Inflation 
Factor ( = VIF)
votep17as14ls 0.110 0.353 0.31 0.755 1.27
muslim 0.0436 0.0629 0.69 0.490 1.37
p_sc 0.0735 0.151 0.49 0.626 1.36
main_cl_p −0.546 0.225 −2.42 0.017 2.10
main_al_p 0.218 0.434 0.50 0.617 2.19
Mdnty 0.831 0.509 1.63 0.105 2.55
constant −1.46 4.57 −0.32 0.749
Weighted least squares with robust standard error: Weight variable = vote2017
Number of obs = 142, F(6, 135) = 3.90, Prob > F = 0.0013, R-squared = 0.1322
Source: Calculated by author.
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Concluding remarks
It can be said that the 2014 Lok Sabha election caused a drastic change in voters’ 
support structure of the party system in UP, and that the 2017 election can funda-
mentally be viewed as a follow-up.
In the mid-2010s, support for the BJP increased in more modern or developed 
areas. Socio-economic modernization has certainly accelerated changes that have 
favoured the BJP. Additionally, it is most likely that the groups that tilted to the BJP 
were the relatively weaker sections among Dalits as well as cultivators consisting of 
OBCs other than the Yadavs. However, the traditional core castes/communities that 
supported the BSP, namely Jatav/Chamar, or the SP, namely Yadav, by and large, 
seem to have generally continued to support their respective parties, although to a 
lesser degree. The SP and Congress appeared to be the best combination that have 
elicited trust from Muslims against the BJP in the 2017 election.
Consequently, the new BJP government, led by Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, 
owes its political support not only to the traditional support base of high castes 
but also to those people living in modernized areas, and those Hindu castes and 
cultivators who were marginalized by the previous BSP and SP regimes. The new 
BJP government owes its majoritarian support base to these heterogeneous social 
strata, except for Muslims. That is to say, the BJP depends on a ‘heterogeneous 
majority’, not a ‘monolithic majority’, in Hindu society. To maintain their sup-
port, therefore, the BJP government needs to make a few delicate policies.
First, the BJP government has to assign greater emphasis to its good governance 
and development agendas, as it had declared in its election manifesto. This would 
satisfy the heterogeneous social strata and would clarify the difference between 
the previous governments and the current BJP government. Chief Minister Yogi 
Adityanath’s continued emphasis on good governance and development is a clear 
sign of this need. In September 2017, he released a white paper on the earlier 
government.15 It severely criticized the misrule of previous governments over the 
past 15 years, such as the mismanagement of government expenditures, delays, 
and corruption within government projects, namely, their poor development per-
formance and misgovernance.
It goes without saying that the BJP government knows that its development 
and good governance agendas are key to maintaining a stable government and 
balancing various social groups because these concepts are comprehensive and 
appealing to heterogeneous social groups. The agendas overlap the image of the 
Modi government in the centre.
Second, the BJP government should conduct policies to strengthen the cohe-
siveness of its heterogeneous social support base, except for Muslims. Muslims 
are firmly behind the SP and Congress combination. For example, in April 2017, 
the BJP issued an order to remove the reservations in private medical colleges for 
candidates belonging to the SC, ST, and OBC categories. This order had already 
been decided by the previous SP government.16 Furthermore, the UP BJP is trying 
to woo Dalits and OBCs by re-creating new icons for these communities, such as 
Raja Suheldev, Rani Jhalkari Bai, and Lakhan Pasi, while simultaneously show-
ing respect to icons like Ambedkar.17
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In spite of the unmistakable necessity of the above policies and schemes, how-
ever, the basic trait of the Hindutva ideology of Yogi Adityanath’s BJP govern-
ment seems to pose some uncertainty regarding the choice of policies. Hindutva, 
if it is plainly biased in favour of high castes, is most likely to put a limitation on 
maintaining a delicate balance among heterogeneous castes/communities, or in 
promoting social amalgamation for the benefit of Hindutva, especially for Dalit 
people. An incident involving local officials insulting a section of the Dalit caste 
in Kushinagar district in May 2017,18 for example, elicited strong reactions from 
the Dalit people. This incident forced the chief minister to show a reconciliatory 
attitude toward Dalit communities.19 This example seems to show that the BJP 
cannot be in a position to impose the tyranny of a ‘monolithic’ majority, even on 
the Hindu society. However, positioning Hindutva against religious minorities, 
especially Muslims, could have the effect of consolidating the support of various 
Hindu castes or communities. This could contribute to the strengthening of the 
support bases among Hindus; however, it could also result in widespread law-
and-order problems.
This inherent uncertainty concerning the Hindutva policy seems to have meant 
that the Yogi Adityanath government has been easily influenced by the policies 
of the central government. If Narendra Modi’s government in the centre tilted 
toward Hindutva policies, this would accelerate the Hindutva policies of Yogi 
Adityanath’s government.
Nevertheless, the first priority of the BJP UP government has to be 
socio-economic modernization through good governance and development. This 
is because, in view of the finding of this analysis, modernization would surely 
broaden the support bases of the BJP in UP. This would make it easier for the Yogi 
Adityanath government to adopt a stronger Hindutva policy.
Notes
 1 “OBCs” is an administratively defined category of castes/communities that are socially and 
educationally backward, excluding Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The des-
ignation was created for affirmative action, such as reservation of government employ-
ments, and so on, for these peoples.
 2 Dalit means “depressed class of people,” which includes SCs and STs and others depending 
on the context. In this chapter, Dalit is used interchangeably with SC.
 3 Although in the UP villages, Dalits were, by and large, under the pressure of dominant upper 
castes before the 2000s, their status seems to be improving gradually (Lieten and Srivastava 
1999; Kapur et al. 2010). Some sections of Dalits, especially Chamar, were successful in 
raising their social status; the BSP clearly accelerated such process in the 2000s. Consequently, 
Chamar “neta” (leaders) emerged, although they were still few (Jeffrey et al. 2008).
 4 Lokniti (2017). The survey was conducted from January 17 through January 23, 2017, 
among 6481 voters in 322 locations (polling stations) spread across 65 assembly 
constituencies.
 5 The Hindu, May 26, 2009, “Why the Congress Did as Well as It Did.” Original source is 
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 2009, “National Election Survey 2009” (sam-
ple size: 2849).
 6 The Hindu, May 28, 2014. According to the article, in January to March 2014, about 34% of 
people preferred Modi as the next Prime Minister, while only 15% preferred Rahul Gandhi 
of Congress. Regarding the campaign and strategy of the BJP and RSS, see Narayan (2014).
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 7 Ramakrishnan (2017) presents an illustrative example.
 8 As described in the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 
2008.
 9 For example, it is virtually impossible to apply the method of instrumental variables because 
of the difficulty of finding appropriate instrumental variables.
 10 In both cases, n = 124 after excluding the sample units involving BJP-vacancy LACs.
 11 Regarding this point, the informal welfare provision of BJP-related organizations to poorer 
people might play an important role in rural areas. In this connection, see important work 
by Thachil (2014).
 12 The strategy of BJP to divide the OBCs and get support of non-Yadav OBCs can be seen 
much before the 2010s. See, for example, Zérinini (2009: 58–63).
 13 Muslims do not seem to vote en bloc for a particular party to defeat the BJP. By and large, 
Muslims seem to be anti-BJP (Verma and Gupta 2016).
 14 The adjustment was not complete. SP fielded 311 candidates while Congress fielded 114 
candidates. There were 25 overlapping constituencies and 3 constituencies with no candi-
dates from both parties. The coalition is not up to the expectation of both parties (Farooqui 
and Sridharan 2017).
 15 “White Paper Released by Yogi Adityanath Targets ‘Misrule’ by SP, BSP Govts,” 
Hindustan Times, September 18, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/lucknow/
white-paper-released-by-yogi-adityanath-targets-misrule-by-sp-bsp-govts/story-
NfjFRxPaCRqZLeecgEaoMO.html.
 16 India Today, April 13, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/education/story/yogi-
adityanath/1/928050.html.
 17 Hindustan Times, June 13, 2017, “New Dalit Icons Emerging in Uttar Pradesh as BJP 
Tightens Its Reins,” http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/new-dalit-icons-are-
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3 Practicing the right to indifference
Secularism, toleration, and Islamophobia in 
Indian and American national subjectivities
Peter Gottschalk
In December 2017, President Donald Trump retweeted videos posted by the 
British white nationalist group Britain First. Widely discredited, the videos sup-
posedly portrayed Muslims in the United Kingdom committing crimes against 
other Britons. His unrepentant action led Prime Minister May to tweet an admon-
ishment of the American president that was unprecedented in the past century. 
Trump’s retweet represents but one small expression of the populist nativism that 
helped win him the highest office in the nation (“Trump Hits Out” 2017).
Meanwhile, for more than four years since his election to office, Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi kept a studied silence in the face of myriad assaults against – and 
even murder of – Muslims in locations throughout India. The religious chau-
vinism that his political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its mother 
organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), have carefully cultivated 
over many decades helped propel him to power and – until his public condem-
nation in January 2019 of violence in the name of cow protection – he appeared 
prepared to silently condone discrimination in his effort to remain there.
India and the United States: two nations bound by the history of the British 
Empire and defined, in part, by ideals of secularism and tolerance. Yet each nation 
currently struggles with endemic Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment that 
takes different expressions. Arguably, forms of discrimination have emerged in 
response not only to historically varying social circumstances but also to the dis-
tinctive nature of secularism, pluralism, and toleration in each country.
Drawing on the work of scholars of secularism, this chapter examines how 
current American and Indian nation-states seek to craft a normative nationalist 
subjectivity that, in principle, defines itself in part through principles of toleration 
yet, at times, facilitates intolerance toward Muslims and suspicion toward Islamic 
traditions. These notions of toleration often rely on a strategy by which many 
nations understand themselves, which balances the projection of a national ideal 
based on universal principles and the proclamation of a particularism defining the 
nation’s citizens as collectively unique. Establishing a shared history, defining 
bodies of belonging, and positing certain shared values and practices all serve in 
the endeavor to imagine the exemplary national subject, as well as to define those 
who do not share their subjectivity. Although the derisiveness of discrimination 
appears inherent to nationalism, the assertion of a “right to indifference” from 
the state and fellow citizens may offer an avenue by which minority groups like 
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Muslims can escape the stereotypes used to justify their marginalization and side-
step principles of toleration that often work against them.
Imagining nationalist universalisms and particularisms
Mayanthi Fernando, the late Saba Mahmood, and other scholars have recently 
outlined the dual, complementary sides of modern nationalisms. On the one side 
of the nationalist coin, any particular nationalism generates a set of universal 
ideals by which it defines the nation. This promotes the nation as exemplary in 
its expression and/or protection of these ideals. As Fernando points out in regard 
to France, this idealization centers on Liberté, égalité, fraternité (“liberty, egal-
itarianism, fraternity”). Officially instantiated as the national motto, these terms 
offer a touchstone for national self-definition or, put another way, as a center 
counteracting the centrifugal forces of national discord found in varying degrees 
in practically every nation. Popular sentiment – supported and promoted by the 
state – holds these as universally applicable ideals (Fernando 2014: 51).
Instances of such state promotion of universal ideals for formulating the Indian 
nation can readily be found on the government of India’s National Portal of India. 
Through this extensive website, the central government apparently intends to pro-
vide both Indians and foreigners information about a breadth of subjects regard-
ing the nation. Readily accessed from the homepage, the “Community” section 
features subheadings with information for specific demographic groups such as 
“businesspersons,” “sportsperson,” “women,” and “Non-Resident Indians” [sic]. 
In contrast with this recognition of social division, an image of three white-clad 
men is prominently positioned in the top center of this page. Arms flung ecstat-
ically wide, they look gleefully at one another in a seemingly shared celebra-
tion. Although the pagari (turban), skull cap, and bindu (forehead mark) each 
dons, respectively, identifies them as Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu, each also has the 
national colors of green and saffron adorning his face. Thus, on a web page invit-
ing Indian users to pursue information pertinent to their specific demographics, 
an image of Indians sharing a universal and joyful bhai-bhai (“brotherhood”) 
promises to ameliorate the religious communal divides responsible for some of 
the country’s worst public violence since its independence from British rule in 
1947. As though resisting any counterpoint to this assertion of unity – and despite 
a link for “Scheduled Tribes/Schedule Caste” [sic] that touches on a web of major 
social fault lines – the “Community” page’s subheadings suggest no information 
regarding religious groups except for one titled “minority community.” Few of 
the links cited in this subheading explicitly reference religious groups (National 
Portal of India 2020b).
On the other side of the nationalist coin, most nationalisms also create a set 
of particular characteristics that differentiate its citizens from those of all other 
nations. After all, a nation defined by universal ideals alone could potentially 
include all humanity. In the case of many French, they define themselves as dif-
ferent from Britons and Moroccans, among others, based on a historical narrative 
in which the French language, a Catholic heritage, white racial identity, and the 
significance of certain historical events coalesce into a vital national character. 
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Hence, the national subjectivity thereby fashioned can have linguistic, moral, 
embodied, and mnemonic dimensions (Fernando 2014: 18–19).
The National Portal of India manifests this quality as well. For instance, fol-
lowing the “Know India” link from the homepage and clicking on the “My India 
My Pride” subheading leads the user to a page declaring that “India is one of the 
oldest civilizations in the world, spanning a period of more than 4000 years, and 
witnessing the fusion of several customs and traditions, which are reflective of the 
rich culture and heritage of the Country” [sic]. The text then describes the eco-
nomic success of India following an era of “colonialism” by noting “more than 
anything, the nationalistic fervour of the people is the contributing force behind 
the culmination of such a development” (“My India, My Pride” 2020c). This 
projects a profile of Indians as sharing a remarkably ancient civilization that has 
cultivated a certain mélange of cultures over the course of its history. The page on 
the National Portal that describes India’s ancient history makes a more deliberate 
claim. “The history of India is punctuated by constant integration of migrating 
people with the diverse cultures that surround India” (National Portal of India 
2020a). This metanarrative establishes a continuity created by an enduring Indian 
civilization that absorbs and makes arriving cultures part of itself, foregoing any 
sense of a more disruptive process of intercultural encounter. The conclusion for 
the page “People & Lifestyle” sums up the particularism implied in these narra-
tions: “The beauty of the Indian people lies in their spirit of tolerance, give-and-
take and a composition of cultures that can be compared to a garden of flowers 
of various colours and shades of which, while maintaining their own entity, lend 
harmony and beauty to the garden – India!” (“People & Lifestyle” 2020). These 
lines emphasize the particular qualities of tolerance and pluralism as defining 
“the Indian people” who cumulatively comprise “India”: a theme developed by 
certain early pre-independence nationalist leaders such as Mohandas Gandhi.
In contrast with the official National Portal of India, the webpages of the US 
government’s USA.gov website – which provide a parallel introduction to the 
demographic and historical qualities of the country’s citizens – offer no such 
direct statements of national qualities yet nevertheless lead the user to intuit 
certain universalisms and particularities. For instance, although the “American 
History” section of the “U.S. History and Historical Documents” page eschews 
any overarching narrative, the list of nineteen significant events it provides offers 
a trajectory in which voting rights are more equally applied and Black Americans 
increasingly overcome racist obstacles. The history of the nation’s people, this 
implies, is defined, in part, by universal values (albeit, not uniformly realized) 
of democracy and equality. Simultaneously, this selection of events suggests a 
particularity as well. It indicates that Americans have increasingly realized these 
values through a redemptive teleology of successful struggle and political pro-
gress beginning with the American Revolution and ending with “the first African 
American to be elected president” of the country. Meanwhile, other particular 
qualities of Americans can be assumed from considering the two other themes 
– technology and war – that thread throughout the unconnected events listed 
on the “American History” page (US.gov, n.d.). Specific events describing the 
Industrial Revolution, the Wright Flyer’s milestone, the use of atomic weaponry, 
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and the Apollo 11 moon landing all emphasize a people seemingly successful in 
the development of technology. In 2017, the timeline began with the American 
War of Independence and ended with the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, 
depicting a people frequently involved in war, usually overseas, and not always 
successfully. By 2018, the timeline had been altered to omit the bin Laden assas-
sination and end instead with the Obama electoral victory, demonstrating how 
the federal government carefully cultivates a national subjectivity (US.gov, n.d.).1
The respective governments of India and the United States use official digital 
platforms to project an image of Indians and Americans that cannot be confused 
with that of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Nepalis, or Canadians, Mexicans, and 
Cubans. Through the mutually reinforcing combination of universalisms and 
particularisms, the nation emerges as distinct and distinctive from its neighbors. 
Notably, neither government promotes religion as a prominent quality of the 
nation or its people. This silence loudly demonstrates the centrality of specific 
forms of secularism in Indian and American state imaginaries of their nations. 
These secularisms – operating within the rubric of “toleration” – allow both for 
the embrace of certain religious identities as part of a national subjectivity and for 
the exclusion of others as incompatible.
Toleration and religious liberty
An independent United States and India developed particular secularist ideolo-
gies, structures, and sentiments out of their earlier experiences as British America 
and British India. These secularities fostered state-developed understandings of 
religion that, in turn, molded acceptable forms of religion that “deserved” toler-
ance and liberty. They also helped establish the category of “religious minority” 
and created religious norms in defiance of which certain groups would appear 
to be threats to the secular order. These groups might not only be excluded from 
certain formulations of a nationalist subjectivity, they might also be used to neg-
atively define that subjectivity.
Toleration, as a European concept, emerged as a result of the chaotic cen-
turies following the Protestant Reformation as states with differing politically 
established churches convulsed the continent with myriad wars. Simultaneously, 
these states internally struggled with minorities – mostly Christian – who dis-
sented from membership in the established churches. For instance, already stri-
dent Church of England distrust toward Catholics quickened with the 1605 Guy 
Fawkes’ conspiracy to blow up Parliament. Later, Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Voltaire and Thomas Jefferson speculated on how to best maintain social stability 
given the potential for riotous religious provocations. When he wrote A Letter 
Concerning Toleration in 1689, John Locke drew on the painful national memory 
of England’s seesaw travails with established churches as Queen Mary prosecuted 
Church of England dissenters of the Roman Catholic Church and her succes-
sor Elizabeth replied in kind toward Catholics. Meanwhile, other dissenters – 
Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers – also suffered occasional oppression. Indeed, 
Locke wrote his Letter while in exile during the rule of the Catholic James II. 
Hence, Locke advanced “toleration” as a key concept (McKinnon 2006: 7–8).
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In the British colonies of North America, this concept had particular resonance. 
While the original thirteen British colonies diverged from one another in regard to 
which church establishments they created (if any), they also differed in their reli-
gious demographics. For much of their pre-independence history (1607–1775), 
Puritans firmly controlled colonial Massachusetts, Quakers ruled Pennsylvania, 
and dissenters of all sorts made Rhode Island their home. But in all, substantial 
Christian minorities existed as well, and how they should be treated, what should 
be their tax burden, and whether they could hold public office proved nettlesome 
issues. Of course, all these colonies also had populations of Jews, non-Christian 
Native Americans, and recently enslaved Africans, but these featured little in the 
discourse on tolerance, which focused at first only on Christians. Indeed, even 
Catholics seemed beyond the pale of consideration in the eyes of most Anglicans 
and Protestants who often refused them consideration as “Christians.”
During the eighteenth century, a variety of social and religious changes 
occurred that moved increasing numbers of Anglo-American colonists away from 
mere toleration of Christian dissenters to, ultimately, an ideal of religious liberty 
for all. As ideals of individualism grew – especially influenced by Calvinist theo-
logical commitments to self-determined belief – a notion arose that all individu-
als had the “right of private judgment.” This divinely granted right meant that no 
Christian should be punished for the dictates of their own conscience in terms of 
their choice of belief and practice. Hence, dissenters from established churches 
should not be merely tolerated without punishments meted out by a disapprov-
ing state, but they should be respected for a choice that was rightful. Ultimately, 
this led to decreasing social acceptance for the public disparagement of specific 
Christian denominations. In the century before, condemnatory sermons and tracts 
commonly emerged from church pulpits and printing presses that targeted rival 
churches and condemned their divergent views. In a growing consensus about 
civility in public life, mid-eighteenth-century colonists embraced an acceptance 
of diversity beyond tolerance (Beneke 2006: 80–87).
All these dynamics coalesced most materially in the crucible of the American 
Revolutionary War. As men left farms and furnaces, law offices, and dockyards to 
take arms together against the British Empire, and as women bore the added bur-
den of caring alone for those fields, businesses, and families the men left behind, 
the perceived differences dwindled along with the willingness to disparage. Even 
Catholics found acceptance during this period. The perceived right of private 
judgment and freedom from public slander eventually gave way to religious lib-
erty, as colonial elites like Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and James Madison 
developed first the ideological justification for rebellion against King George III 
and, then, the constitutional guidelines for establishing a new, democratic gov-
ernment. Increasingly, Americans abandoned toleration as inherently intolerant 
since it signified a religious superiority that was growing unpopular. The first 
article of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights made any church establishment ille-
gal and protected the free exercise of religion from legal restriction, while the 
Sixth Article guaranteed that no religious test could disqualify a candidate from 
public office (Beneke 2006: 136–137, 153–154, 167, 175). While toleration sug-
gested an impermanent condition of forebearance that the state could withdraw, 
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American notions of natural rights made religious liberty inalienable to each citi-
zen. Although Catholics as well as other non-Christians such as Jews and Indians 
still faced discrimination in many of the new states, the foundation of religious 
liberty had been established and gradually was exercised more firmly and equally 
(although not fully, even as of yet).
These developments simultaneously helped construct an ideal, nationalist 
subjectivity defined not only by white bodies, “Christian” values, and a shared 
British heritage but also by a certain practice of religion defined by Anglo secular 
and Protestant standards. To wit, as Talal Asad (2004: 190–191) has repeatedly 
demonstrated, secularist ideals such as those instantiated in the US Constitution 
were as much a product of the Protestant Reformation as Protestant sensibilities 
were shaped by secularism. In other words, the popular American subjectivity that 
emerged as a result of the revolution modeled certain religious and non-religious 
practices in public life that may have hewed to the notion of toleration yet, never-
theless, could lead to intolerance.
Like those of British colonial rule in America, the centuries of British impe-
rial rule of India saw changes in how the state managed religious diversity. With 
its ascendance to political and judicial power in Bengal following the Battle of 
Buxar in 1764, the East India Company sought to emulate as many Mughal pol-
icies and laws as possible. Until English Evangelicals complained long and loud 
enough, this included continuing previous Mughal patterns of state patronage 
for Hindu, Muslim, and other religious groups’ institutions such as temples, 
mosques, and dargahs (Sufi tombs). Meanwhile, although chartered by the 
English crown – which also served as nominal head of the established Church 
of England – the company forbade missionaries from entering India until, again, 
Evangelicals forced the issue using political pressure in the 1830s (Carson 2012: 
3–4). However, even with the termination of company patronage to religious 
institutions and its admittance of missionaries, Company Raj can no more be 
considered to have promoted an established church than the British Indian Raj 
that succeeded it. The governmental attitude toward religious diversity in either 
period had no name but was inherently governed by a tendency to avoid inviting 
antagonism to British rule that might imperil profits.
However, in the nineteenth century, as Indian elites began to mobilize for 
resistance to foreign rule and to organize for self-governance of a self-deter-
mined democracy, they first had to imagine their nation and promote a nationalist 
subjectivity uncongenial to overseas control. Of course, they did not do so ex 
nihilo but rather drew on both indigenous and British concepts to realize a nation 
and a model national subjectivity. Because Britons had since their earliest years 
of rule defined Indians as instinctively religious and, thus, as inherently divided 
– particularly between Hindus and Muslims – their imaginary was defined by 
religious diversity. The earliest of British knowledge projects attempting to 
understand the human contours of the lands they had recently acquired made 
religious identity one of the salient categories of interrogation, viewing “Hindu” 
and “Muslim” as mutually exclusive species of Indian who, for reasons explored 
later, were also inherently antagonistic to one another. Despite myriad changes 
in British Indian rule, these sentiments endured throughout most of its nearly 
Practicing the right to indifference 47
two centuries. Only at its end, when the furies of communalism threatened to 
consume South Asia, did the government desist in emphasizing religious differ-
ence, even as their censuses and other empirical studies continued to collect data 
on religious demographics (see Gottschalk 2012). Meanwhile, Western-educated 
Indian elites considered European models of democracy and secularism as they 
slowly attained more opportunities for self-rule and gathered increasing support 
for self-determination.
As C. S. Adcock has described, the nationalist movements of the early twen-
tieth century projected two models for managing India’s religious diversity in 
terms of secularism. While Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a Western model, Gandhi 
promoted what he viewed as an indigenous tradition of tolerance based on respect 
for all religions. Gandhi gave voice to his model during the 1920s’ debate regard-
ing the Shuddhi Campaign of the Arya Samaj that he described as an effort to 
convert Muslims to Hinduism. He judged proselytization as manifestly intolerant 
because of the presumption of religious superiority apparently motivating it. The 
Indian National Congress report on the 1931 eruption of Hindu–Muslim violence 
in Kanpur demonstrated how persuasive Gandhi’s views were with its portrayal 
of both the “ancient” (Hindu) and “Mughul” (Muslim) periods as characterized 
by religious toleration and political balance. The report held the Arya Samaj’s 
shuddhi (“purification”) endeavours as ultimately responsible for the current 
conflict. But, as Adcock shows so thoroughly, these conclusions helped deflect 
attention from the Congress’s own Hindu-oriented strategies and their alienating 
impact on Muslims while promoting Congress as successfully secular because of 
its tolerance ideal (Adcock 2014: 6–13).
Instead, Adcock insists, shuddhi involved caste identity far more than reli-
gious identity, while Congress’s emphasis on religion helped reaffirm that – 
and not caste – as the principle quality among Indians. Gandhi wrestled with 
B. R. Ambedkar in part to assure that those viewed as low castes remained in 
the fold of “Hinduism” (Adcock 2014: 13–15) at a time when he and most of 
the Congress leadership relied on Hindu themes, symbols, and motifs to help 
build and attract that largest Indian constituency possible: Hindus. “Tolerance,” 
therefore, became yet another of these Hindu characteristics. However, as in colo-
nial America, “tolerance” required a state or (as in this case) a majority who 
demonstrated forbearance and a minority that required it due to their dissent from 
joining or mirroring the majority. In colonial America as in Europe earlier, toler-
ation provided protection for minorities from state persecution. However, despite 
the endeavors of British and Hindu nationalist historians, few examples can be 
found in South Asia of premodern states – Muslim-led or otherwise – religiously 
persecuting significant populations. In this situation, then, Gandhi’s promotion of 
“tolerance” as a Hindu trait that should be demonstrated in the political moment 
provided yet another example of how Congress portrayed Hindus and their sup-
posed traditions as peaceful, accepting, and absorptive of invaders. This formu-
lation required an x-factor. If the need for tolerance was predicated on the threat 
of intolerance and if tolerance was an essential Indic quality, then those requiring 
tolerance perforce were non-Indians who represented a threat. In other words, 
despite differences in their messaging and declared attitudes toward Muslims, 
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leaders of the Indian National Congress and of Hindu nationalist organizations 
like the Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha formulated a normative nationalist 
subjectivity using “Indian qualities” that they most associated with Hindus.
Indian Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment
Since India entered its first phase of nationalist self-imagination in the nineteenth 
century, there have been some Indians who have similarly sought to negatively 
define the nation relative to Muslims. Although we should not discount the possi-
bility that some pre-independence Indians had interpreted certain social tensions 
as caused by differences between Hindus and Muslims, neither can we discount 
the impact of British Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment on Indian attitudes.
From the start of their rule, the British relied on a metanarrative of Muslim 
invasion and Hindu subjugation that derived from European medieval encoun-
ters with Muslims. Throughout this story ran a theme of Islamic persecution and 
Hindu victimhood that had not existed in any pervasive manner in South Asia 
before the eighteenth century. Although Indian nationalists today project a very 
different history, Muslim sovereigns who might have had an interest in oppress-
ing non-Muslim subjects usually faced considerable social and financial risk in 
doing so, as the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb discovered when protest derailed his 
1679 effort to impose the jizya tax (Faruqui 2009: 41).
Nevertheless, British-written historiography often took Hindu–Muslim antip-
athy as foundational to South Asian society and politics. This narrative simply 
transposed long-standing European stories of Muslim incursions into the Chris-
tian Holy Land (today’s Palestine/Israel) in the seventh century and Europe 
(through Iberia and Byzantium) in the eighth to fifteenth centuries, drawing on 
similar themes of an essentially malicious “Islam”-driving fanatic heathens. In 
early modern publications, Christian Europeans continued medieval themes of 
a sex-crazed, material-mad Muhammad who acted as a prophet “imposter” to 
satisfy his desires. Alternatively, medieval and early modern authors viewed him 
as a Christian heretic, driven to split the church for his own benefit. Yet others 
considered him working in league with Satan.
As the subject of such extreme views of a normative threat to Christian 
European social and theological orders, Muslims became the obvious choice as 
foils for negatively defining those orders. The Britons serving in both company 
and, then, British Indian rule brought with them sentiments shaped by centuries 
of anti-Muslim animus. While published – and often fantastic – portrayals of the 
Ottoman sultans’ “debauchery” and “despotism” may have served as the most 
frequent foil for British morality and good governance in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, many Britons in India encountered Muslims face-to-face. 
The books, essays, and sermons written by some of them proved popularly influ-
ential not only among Britons and other Europeans but among many Indians as 
well. For some, however, their personal interactions challenged the presupposi-
tions with which they had begun their Indian service.
Given the lessons of the British-informed historiography that coalesced in 
the nineteenth century regarding “Muslim invasions” and “forced conversions,” 
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Muslims could not but appear as foreign, intolerant, and ideologically non-Indic 
to many Western-educated Hindu elites. The “tolerance” theme of Gandhi – and 
the Arya Samaj – played into and reinforced this portrayal of Islam by bifurcat-
ing religions into those that proselytized and those that did not. According to the 
Samaj’s argument, the former demonstrated intolerance because of their presumed 
superiority while the latter reflected an acceptance of others. In the faulty logic of 
stereotypes, what was supposedly true of “Islam” was true of all Muslims, who 
necessarily could be viewed as condescending, intolerant, and, therefore, antag-
onistic. Hence, British and Hindu historians of the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries often portrayed the incursions of Western and Central Asians into South 
Asia as “Muslim invasions” with “Islam” as a motivating ideology that led to 
temple despoilment, monastery sacking, and forced conversion. Despite his close 
associations and even alliances with Muslims in his South African and Indian 
campaigns, Gandhi’s (1983: 398) autobiography often rehearses the theme of 
implacable Hindu–Muslim conflicts common to British accounts.
The demands of the Muslim League (led by the alienated former Congress 
leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah), its Direct Action campaign, and the horrors of 
partition provided more proof for many post-independence Hindu chauvinists 
regarding Muslim difference and intolerance. It is true that the assassination of 
Gandhi by former members of the RSS led to a deep unpopularity of this, one of 
the foremost Hindu nationalist organizations in pre-independence India. However, 
persistent antagonisms with Pakistan helped to maintain certain Islamophobic 
and anti-Muslim sentiments until the RSS rehabilitated itself and began its slow 
ascent to national prominence and political dominance beginning in the 1980s. 
Members of the RSS and its offshoots in the Sangh Parivar (“the family of 
organizations” branching out of the RSS) also targeted Indian Christians. They 
often repeated the complaints made by Arya Samajis a century earlier regarding 
“Western” missionaries of intolerant religions seeking to foist their supremacy on 
Hindus by denigrating them before converting them.
The Constitution of India – finalized in 1949 and promulgated the next year – 
guaranteed that “all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the 
right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion” (Parthasarathy 2015: 100). 
This positive freedom is complemented by a constraint established in Sections 
153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code that proscribe, respectively, “promot-
ing enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, 
residence, language, etc.” and “deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage 
religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.” Today, 
Sangh Parivar members attempt to outlaw proselytization to “protect” Hindus and 
Hinduism (which they portray as an “Indian religion”) from predatory “foreign” 
Muslims and Christians.
American Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment
For centuries, Muslims and Islamic traditions have represented foils by which 
Americans periodically have defined their nation, values, religions, and cit-
izens. Although instances of Islamophilia and Orientalist romanticism have 
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occasionally appeared, since at least the revolutionary era Muslims have played 
a similar, occasional role in non-Muslim American2 imaginations as they did in 
early modern British ones. British publications found eager readers in the col-
onies and then the new republic. Intellectual and political elites such as John 
Adams, John Quincy Adams, and Benjamin Franklin all negatively referenced 
Muhammad or Muslims in their public writing, clearly anticipating their readers 
to understand their references (see Spellman 2014).
During the debates in constitutional conventions for the individual states, as 
well as the one for the new nation, political statements favoring religious liberty 
often mentioned Muslims as foils for debates on religious tests. For instance, 
Jefferson (1853: 45) recounted in his Autobiography that as the Virginia legisla-
ture debated how to formulate their state constitution “a great majority” “meant 
to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the 
Christian and Mahometan.” Meanwhile, in 1776, Jefferson’s fellow Virginia 
statesman Richard Henry Lee said, “True freedom embraces the Mahomitan and 
the Gentoo as well as the Christian religion” (Madison 1985: 65). However, these 
statements evidence less an inclusive respect than a reiteration of Muslims as 
foils. Lee was not any more likely to anticipate that “Gentoos” (a contempo-
rary term for “Hindus”) lived in North America than he was that Muslims did. 
Muslims had for so long served as foils to European and Christian values that they 
could serve as markers of absolute alterity. Jefferson and Lee could just as readily 
have said, “We intend our laws to protect even Muslims.” Even if only intended to 
include hypothetical Muslims, however, the inclusive intent is clear since few of 
the republic’s founders likely recognized that Muslims lived among them.
American antipathy toward Muslims was not improved with the first interna-
tional war that their new republic fought. The new century soon brought conflict 
as President John Adams refused to pay tribute to a group of states on Africa’s 
Mediterranean coast. The “Barbary pirates” earned the ire of many Americans as 
they took hostage for ransom fellow citizens widely described in the popular press 
as “Christian men and women.” Although other Berbers allied with American 
forces and helped win some of the eventual US victories, the nation’s enemies 
were popularly denigrated using stereotypes of them as “Ottoman,” “infidels,” 
and “Muhammedans.” In later antagonistic moments between Americans and 
those who happen to be Muslim, many of these stereotypes have resurfaced to 
service new diatribes against “Arabs,” “Turks,” and other putative Muslims (see 
Allison 2000). By no means did these stereotypes remain the same, and by the 
middle of the century onward, racial inflections meant that some of the stereo-
types relied less on Islamophobic than anti-Muslim sentiment as they focused 
less on a fear of the religion, per se, and more on the denigration of Muslims as a 
perceived race and/or ethnicity.
The demise of the Soviet Union as a Cold War nemesis and the somewhat coin-
cidental ascent of insurgent groups utilizing violent Islamic ideologies has meant 
a more public resuscitation of Islamophobic and anti-Muslim sentiment than seen 
before 1979. In that year, Iranian students seized American embassy staff dur-
ing a revolution in which Shia leaders played a prominent (but not sole) role. 
“Political Islam” had purportedly toppled one of the United States’ most steadfast 
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allies in Central Asia: one who served as a bulwark against “Soviet expansion.” 
Although the United States also supported the mujahidin against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan and had partnered with the Wahhabi-legitimated Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, the inability to co-opt many Islamists stoked anew American fears of 
Islamic traditions. Meanwhile, less than two decades earlier changes in immigra-
tion and naturalization law – culminating in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(or Hart-Celler Act) of 1965 – allowed for the first time non-whites to migrate 
and become citizens without restriction. As the Cold War gave way to the War 
on Terror and as a new wave of nativism currently sweeps the country, various 
Islamophobic provocateurs, many Republican politicians, and some members of 
law enforcement have viewed the rising numbers of Muslim Americans (most of 
them non-white, some of them foreign-born) as potentially threatening, leading 
to surveillance, detention, deportation, and harassment. For many of these public 
actors, the demands of national security apparently have outweighed the rights of 
religious liberty.
Implicitly, Americans supportive of these developments have questioned the 
suitability of Muslims to fit the normative American nationalist subjectivity they 
presume to inhabit. Allegations of Islamic “intolerance” and “fanaticism” connote 
the suspicions cultivated over centuries that Muslims cannot be true Americans 
because their religious traditions interfere in the practice of secularity. Not with-
out reason have physical markers of Muslim “difference” – such as hijabs and 
mosques – come under attack (literally and figuratively) with crimes justified, 
paradoxically, in the name of protecting a tolerant society.
The right to indifference
Given the intersections of nationalism, secularism, and pluralism, it becomes clear 
that the struggles against Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment and for reli-
gious liberty in twenty-first-century India and the United States rely on an aware-
ness of the history that shaped conclusions that Muslims and Islamic traditions 
represent an imminent threat to the nation. Today, significant populist-nationalist 
ideologies attempt to harness enduring yet variable Islamophobia and anti-Muslim 
sentiment through a divergence of approaches that reflect the varied struggles 
each nation has faced in fulfilling its own ideals of pluralism, toleration, and 
secularism. But neither Prime Minister Modi nor President Trump, nor their sup-
porters, represent a new phenomenon with regard to intolerance and threats to 
religious liberty.
To properly counter the chauvinistic movements each represents, it will not 
be enough to simply address the ideas informing their views but also the liberal, 
nationalist, and secularist structures that have helped give rise to them. As one 
political commentator has argued, because liberal democracies value diversity 
and complexity they create a threat to the norms by which nations understand 
themselves. After all, despite the universal ideals their nations supposedly rep-
resent, nationalists also define themselves according to a set of particularities. 
Those within the country or attempting to enter who do not share these qualities 
threaten the norm and, thus, the oneness of the nation (Edsall 2017). Since their 
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inceptions, India and the United States have simultaneously celebrated their inte-
gration of immigrants and harbored ideas and sentiments that created “foreign” 
Muslims as a normative threat usefully employed as a foil to elaborate and justify 
the nation’s imagined values.
Meanwhile, in various Muslim-minority countries, the projected history of 
Muslims and the nation inflected through the ideology of “toleration” suggests 
that the state and/or populace accede to a Muslim presence only conditionally, 
perpetually maintaining the right or ability to no longer tolerate Muslims should 
they prove intolerable. As New England Protestants realized in the antebellum 
period, toleration does not necessarily imply belonging.
One approach toward undermining this notion of toleration and religiously 
chauvinistic definitions of national belonging might be to embrace “the right 
to indifference.” Coined in the 1970s by French civil rights groups such S.O.S. 
Racisme, droit à la difference promotes not simply a right to be different but 
also a right (or at least the respect) to have difference viewed by the state and/or 
citizens without interest or concern. Initially used in support of French persons 
with immigrant heritage, the right to indifference was later used by French gay 
communities to capitalize on the repeal of homophobic legislation and assert a 
place in society neutral in the eyes of their neighbours (Gunther 1999: 329).
In the United States, Muslims have asserted a right to indifference in various 
ways without calling it such. They – and other Americans – have urged govern-
ment and law enforcement to focus surveillance on perpetrators of civil violence 
instead of on Muslim communities. Legal endeavours to protect certain Muslim 
immigrants from the Trump administration’s strictures against them also asserts 
a demand to be treated without distinction because of their religious identity. 
Ideally, American secularism protects both against state restrictions on anyone’s 
religious exercise, as declared in the First Amendment, and against a religious 
test for public office holders, as established in Article Six. Yet not only is no 
right perfectly observed in all instances, but popular practice also erodes these 
strictures. For instance, candidates for political office so commonly declare their 
religious identities (if they have them) that not doing so might compromise their 
candidacy.
In contrast with the American context, Indian secularism proves more com-
plicated. As the differences between the two national government’s websites 
demonstrated at this chapter’s start, Indians often assert secularism through 
the celebration of difference among specifically named religious groups while 
American secularism abstractly promotes the pretence of equality among unnamed 
religions. The American state ideally practices a religious know-nothing attitude 
as reflected in the fact that its decennial census has never asked citizens to declare 
their religious identity. In contrast, the Indian state has continued the practice that 
the British inaugurated with their first all-Indian census in 1871–1872 of ask-
ing every citizen to declare their religious identity (Gottschalk 2012: 182–224). 
Hence, the National Portal of India (2020d) reports that 13.4 percent of the pop-
ulation are Muslims while the US website offers no such statistic. Meanwhile, 
Indian constitutional protections for the use of Muslim personal law instead of 
civil law, for instance, requires that the state both recognizes Muslim difference 
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and protect Muslim rights that differ from those of their Hindu, Christian, and 
Sikh fellow citizens.
Reformulating Indian and American national subjectivities so that the prac-
tice of indifference toward Muslim identity would mean that Muslim Indians 
and Muslim Americans would enjoy the condition in which neither their fellow 
citizens nor the national state see them first as Muslims or view their primary 
allegiance as to “Islam.” Only when their neighbors and governments practice 
indifference and not “toleration” toward Muslim identities and belonging will 
pluralism be self-determined instead of majoritarian- and state-established.
Notes
 1 The line removed from the website between December 2017 and August 2018 read 
“Operation Neptune Spear is carried out on May 2, 2011 resulting in the death of long-time 
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.”
 2 While recognizing the challenge of determining exact figures, Sylvia Diouf (2013: 70) con-
cludes “that there were hundreds of thousands of Muslims in the Americas” in the colonial 
period because of the enslavement of Africans and traces their few traditions that appeared 
to have survived their brutal conditions.
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4 State and violence in 
Burma/Myanmar
The Rohingya crisis and its implication for 
South and South-East Asia
Kazi Fahmida Farzana
The 2017 sudden explosion of nearly a million Rohingya refugees from 
Myanmar to its bordered neighbour Bangladesh took the world by surprise at a 
time when the decades-old domestic ethnic violence and instability in Myanmar 
were abating and a time of democratic peace was making inroads in the country 
through democratic reforms and a slow transition from the authoritarian military 
rule. The incident brought the entire world into this locality, exposing the multi-
tude and inhuman facades of the decades-old globally and, to a large extent, even 
regionally, ignored ethnic conflict. As more and more regional and global powers 
became engaged with the issue, a new look at the dynamic of peace and conflict 
in the region on the same or similar issues has been warranted from the policy-
makers, policy groups, and academic investigators.
Myanmar has long been known as a repressive military state. However, it, after 
five decades of military rule, has, since 2010, with its apparent change of govern-
ment from military to civilian, benefitted from positive media, resulting in many 
North American and European countries lifting their sanctions. Events which 
have been instrumental include its election in November 2015 and the subse-
quent so-called ‘democratic government’ that formed in March 2016, indicating 
to foreign powers that it is willing to move towards democracy. Among other 
positive changes, some important ones were a noticeable relaxing of restrictions 
on freedom of expression, allowing a limited number of political groups to form, 
and the release of several political prisoners from jail brought hope among the 
international community that the country has been moving towards democracy.
However, several years on, many still argue that Myanmar is only a quasi-military, 
as the influence and presence of the military is still very strong within the current 
elected government (Bünte 2014; Beets 2015; Stokke, Vakulchuk, and Øverland 
2018). Indeed, the topmost ranked files are filled by the former military regime, 
and one–fourth of the seats in both the upper and lower houses of the legislative 
branch are appointed by the military. A partial list would include senior General 
Min Aung Hlaing, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces who has 
been referred to by the United Nations as a candidate of ‘war criminals’ (Fortify 
Rights 2014), because of the crimes he committed against the Kachin and the 
Shan. The second-in-command is the home minister, Lt-General Kyaw Swe, who 
is accused of masterminding the murder of lawyer U Ko Ni,1 a prominent member 
of the Muslim minority and legal advisor to Myanmar’s ruling National League 
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for Democracy Party. The third-most powerful person is the minister of border 
affairs, Lt-General Ye Aung, who is responsible for the development of border 
areas and national races. And last but not least the fourth person in this group is 
the minister of defence, Lt-General Sein Win, who is responsible for the coun-
try’s national security and the armed forces.
These facts reveal the military’s continued grip on key institutions of power. 
Together, the four men control the most important state institutions, wielding 
power to manipulate the political and legal systems, to encourage and patronize 
xenophobic nationalism among Burmese citizens in favour of the predominant 
Theravada Buddhists’ Burman nationalism, and mobilize ethno-religious prej-
udices, hatred, and violence on other ethnic and religious minorities that only 
confirm the repressive authoritarian nature of the state.
Hence, under the current quasi-military government political reforms appear 
no more than eyewash which is reflective its current human rights record, which 
is considered to be worse than during the past military era. The past pattern of 
violence and atrocities against the Shan, Karen, Karenni, and Rohingya ethnic 
minorities continue with similar and, in some cases, with greater intensity. Even 
though the apparent democratizing trend has brought Myanmar in closer relations 
with countries, regionally and globally, the implications of the continued repres-
sive military policies fall primarily on the neighbouring South and South-East 
Asian countries.
The current chapter analyses the state of violence on the Rohingya ethnic 
minority group of Myanmar and its possible implications for the neighbouring 
countries in South and South-East Asian nations. Drawing on primary sources 
from partial fieldwork (in Bangladesh and Malaysia) involving interviews and 
focus group discussions with about 200 refugees and secondary sources, the anal-
ysis of this chapter argues that the internal ethno-religious conflicts in Myanmar 
have spillover effects on the neighbouring countries as the persecuted Rohingya 
community has largely dispersed in those countries like Bangladesh, India, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. The economic and social pressures of the displaced 
Rohingyas are likely to generate interstate diplomatic and socio-political tension 
between those countries and Myanmar.
Theoretical framework
The central problem of the Rohingya is that they claim their citizenship to the 
country as their natural right, but the state political authority continues to deny 
this natural right and entitlement, claiming that the Rohingya are outsiders or 
illegal immigrants. The question about the identity of the Rohingya of Myanmar 
can be discussed from the perspectives of the multiculturalism theory.
Over the past few decades, there is a changing political trend in Western 
democracies, strengthening cultural, minority and ethnic prominence in politics. 
According to Kymlicka, there are “shifts away from historic policies of assimi-
lation or exclusion towards a more ‘multicultural’ approach that recognizes and 
accommodates diversity” (2005: 28). It focuses on the micro features and diversi-
ties in the society, giving rise to the theory of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995). 
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The multicultural theorists argue that the conventional perception of citizenship 
rights was originally developed and defined by white men and for white men 
(Marshall 1965). So, such a concept is unable to accommodate the particular 
feeling, perceptions and needs of non-white or minority groups.
The theory of multiculturalism visualizes social equality within a larger com-
mon identity, through differentiated recognition, rather than merging differences. 
Kymlicka (1995) argued that “[a] comprehensive theory of justice in a multicul-
tural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of 
group membership. And certain group differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for 
minority cultures” (6). This is because, as Young (1989, 1990) argued, group dif-
ferences are fundamental and natural; therefore, any attempt to develop a univer-
sal conception of citizenship overlooking the group differences would be unjust 
to the groups.
Kymlicka (1995) has identified four mechanisms that fall under the boundary 
of multiculturalism. Those are known as assimilation, integration, accommoda-
tion and ethno-federalism. Assimilation refers to the government policy to com-
pel the minority groups to abandon their cultural peculiarities and adopt those of 
the majority group. This policy strikes on the identity of the group rather than 
forcing the group out of the territory. If the group’s cultural characteristics were 
eliminated, then their identity would be assimilated into the dominant group. 
For instance, the Canadian policy, in the early twentieth century, to forcefully 
segregate aboriginal children from their parents, forcing them to live in board-
ing schools, was implemented to forcefully re-socialize them out of the aborig-
inal cultural influences. The second mechanism is integration, which involves a 
greater amount of willingness on both majority and minority groups to recognize 
each other’s privileges and existence in exchange for certain compromises. Here, 
the minority recognizes and accepts that the majority will be culturally privileged, 
and will have larger control on resources and decision-making; in exchange, the 
majority will recognize and accept the minority’s right to practice and maintain 
aspects of its culture. The Malaysian experience in letting the Chinese and Indian 
communities continue to use their respective languages in schools or in maintain-
ing their vernacular and culture-specific schools are examples of the integration 
mechanism.
The third multicultural mechanism is called accommodation, which pre-
scribes a higher degree of cultural freedom for the minority. Known also as cul-
tural autonomy or affirmative action policies or “special representation rights” 
(Kymlicka 1995: 7), the accommodation mechanism ensures extensive rights and 
privileges reserved for members of minority ethnic groups. The policy may offer 
a range of greater rights such as the right to attend schools where the curriculum 
is designed in the minority language, special treatment in hiring, quotas for cer-
tain government positions and preference to minority members. The affirmative 
action policies of the United States exemplify the mechanism of accommoda-
tion. A much improved and institutional version of accommodation is known as 
“consociational democracy” (Ahmen 2005: 27) practised in the Netherlands. And 
finally, the ethno-federalism policy, which confers, on the minority groups, terri-
torial autonomy with a high degree of, but not complete control over, resources 
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and decision-making. Only specific powers are delegated to the groups to manage 
regional governance specific to the region and the groups; an entire country could 
be a federation of ethnic autonomous territories. In this case, the ethnic minorities 
must be geographically concentrated in particular regions in ways that the regions 
can be clearly distinguishable from each other. Known also as “self-government 
rights” (Kymlicka 1995: 7), such as the reservation system of the American 
Indians, the demand for group rights is not seen as a temporary measure; rather, 
such rights are natural. Aboriginal peoples and other national minorities such as 
the Quebecois or Scots claim permanent and inherent rights, grounded in a princi-
ple of self-determination. These groups occupy a particular homeland or territory 
and share a distinct language, culture, heritage and history. Such cultural nations 
are usually located within the territories of a larger and different political commu-
nity but claim, due to their distinctiveness, the right to self-autonomy to maintain 
their distinct culture and otherness. What these national minorities want is not 
primarily better representation in the central government but, rather, the transfer 
of power and legislative jurisdictions from the central government to their own 
communities. The Belgian, Canadian and the autonomous regions of China are 
examples of ethno-federalism.
The theory of multiculturalism and the various mechanisms are based on 
recognizing differences; hence, known also as “differentiated citizenship” and 
“multicultural citizenship” in contrast to the universal citizenship. Although the 
theory is West-centric, we have seen some Asian countries such as China and 
Malaysia adopted various forms of multiculturalism. It apparently looks more 
attractive for multi-ethnic nations, in situations where integration, or common 
culture theory of citizenship, was found to be inadequate in resolving issues of 
sub-national identities.
The facts about the state of violence on the Rohingya
The Rohingya are a historical ethnic minority Muslim population in the state of 
Rakhain in Myanmar. Historically, Rakhain is known as Arakan, which was an 
independent kingdom during the Mughal Empire and until the advance of the 
British colonialism in the region. Once Burma became a part of the British India 
border, re-organization placed Arakan in the Burmese administrative region, but 
it maintained certain autonomous status. However, upon the Burmese independ-
ence in 1948, the Burmese government adopted a fierce nationalist agenda of 
unification and homogenization which caused ethno-nationalist separatist move-
ments in a number of regions among which Arakan was one. However, compared 
with other ethnic groups in Myanmar, the Arakani Muslims experienced more 
systematic and sustained forms of persecution apparently on three grounds: that 
they collaborated with the British Army to fight against the Burmese, that some of 
them were Indian labourers who were brought to Arakan during the British period 
and therefore were not deemed as ethnic to the land and that they were Muslims. 
To maintain an absolute grip on the region, the Burmese government applied sys-
tematic exclusion methods such as denying citizenship to the Rohingyas, impos-
ing social, economic, political and religious restrictions, and forceful eviction and 
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expulsion. Simultaneously, the government adopted human transplantation in the 
region by the local Buddhist in an attempt to create severe population imbalance 
against the Muslims to the point of their extinction.
A classical method of persecution that any military or authoritarian regime 
employs in wartime or ethnic cleansing cases, such as what happened during 
the Japanese occupation of China and South Korea during World War II and the 
Serbian ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims in the Balkans in the 1990s 
(Chang 1997; Tanaka 2001; Skjelsbæk 2011; Hirschauer 2014) is sexual vio-
lence in the form of rape and mutilation. The Myanmar military regime applied 
the same method of sexual violence on the Rohingya women systematically for 
decades. My fieldwork and personal interviews in February 2018 with survivors 
who had fled to Bangladesh and Malaysia revealed numerous instances of gang 
rape and cruel violence by Myanmar’s military and security forces. Reports by 
various rights groups and aid organizations also shed light on rape being used as 
a key component of the military’s persecution of the Rohingya to force them out 
of the country (Bennett 2017). Pramila Patten, United Nations’ special rapporteur 
on sexual violence in conflict, has been noted as saying, “Sexual violence is being 
commanded, orchestrated and perpetrated by the Armed Forces of Myanmar” 
(Quadir 2017: 89). The 2017 Human Rights Watch report interviewed 52 women 
from 19 different villages of the Rakhine state and found that 29 had been raped. 
Skye Wheeler, a Human Rights Watch researcher, said:
Rape has been used by the armed forces of Myanmar as one of the ways 
to carry out ethnic cleansing. It worked out so effective to attack someone, 
because rape often has lasting traumatic memories that make it even harder 
for women to go back to Myanmar and feel safe in places where they have 
been assaulted.
(Hancock 2017)
The available numerous authentic documents testify that for decades the 
Rohingya have undergone systematic denial to legitimate rights, and persecution 
of arson, torture, arbitrary killing, gang rape, being burnt alive, forceful detention 
and other grave human rights violations by Myanmar military and state secu-
rity as well as civilian forces (Selth 2018). The United Nations has termed this 
a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (UN News 2017) while others have 
called this a “slow genocide” (Ibrahim 2016; Klug 2018). As a consequence of 
these multiple forms of perpetrated violence nearly 2 million Rohingya Muslims 
have fled Myanmar since the late 1970s (Farzana 2017). Many took shelter in 
neighbouring South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India), South-East Asian coun-
tries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) and beyond.
Of these countries, Bangladesh being the bordering state with Rakhain, it bears 
the heaviest burden of the fleeing Rohingya population. Bangladesh is currently 
a host to over a million Rohingya refugees. According to a United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2018) report, following an escalation in 
violence in Rakhine, between August 2017 and 31 July 2018, approximately 
723,527 Rohingya population were forced to leave the Rakhine state of Myanmar 
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and entered into Bangladesh. This makes it the third-largest recorded exodus of the 
Rohingya; the first and second forced migrations were in 1978 during Operation 
Nagamin (Dragon King) and in 1991 during the Pyi Thaya (Prosperous Country) 
Operation. Other than Bangladesh, India also has sizeable number of Rohingya 
refugees. Indian prime minister’s plan to send an estimated 56,500 Rohingya 
refugees currently in India to Bangladesh caused tensions between the countries.
Among the South-East Asian countries, Thailand and Indonesia have been 
used as a transit point by the refugees to enter into Malaysia. Perhaps that is why 
the number of Rohingya refugees in Thailand is small, which is about 5,000, 
and Indonesia has about 1,750 Rohingya refugees mostly concentrated in various 
camps in Banda Aceh. Malaysia hosts the highest number of Rohingya refugees. 
As of February 2020, there are 101,010 stateless Rohingya registered with the 
UNHCR, and an estimated 30,000-plus remain undocumented. Rohingya refu-
gees in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia are a very underprivileged, marginal-
ized social group facing constant challenges, and their marginal status has been 
exacerbated by various local socio-political factors/circumstances. During our 
interviews with the Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, most of them mentioned ‘fear 
of detention’ by saying things like “sufferings greet us all the time”, “no respect 
for Rohingya” and “police and immigration officers search for us”. This situation 
is connected to the state attitude and policies towards the refugees. None of these 
countries is a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or its Protocol and, 
therefore, are not bound to have any legal framework or protection mechanism 
for refugees. Registered refugees are not documented migrants and all are consid-
ered ‘illegal’, ‘prohibited’ immigrants and ‘security threat’ under the law.
Forceful internal and cross-border displacement and expulsion of a large num-
ber of people as refugees being an obvious consequence of the state repression, 
there are also unintended inhuman consequences for countries like Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia and Malaysia, Thailand and other parts of the world as many of 
the persecuted people would take illegal routes for escape, therefore leading to 
human trafficking, social insecurity and further new challenges to human security 
in those countries.
The case of Rohingya can be explained from the perspective of ‘Structural 
Violence’, a situation purportedly created by an authority through state insti-
tutions and policies targeting a particular group of people with an intention to 
inflict a predesigned consequence on them. Obviously, the most direct of that 
structural violence is the Rohingya people being ‘stateless’ despite their having 
a legitimate state. This statelessness is something that is produced by their own 
state and not created by the people or the community itself. It is an imposed con-
dition by the state with stated intention. Once a community is made stateless, it 
becomes legally and structurally subject to all and any form of depravation and 
violence. The depriving state in such a situation institutionalizes its acts through 
legal regimes and political socialization of its people that its acts and policies 
are legitimate. According to Maung Zarni (2017), stateless is structural violence, 
and structural inequality and structural violence are connected. He further argues 
that statelessness is structural violence which is linked to political socialization 
or domestic societal tendency and an illiberal regime miseducates its citizens 
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about the concept of what people or communities are. The state may mobilize 
ethno-religious prejudices and, in some cases, hatred to advance its political 
agenda (Zarni 2017). Desmond Tutu has rightly commented that such “discrimi-
nation doesn’t come naturally; it is taught” (quoted in Zhou and Safi 2017).
The Myanmar state narratives: politics of labelling
Like every state that practices such policies, Myanmar has its own narrative of jus-
tification of its acts and policies towards the Rohingya people which is based on 
puritanical nationalism. This form of nationalism is inclusive of its ethno-religious 
and cultural-linguistic homogeneity, on one hand, and simultaneously exclusive 
of non-conforming others, on the other hand. As such, the dominant narrative of 
the Myanmar government has been focused on rejecting the Rohingya by denying 
them their legality, personalities, and citizenship. The dominant narratives of the 
state and state-centred history claim that in the post-independent Rakhine state, 
all Rohingya Muslims are illegal immigrants. It has constructed and framed the 
Rohingya minority as “Other”, hence justifying the state’s actions in eliminating 
“the existential threat” to the Burmese population and its way of life (Holt 2019).
In constructing as well as maintaining its grand narrative, the Myanmar gov-
ernment has always rejected all accusations against its military and government 
of the ethnic cleansing that has been taking place in the Rakhine state. Although 
Aung Sun Suu Kyi promised that “Myanmar will ensure secure environment for 
all communities” (Ranjan 2017: 2), there are clear indications that the nationalist, 
quasi-military government views the Rohingya as an “illegal insurgent group,” 
not as citizens.
The grand narrative is constructed carefully by playing with the historical 
records through a combination of distortion, rewriting and omitting of the histor-
ical facts with regard to Arakan and its people. This process started mainly after 
the conquest of Arakan by the Burman in 1784. Between 1784 and 1948, Arakan 
witnessed a long tussle between the British Indian and the Burmese kingdom 
over its territory as the British Indian authority wanted to use it as a buffer zone to 
prevent the Burmese threat, and the Burmese authority wanted to take complete 
control over the land to push the British threat farther west. Thus, the official 
grand narrative claims that the people in the land were artificially planted by the 
British authority for its advantage and those people came from the British Bengal. 
Therefore, the Arakani Muslims are not native to the land, and they do not nat-
urally form a part of the Burmese nationhood. Since, according to the Burmese 
claim, this is the historical facts about the people of Arakan, they are outsiders 
and therefore do not qualify for citizenship. So the policies of exclusion are not 
discriminatory; rather, these are legally justified.
While this grand narrative has some merits, it hides many other historical 
realities and facts that suggest an otherwise narrative. Other available authen-
tic historical sources suggest that the politics over the land, locality, people and 
their identity of the region is much more complicated than its simplified version 
presented by the Burmese authority. A cursory look at the major historical facts 
present with the following scenario.
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First, the area between modern Burma and Bangladesh, where today’s 
Rakhine state is located, has a long history of people travelling or moving back 
and forth across the boundary. Rakhine was once an independent Maruk-U (the 
ancient name of Arakan) kingdom, separated from the two Burmese kingdoms 
in Central Burma and the Irrawaddy Delta, as well as Bengal and the Mogul 
Empires in India (Charney 2016). In 1459 CE, the Arakani kingdom conquered 
the adjacent Chittagong region on its western frontier (today’s south-eastern part 
of Bangladesh) and ruled it until 1666 CE. Evidence from Arakan genealogy 
demonstrates that during this time, the Muslims’ relationship with the Maruk-U 
kingdom became stronger, which also explains the Bengali influence in Arakan. 
Some of the Arakanese kings even adopted Muslim names (Phayre 1967; Jilani 
1999), and “became somewhat Mahomedanised in their ideas” (Bhattacharya 
1927: 141). During this time, “an attitude of tolerance prevailed, with Theravada 
and Mahayana Buddhism, together with Brahmanism, Hinduism, animism and 
other beliefs” (Blackburn 2000: 14). Thus, it was an inclusive and heterogeneous 
society that tolerated each other.
Second, historically, it appears that the ethnic tensions were deeply rooted even 
before modern Burma as a nation came into being. Conflict in Arakan can be 
traced to the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, when various invasions 
came from the Irrawaddy Valley, from the Kingdom of Ava and the Kingdom 
of Pegu, which, at the time, were engaged in a massive war with each other 
(Charney 2016). Subsequently, in 1784, the Burmese king Bodawpaya conquered 
and incorporated the Arakan region into his kingdom, Ava, in Central Burma. 
During this incorporation process, the king replaced the Arakan throne with their 
own kings and brought in administrators, soldiers and settlers. This transforma-
tion of integration with the Irrawaddy Valley brought about in this region the 
Irrawaddy Valley culture, the Burmese language, Burmese script, Theravada 
Buddhist monks and Theravada Buddhism that first appeared as a royal cult in 
Arakan (Charney 2016).
During this period a systematic socio-political and economic oppression was 
inflicted on the people of Arakan by the Burman king. The most common form of 
oppression was heavy taxation imposed on the people. G. E. Harvey (1967: 280) 
mentioned that those who were not able to pay taxes were summoned to various 
garrison headquarters, and “when they arrived the Burmese would round them 
up and massacre them.” Many similar incidents were reported with thousands 
of people (both Muslim and Buddhist Rakhines) killed between 1790 and 1797, 
compelling thousands more to flee from this area to the then adjoining British 
colonial territory of Bengal (Harvey 1967: 282). The local Arakanese began to 
rebel against the Burmese oppression. Thus, it can be argued that Arakan was 
deeply affected by the invasion of the Irrawaddy Valley. Since then, the relation-
ship between the state of Arakan and the Burmese king was marked by animosity 
and deep mistrust.
Third, another murky episode that deepened the enmity between the local 
people and the Burmese kings was when the British imperial power colonized 
Burma (1824–1886). Their first step was to annex Arakan and use it as a buffer 
zone to invade mainland Burma. Faced with severe oppression by the Burmese 
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king, the Arakanese supported the British when the colonizers offered their sup-
port. During this time, as part of the British dual administration policy, the ethnic 
minority-based frontier areas and other ethnic and religious groups were able to 
move to the top levels of the colonial services (Smith 1999), and the peripheral 
states were allowed to govern their area under the control of traditional rulers. 
During this time, Arakanese Muslims, Karen, Shan and many other minority 
groups collaborated with the British colonial power against the Burmese state.
This policy of divide and rule of the British authority comprising ethnic minor-
ities to suppress Burmese resistance (Moscotti 1977) created more a tense and 
conflictual relationship between the Burmese and ethnic minorities. This was a 
significant factor in solidifying the boundaries between the Burmese and ethnic 
minorities. This evolving nature of borderlands’ geography has played an impor-
tant role in constructing, reshaping and complicating the Rohingya identity in the 
post-independence era.
It is due to these historical facts that the post-independence Burmese gov-
ernment has perceived the Rohingya as collaborators with the British enemy, 
and since it was the British who brought a large number of Indian labourers to 
Arakan, the Rohingya were not deemed compatible with the push to promote a 
sense of national solidarity. Moreover, because their religion, Islam, differed from 
the dominant practice of Theravada Buddhism, it was easy for the government 
officials to view and represent them as ‘others’. As part of its nation-building 
process, Burma/Myanmar, under its five decades of military rule until today, has 
been trying to establish an imaginary nation that is ‘homogeneous and exclusiv-
ist’ so that the majority Theravada Buddhist, Burmese-speaking, Burman culture 
remain unchallenged.
It is this process of nation building and Burmanization of the land that the 
politics of ‘remaking of Rakhine’ (Charney 2016) as part of a greater Myanmar 
that continues today. By changing its name from Arakan to Rakhine state (named 
for the majority Buddhist community), militarizing the state, patronizing the 
in-migration of Rakhine population from various areas to the Rakhine state, 
making Rakhine look increasingly like the majority culture, language and reli-
gion the process of exclusion continues. The process has involved a distortion 
of the historical facts that the “archaeological sites, texts, and other sources are 
being remade or expunged to develop a historical record that emphasizes an 
unchallenged culture and religious homogeneity to the region” (Charney 2016: 
4). A recent example of such distortion is that the Myanmar government even 
officially banned the term Rohingya, claiming that it is a recent invention by 
Muslim separatists. Aung Sun Suu Kye in her defence of Myanmar at The Hague 
International Court of Justice did not use the term Rohingya at all. While apart 
from eight hundred years of the claims of the people, some documents by the 
Western authors suggest that at least three hundred years earlier, the people used 
to call themselves Rohingya. Francis Buchanan’s diary, published in 1799, men-
tioned “the Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan . . . call themselves 
Rooinga, or natives of Arakan” (Buchanan 1799: 220). Any attempt to dismiss 
this kind of evidence will only obscure the truth. The government’s denial of 
history has positively eased Rakhine’s integration into the Myanmar nation-state 
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but has simultaneously undermined the true Rakhine past, its unique culture and 
history based on tolerance, inclusion and diversity.
Implications for South and South-East Asian countries
It is argued in this chapter that in the context of normalizing relations between 
Myanmar and its South and South-East Asian nations, the conflict between 
Myanmar authority and the Rohingya ethnic minority community has a spillover 
effect on Myanmar’s neighbours. This is obvious due to voluntary, forceful, or 
otherwise, refugee flow to the neighbouring countries, the induced diplomatic 
tensions, and socio-economic and human security–related pressures caused in 
those countries. The most likely enduring implication could be that the conflict 
might take a perpetuating tendency due to Myanmar’s deliberate state policy of 
denial of citizenship to the Rohingya minority group considering them as illegal 
immigrants. The resultant chain implication of this on the neighbouring coun-
tries could be that they might to carry the burden of the refugees forever. This 
will likely compromise with peace in the entire two regions due to socio-eco-
nomic pressures and human security issues caused by the refugees, cross-border 
human trafficking, and intentional terrorism and crimes. This a serious contextual 
analysis.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh, being the immediate bordering state with Rakhain, faces the horrible 
nightmare of the refugee pressure. Since Bangladesh had been burdened with a 
huge number of refugees since the 1978 influx, its initial reaction to the 2017 new 
influx was to ‘push back’, yet it failed to control and eventually opened its bor-
der due to the gravity of the situation and on humanitarian context. Unwillingly, 
Bangladesh is now hosting at least 1 million documented Rohingya refugees. The 
Bangladeshi government maintains that the Rohingyas were not originally from 
Bangladesh and were not officially known until 1978 when they first crossed the 
border from Myanmar in huge numbers because of political upheaval in their land 
of origin.
Hence, the Bangladeshi government views the issue as created by the Myanmar 
state and reiterates that it is not the ultimate responsibility of Bangladesh to take 
care of these people and that since the Rohingyas originated from Myanmar, they 
must return to Myanmar and cannot be allowed to stay in Bangladesh perma-
nently. Under such a resolute denial, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh live a 
miserable life, especially the newcomers. It is a serious humanitarian situation in 
the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh where the refugees have been placed, with 
some human rights organizations warning that an epidemic may break out at any 
time, due to the serious lack of food and medical care (Banerjee 2019).
More than a million unwanted refugees have already caused social antago-
nism in the locality in Bangladesh as the local poor feel that they are deprived of 
the lucrative foreign food aid handed to the refugees, the local labour market is 
illegally encroached by the refugees and the inadequate health care facilities for 
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the locals are being overpopulated by the refugees. The refugees also cause local 
political tension as well since political parties and their local interest groups take 
illegal advantage of the refugees as potential vote bank in exchange of monetary 
benefits extended to the latter. There is a possibility that this situation may esca-
late to even more conflicts between refugees and the locals.
To avoid any local or inter-state conflict the Bangladesh government has always 
maintained its position to solve the crisis through peaceful means of negotiation 
and full repatriation of the refugees. However, due to deliberate negligence and 
procrastination on the part of Myanmar, the issue remained unresolved for dec-
ades. As late as 23 November 2017, Bangladesh signed a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) with Myanmar government (Reuters 2017) on repatriation. The 
MOU carefully avoided identifying the refugees as ‘refugees’ or ‘Rohingya’, 
instead calling them as ‘displaced persons from Rakhine State’. Furthermore, it 
is fairly obvious that the MOU itself is quite ineffective since it resulted from a 
hurried expectation on the Bangladesh side of stopping further refugee flow and 
quickly returning the refugees and, on Myanmar’s side, from a tendency to abate 
the international pressure and criticism.
This fact is very much clear from the terms and conditions of this new agree-
ment of repatriation that these are the same as those of the 1990s repatriation 
deal (Abrar 1994) – which was mostly a failed attempt – under which refugees 
had to prove, through documentation, that they were from the Rakhine state and 
that they had to agree to repatriation on “temporary resident” status. Because 
both countries do not seem to take the agreements seriously, it is not surprising 
that refugees continued to rush into Bangladesh until today, although in lesser 
numbers.
From the refugees’ perspective, the repatriation deal is also impractical and 
seriously objectionable. The refugees in the new settlement sites are still very 
traumatized by the violence and atrocities they experienced in Myanmar. More 
than 60 per cent of the new arrivals are women and children (UN Children’s Fund 
2017). Apparently, the recent violence created many households to be headed by 
single mothers with lots of orphans. Our fieldwork data from the interviewees in 
Cox’s Bazar in February 2018 documented testimonies that although they had 
been in Bangladesh for more than six months, the spiralling smoke from their 
burning villages and the smell of burnt dead bodies still remained painfully fresh 
in their subconscious minds, creating sleeplessness and a distaste for food.
A more serious concern of any voluntary repatriation on behalf of the ref-
ugees is safety and dignity.2 The refugees claim that returning to Myanmar 
without proper assurance of safety and dignity is tantamount to jumping from 
the frying pan into the fire. This is because the past experience of the refugees 
who returned earlier faced even more harsh torture and persecution which made 
many to flee again. This is substantiated by the Amnesty International (2018) 
report that Myanmar was further militarizing Rohingya villages and eradicating 
the evidence of their crimes against humanity by bulldozing Rohingya villages 
and replacing with newly constructed military bases. Furthermore, about five 
thousand Rohingya remain trapped at no-man’s land between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar (Alsaafin 2018). Several media report also stated that the sound of open 
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gunfire and announcements by the Myanmar military were in place to frighten the 
Rohingya to flee Myanmar (Myint 2019).
Under such a militarized and militant atmosphere in Rakhain, it is inconceiv-
able for the refugees to even think of returning. From their practical experience 
and observation, the refugees started coming out to be recognized as a party to 
any repatriation agreement as they on 19 January 2018 submitted a thirteen-point 
demand to Ms. Yanghee Lee, UN special rapporteur on the human rights situa-
tion in Myanmar who visited refugee camps and settlements in Cox’s Bazar. The 
demands included the following seven major points:
 1. “citizenship” and equal rights are granted to the Rohingya;
 2. a nationality card is issued to them prior to repatriation;
 3. the Myanmar government ensures improved law and order for all Rohingya;
 4. the UN and ICC are involved in this repatriation process;
 5. their original land in the Arakan (Rakhaine) state is returned to them;
 6. ICC ensures justice against crimes of gang rape, killing, and destruction of 
properties; and,
 7. the UN fact-finding missions and the investigation teams are allowed to 
investigate the details arising from the August 2017 incidents.
Not being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol, 
Bangladesh can officially proceed with the repatriation process. However, any 
repatriation under the current situation is likely to be a violation of the principle 
of non-refoulement policy of those relevant conventions that state that refugees 
should not be forced to return to their home country. This makes the situation 
even more precarious for Bangladesh in terms of looking after the survival and 
welfare of the refugees and maintaining local law and order and economic and 
social stability in the region.
Rivalry between regional powers
The Rohingya crisis is more than just about Myanmar’s religious and ethnic ten-
sions. It has crossed that threshold and has become an international issue. In 
this connection, it is important to consider major power politics, particularly the 
two rising powers – China and India. The Arakan/Rakhain issue can potentially 
cause further regional conflict involving those great as well as regional powers. 
Myanmar is resource-rich, and it is strategically located near major Indian Ocean 
shipping lanes. Myanmar has a 2,129-km border with China on the north-east 
and a 1,468-km border with India on the north-west. Because of its geostrategic 
importance along with being economically important to both China and India, 
these countries want to protect and defend their respective interest in Myanmar, 
with which they have long-established economic and military relations. Both 
countries have concluded major trade agreements (Zhao 2008; Solanki 2018; 
Peng 2019). And furthermore, Arakan/Rakhain, being a resourceful region and 
located on the Indian Ocean shore, has the strategic importance of the region is 
more lucrative to both China and India. According to many reports, China wants 
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to build an Asian highway with a new seaport through Rakhine state in the Bay 
of Bengal (Kamal 2017). This highway will connect China to the Indian Ocean 
securing a number of advantages for the country. First, China is unlikely to be 
comfortable with an increasing American influence in Myanmar as it progresses 
towards democracy. So a highway directly connecting to the Indian Ocean can 
substantially counter the strategic influence of the US on Myanmar. Second, with 
American influence in the South China Sea, China would like to find an alterna-
tive route on the proposed Asian highway for its trade and import of oil, bypassing 
the South China Sea. The highway can also offer China an easy short-cut access 
to the Indian Ocean to trade with Africa and Europe. Therefore, it is quite logical 
for China to see the Rakhain region remain free of conflict and security threats 
from any separatist or insurgent or ‘Islamic’ terrorist group. Even if this can be 
ensured by forceful eviction of the entire suspect population, China may maintain 
no reservation on that. Indeed, this was reflected in the UN Security Council’s 
first meeting on the Rohingya issue on 28 September 2017, when China and 
Russia supported the Myanmar government. It is to be noted here that both China 
and Russia are major suppliers of military arms and gadgets to Myanmar.
With regard to India’s interest in Myanmar, it maintains a similar perspective 
like that of China. This is clearly indicated in its official position in support of 
Myanmar during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in 2018 at a time when 
the entire world was still horrified by the 2017 Rohingya refugee explosion and 
Myanmar was heavily criticized for its brutal military atrocities in Rakhain. This 
opens two opportunities for India. On one hand, it can improve its economic 
relations with China by joining the Asian highway project to create an economic 
‘industrial zone’ in Myanmar, particularly in the Rakhine state, to exploit its 
natural resources. On the other, it legitimizes India’s plan to send an estimated 
56,500 Rohingya refugees currently in India to Bangladesh arguing that they are 
in fact Bangladeshis. Furthermore, Indian support for Myanmar’s expulsion of 
Rohingyas allegedly being Bangladeshis extends legitimacy to India to expel in 
a similar fashion the alleged Bengalis from Bangladesh who have been staying 
illegally in the north-eastern states of India. Such a move has later actually been 
taken through several censuses in the eastern provinces of India which classified 
a few million people as non-citizens. On the same issue, India–Bangladesh rela-
tions have been tense during 2018–2019.
Clearly, if such a situation persists involving great and regional powers’ con-
testation over the strategic importance of the Rakhain region, then it is likely 
that their support would make Myanmar invincible in continuing its repression 
of the Rohingya people and in shrugging off international pressure to accept any 
responsibility and liability to the expelled millions.
Militancy, extremism and terrorism
It is a worldwide trend in the contemporary world to label anti-government 
groups, more specifically separatist groups or movement for independence, as 
terrorists. Terrorism as a blanket term has effectively criminalized any legitimate 
activities or movements for self-independence. This is more conveniently used 
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against any Muslim group. Countries, where there are large Muslim minority 
communities concentrated in a specific land area and are active for their auton-
omy or independence, are subject to such terrorist label. Examples include 
China (Uighur), India (Kashmir), Myanmar (Rohingyas), Moros (Mindanao, the 
Philippines), and Turkey (Kurds). Myanmar, in its 2017 large-scale operation 
against the Rohingya Muslims, officially used the rhetoric of Muslim terrorism. 
Concurrently, Bangladesh and India also directly stated their official position 
on concerns of ‘national security threat’, ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ emanat-
ing from the 2017 Rohingya expulsion case. On this, Bangladesh sided with the 
extreme communal Hindu Indian and extremist Buddhist Myanmar governments 
in identifying the Rohingya as a common ‘national security threat’.
The official narratives of labelling the Rohingya refugees as terrorists and extrem-
ists are also reinforced by government-linked or even independent think tanks, policy 
experts and security analysts and experts whose voluminous works over the past few 
decades, and especially after 9/11, have turned ‘Islamic terrorism’ a growth industry 
(Jackson 2007). The international media coverage in support of such views, as well 
as opinion-making, has also aided in the growth of this industry (El-Aswad 2013).
The downside of this labelling politics is an exoneration of governments and 
institutions that perpetrate unjust violence, cruelty, oppression, ethnic cleansing 
and religio-cultural genocide from liability and accountability. The labelling pol-
itics rather works as an easy excuse for some countries and leaders to become 
more oppressive with a free hand. Such indiscriminate and purported labelling 
can also potentially turn a peaceful community or movement into militancy out 
of anger, frustration, and desperateness. Many argue that such is the case with 
the Rohingya community who have been largely peaceful in their approach and 
claim to political rights, human rights, and natural justice. There are some negli-
gible groups of people who have called for independence of the region, but they 
remained peaceful until 2017 systematic military atrocities on the Rohingya peo-
ple to evacuate them and apparently to clear the land for foreign investors. This 
is arguably true because the Myanmar government claimed that its large-scale 
operation in 2017 was a follow-up response to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation 
Army (ARSA) assault on its soldiers. This means ARSA might not have been a 
militant group earlier until it felt the government atrocities unbearable.
A second and more dangerous implication of Rakhain instability is the refu-
gee flow to other nearby and safer destinations, such as Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, and its resultant socio-political consequences. The Indian government 
and people have shown an intolerant and hostile attitude towards the Rohingya 
living in the country, with the threat of pushing them back to Bangladesh and 
labelling them as Bengalis. Such an attitude easily gets mixed with the com-
munal and violent local political trends raising inter-state and regional tension. 
Following the 2017 mass eviction, Malaysia became the strongest political critic 
of Myanmar (both Malaysia and Myanmar are Association of South-East Asian 
Nations [ASEAN] members) going beyond the ASEAN charter of non-interfer-
ence. Mammoth political rallies headed by the then prime minister and other 
high-ranking government and political leaders strongly condemned Myanmar’s 
government and the civilian leader Aung Sun Suu Kyi. The Muslim population of 
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Malaysia became highly charged and emotional calling for boycotting Myanmar 
politically and economically (Naidu 2017). In response, the extremist Buddhist 
people in Myanmar reacted strongly through street demonstrations and burning 
the national flag of Malaysia (The Bangkok Post 2017). A similar reaction was 
recorded from the Indonesian side where an increasing number of Rohingya were 
arriving on a daily basis and many more were floating on the nearby seas. The 
implication of the incident of Rohingya eviction in 2017 even seriously affected 
the subsequent ASEAN summit that failed to bring the issue on its agenda dis-
pleasing Malaysia. The ASEAN members were seriously divided, and some 
of them were highly angered. ASEAN, the most cooperative, peaceful, and 
well-functioning regional organization, became nearly dysfunctional.
A third serious implication for the refugee-hosting countries is socio-economic 
tension that the refugees create locally as illegal migrants. Because they are con-
sidered illegal, they enjoy no legitimate and legal rights to work or education and 
health care facilities. And yet they need to maintain their daily subsistence. Other 
than Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees in India, Malaysia, and Indonesia remain 
largely dispersed in the open society. These people immediately start invading 
the labour and illegal petty business sectors as a substitute shadow economy. This 
creates tension among the local population. It is alleged that in Bangladesh and 
Malaysia, the illegal migrants are often employed by the exploitative production 
and business sectors with low and sometimes no wages. The corrupt police admin-
istration runs a profitable arrest-and-release business in exchange for bribes, and 
the refugees become a regular issue of electoral politics in those countries.
And the most enduring and inhuman implication for those neighbouring and 
other distant countries is illegal human trafficking (Human Rights Watch 2015; 
Menon 2015; Hindustan Times 2017). Due to military and civilian atrocities in 
Rakhine, the Rohingya people have been taking every possible opportunity to 
escape to a safer destination out of desperateness. Because legal means of travel 
is impossible for them, they fall prey to the cruel underground local and interna-
tional human trafficking networks. It is reported that even the Myanmar Buddhist 
monks are involved in such trafficking businesses to reap economic benefits from 
the oppressed and evicting in the process. A clear chain of networks of such under-
ground traffickers was evident when 139 mass graves of Rohingya were uncovered 
along the Thai–Malaysia border (Yi 2015). On either side of the border, the discov-
ery of a number of mass graves shocked the nations in the region and created a seri-
ous political sensation. Indeed, the fieldwork data testify that most of the Rohingya 
migrants in Malaysia had arrived in the country through underground trafficking. 
The collateral torture, suffering, and abuse that the moving illegal migrants expe-
rience are incredible, particularly the women and children who frequently become 
victims of rape and end working in prostitution run by criminal rackets.
Conclusion
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, a democratic nation today is 
multinational, multi-ethnic, multireligious, multicultural, and multi-linguistic. 
Such a nation is, by default, a tolerating and coexisting nation with its diversity 
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and heterogeneity. The underlying principle is equality and universal citizenship. 
Such a civic state comes fully in terms with the democratic principles. Since 
Myanmar is moving towards democracy and is committed to peace it is impera-
tive that the country reverse its ambitious homogeneity in favour of its officially 
natural 135 ethnic and religious heterogeneity. In this regard a number of initi-
atives are important. First, Myanmar’s civilian leader, Aung Sun Suu Kyi, is a 
globally recognized respected leader considered as a symbol and icon of demo-
cratic rights and democracy in the country. Since she is part of the government 
and a highly instrumental figure in democratic transition, she has a particular 
role to play favour of multi-ethnic and multiculturalism. She can take the nation 
going beyond the narrow state narrative of pure Burmese nationalism. Second, 
the international community has a particular role to play as human rights and 
democratic principles are universal. Like the practice earlier foreign major pow-
ers and international organizations such as the United Nations, Human Rights 
Watch, and the International Criminal Court can keep Myanmar under pressure 
of legal implications in cases of violation of human rights and democratic norms. 
Third, ASEAN can rethink its traditional non-interference policy and remodel its 
operating framework along with international human rights regimes and dem-
ocratic principles. In the face of gross violation of human rights of millions of 
people in a next-door country, ASEAN’s silence and turning of a blind eye can 
only make it morally complicit to the crime. South Asian and South-East Asian 
nations are naturally heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, and 
culture. A denial of such reality or intervention into such natural intermix in an 
attempt to create an artificial manufactured new social and political structure can 
trigger widespread conflict and tension and be irreparably fatal for peace.
Notes
 1 U Ko Ni was the son of Sultan Mahmud, who was one of three Rohingya representatives in 
Burma’s legislative assembly.
 2 A version of this sub-section appeared in E-International Relations. See Farzana (2018).
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Part II
Democratization and social 
movements

5 Manifestation of Dalit rights, justice 
and Dalit-ness in the post-Mandal era
Maya Suzuki
Diluted Dalit rights and justice
The long debates about Dalits and Dalit movements have centered on the ideas 
and ideologies of equality, dignity, justice, and rights, all mutually linked and 
each a set of irreplaceable values underlying universal fundamental rights. In 
the context of Dalit movements, the intense argument on rights and justice was 
sparked after the post-Mandal when reservation policy was gradually extended 
to lower-caste communities (Other Backward Classes, OBCs) in an administra-
tive term. It led to widespread anti-reservation protests by upper castes. What is 
worse, it led to nationwide caste-driven violence in the 1990s.
Assertions of Dalit rights have been met with persistent oppression and vio-
lence including atrocities. The numbers of crime cases have included honor kill-
ings of Dalit youth for marrying a girl/boy from a higher caste, lynching Dalits 
tasked with disposing of dead cows and leather processing in the name of ‘holy 
cow protectors’, and forced labor and humiliating jobs related to death, filth, and 
human waste. All these cases are violations of existing law. As one instance, the 
government has banned the practice of manually removing human waste from dry 
latrines or open sewers by enacting a central legislation known as the ‘Employ-
ment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) 
Act, 1993’.1 However, dry latrines and manual scavengers exist today in many 
states (Darokar 2018; Ramaswamy 2005; Singh [2012] 2014; Thekaekara 1999). 
According to Socio Economic and Caste Census 2011 data, 182,505 manual 
scavengers exist in the rural areas. Despite this, not a single case of violation of 
the law has been punished and convicted, at least between 2014 and 2016.2
A recent Supreme Court judgment (known as the ‘Mahajan Judgement’) on 
20 March 2018 related to the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 has drawn stringent criticism from SC/ST 
activists. The judgment expresses the view that a preliminary inquiry conducted 
by the appointing authority or senior superintendent of police is required before 
registration of a first information report (FIR). However, strong distrust of police 
exists among Dalits. In fact, such cases have quite a low rate of conviction. With 
regard to the disposal of cases by courts in 2014, only 3.9% cases of all cases for 
trial during 2014 (including pending cases from the prior year) for crimes com-
mitted against SC led to conviction; 85.3% were pending. The conviction rate of 
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28.8% was reported among all cases in which trials were completed during the 
year (Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, National Crime Records, 
2015: 109 and Table 7.4). The National Commission for the Scheduled Castes 
Commission (NCSC) has noted this delay in judicial processes and has expressed 
concern that instances of procedural lapses are frequent while dealing with atroc-
ity cases by both police and civil administrators (NCSC Annual 2015–16: 285). 
Given this unfavorable condition of Dalits, is it fair to say the Mahajan judgment 
by the Supreme Court would enforce prompt and effective registration of FIRs 
and consequently assure the rights and justice of Dalits and Adivasis?
In contemporary Indian society, the notions of equality, dignity, justice, and 
rights are not merely symbolic. They are understood as a substantial and realiza-
ble entitlement through collective action (Mangubhai 2014). It is noteworthy that 
a new manifestation of inequality and injustice among Dalits has been observed. 
For instance, public litigation activities have been observed increasingly among 
Dalits since the 1990s in the judicial sphere (Suzuki 2017). This article represents 
an attempt to highlight the awareness of justice, rights, and “Dalit-ness” (Narayan 
2005) from interviews with the Balmiki community (known as the sweeper caste 
and economically and politically vulnerable and socially long-marginalized 
groups, among the lowest castes in the caste hierarchy). The interview research 
conducted by the author will shed light on a particular way in which upwardly 
mobile Dalits, including activists/non-activists, experience their Dalit-ness and 
how they regard tension between their caste identity and new status.
Situating Dalit movements in the post-Mandal era
In the post-Mandal era, national and regional Dalit organizations have emerged 
and emphasized the articulation of an autonomous identity for Dalit and the for-
mation of their leadership potential. They seem to evolve with common aims to 
overcome caste hierarchy and abolish the practice of untouchability in pursuit of 
dignity and equality. Nevertheless, the situation is complicated by the existence 
of various movements embracing different visions and strategies (Gorringe 2005; 
Pai 2010; Shah 2004). The Dalit are not a homogeneous group: they are differen-
tiated in terms of sub-caste and region.
One feature of contemporary Dalit movements is that their aims have been to 
empower Dalits to assert their rights. For instance, the Navsarjan Trust, an non-
governmental organization working among Dalits in Gujarat since 1989, trained 
several hundred youth activists as lawyers. The founder, Martin Macwan, says, 
“The Dalit response to caste realities has been twofold: economic and educa-
tional development on the one hand and the effective use of law to challenge the 
discrimination (on the other).”3 Similar Dalit organizations attempt to motivate 
members of the younger generation to learn law. Most highly educated Dalits 
acknowledge admiration for B.R. Ambedkar’s pioneering legal work in draft-
ing the Constitution, with underlying Dalit entitlement of fundamental rights and 
other protective measures including reservation policies.
During the last decade, a considerable number of state, national, and global 
networks and organizations have emerged among Balmiki activists in Delhi. 
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It is noteworthy that they are organized mostly by educated Balmikis who have 
attained white-collar jobs through the SC reservation policy. Particularly, law-
yers in the community have taken the lead in raising questions related to the 
ongoing SC quota. They seek to secure an equal share through policy review 
through judiciary action, known as public interest litigation (PIL) to the Supreme 
Court (Suzuki 2017). How have the upwardly mobile Balmikis perceived them-
selves and started to manifest a sense of Dalit-ness? Can we say it is sort of an 
automatically spontaneous phenomenon that is apparent in common with other 
educated Dalits? These questions are examined in the next section. I explore the 
perceptions of upwardly mobile Balmikis including activists and non-activists. 
The following sections specifically examine the difficulties experienced by Dalits 
because of their caste and the internal conflict that arises as they struggle to over-
come these difficulties.
Manifestation of Dalit-ness
In what ways do caste-origin difficulties manifest themselves in the lifeworld 
of Dalits who live in cities? I argue that new signs of changes are evident in the 
experiences of people who have been “liberated” from discriminated occupa-
tions, particularly sweeping jobs in the context of the Balmiki caste.
What is interesting about the manifestation is that people do not necessarily 
show explicit resistance to the discrimination they must confront although they 
are placed under similar discriminatory circumstances. People make different 
“choices” depending on the situation while dealing with conflict in ways such 
as by developing an aversion to cleaning work and concealing their identity as 
SC/Balmiki from others (sometimes including one’s own children). This article 
reveals that these “choices” manifest themselves during major life events, for 
example, when they move up in life to the next stage such as in education, mar-
riage, and finding a job. This study identifies forms of resistance and repulsion 
that cannot be captured by visible collective action, from interviews. In doing 
so, one can describe the conflict Balmikis face and the response they choose to 
present vis-à-vis the discrimination they encounter.
Dalit literature is important for exploring Dalits’ internal world, revealing the 
stigma they face and their identity. Publication by Dalits has been on the rise since 
the 2000s. Topics include Dalits’ caste awareness, their discrimination-related 
experiences, and their “success stories” of overcoming adversity, all of which 
have remained unknown to the public, but which are now being discussed 
(Khandekar 2013; Moon 2002; Shyamlal 2001; Valmiki 2003). Among the Dalit 
writers whose works have been translated into languages other than Indian lan-
guages, some have attracted global attention. The autobiography of Omprakash 
Valmiki (2003), Joothan (Leftover), has been translated from Hindi to English. It 
has gained readership even outside India.4
The active publication scene is supported by the Dalit Panther Movement, 
which began in Bombay (present-day Mumbai) during the 1960s and 1970s to 
demand social change. Raja Dahle (1940–), a devoted follower of Ambedkar, 
and Namdeo Dhasal (1949–2014), produced literary works criticizing the caste 
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hierarchy. Because the movement was centered in the state of Maharashtra, much 
of the early writing was in Marathi. Today, their works are published in various 
languages of India. The majority of writers are Dalit men.5 They describe in their 
work the discrimination they have experienced during the process of attaining 
their positions and the questions about their identities they had to face in relation 
to their caste community.
The discrimination and oppression against Dalits, as described in Dalit liter-
ature, are unique and peculiar to them. In this regard, Narayan (2005) makes an 
important point. He argues that awareness and consciousness of the oppressive 
situation, which can be called “Dalit-ness,” is not attributable to nature. He states 
it as follows:
[W]e must not think that dalit-ness is the natural outcome of the historic 
injustices meted out to the dalits. The academic study of marginalized or 
subaltern groups often suffer from this lacuna: one simply assumes that vic-
timhood would lead to protest. .  .  . I have shown in my earlier works how 
dalitness is constructed and produced through mobilizations and discourses. 
There is nothing ‘natural’ about it.
(Narayan 2005: 126, emphasis in the original)
The perspective of non-spontaneous awareness of being discriminated against 
and its (re-)constitution is a theme found in research into long-oppressed commu-
nities other than Dalits.6 In interviews conducted for the present study, when asked, 
“Have you ever experienced discrimination because of your Balmiki caste?” many 
respondents would respond, “Yes, I have.” Asked how they dealt with discrimina-
tion, various responses were received: some would “laugh it off,” saying, “I cannot 
help it if I am Balmiki.”7 Others described details of how they were unable to attend 
school when they were children. Some others shared their painful experiences of 
being harassed and bullied by the teacher and students because of which they 
started private English lessons for the community at their home.8 Some said they 
started movements against discrimination in recruitment and at the workplace. Not 
all members of the community share a homogeneous awareness of being a target 
of discrimination merely because they belong to the same community. Moreover, 
although they might have experienced similar discrimination, not everyone was 
willing to join a resistance movement. The author continued to mull over these 
questions during extensive conversations with several Balmikis in Delhi.
The next section presents details about the ways in which Dalit-ness mani-
fests itself at various major life events (moving onto the next stage in education, 
finding a job, marriage). It is noteworthy that “role model awareness,” which 
appears sharply in narratives of highly educated Balmikis, is the force driving 
the movement.
Embarrassment about stigmatized labor
The relation between caste and occupation is very deep in the case of the Balmikis. 
Particularly, the scavenging work attributed to them readily reminds one of the 
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discriminatory aspects of the caste hierarchy. When talking to Balmikis, the author 
initially became aware of their eagerness to convey that they, their family, and their 
relatives had all strived to cut all of their associations with scavenging labor.
From my observations, a hierarchical order exists in the community according 
to occupation. Particularly “whether they are engaged in scavenging occupation 
or not” serves as the first major criterion. In fact, this is a salient issue consid-
ered when highly educated Balmikis seek to marry. The criterion is applied not 
only to the prospective spouse but also to the whole family and all relatives. 
Discrimination against sweeping work is prevalent in the community. Most avoid 
it because it leads to humiliation. M.K. Gandhi’s “ideal Bhangis,”9 the idea that 
the sweeper caste should be the experts in cleaning, is clearly a concept rejected 
by the Bhangis themselves.
Those engaged in scavenging jobs are further divided into the “organized sec-
tor” and the “unorganized sector” at the place of work. In evaluating the organized 
sector, indices such as “permanent/casual laborer,” “sanitary inspectors/general 
sweepers,” “road sweepers/building cleaners/working at the refuse dump/train/
public latrines,” and “positions in the trade union” are regarded as important. 
Even if one is a casual laborer, working in the governmental sector is regarded as 
superior. By contrast, scavengers in the unorganized sector are engaged in doing 
various tasks (cleaning private homes/cleaning sewage/cleaning dry latrines), 
some of which involves human excrement (manual scavenging, often designated 
as MS): the most despised type of work.
When the purpose of the research was explained, my request for an interview 
was sometimes turned down, perhaps because of MS: “Do you want to research 
those people who are doing that work? We are completely different.” Alternatively, 
a respondent stopped cooperating by saying, “Do you want to know if any of my 
relatives do cleaning work? Why do you ask about cleaning only? Do not you 
have any other questions?”
These experiences underscored that talking about scavenging is an extremely 
unpleasant topic for Balmikis because it associates them with their discriminated 
caste. Here, we see the awareness of being labeled as the “sweeper caste” and the 
strong sense of offense it creates.
Kumar, a social activist in his mid-fifties, retired early from a civil servant post 
(a senior post in the state government). He denies a relation exists between the 
caste and occupation as follows (the quote is omitted):
You should not confuse the occupation and samaj (caste community) because 
not all sweepers are Valmikis.10 Other castes are also working in sanitary 
departments. I strongly request that you not conflate Valmikis and scaven-
gers. You can change your occupation as many times as you like, but you 
can not change your samaj from birth until death. The reason I am Valmiki is 
simply because my father was Valmiki. Religion is exactly the same. If you 
see Valmikis as sweepers, you can not understand things correctly.11
In his words, one can sense the offense he feels and his rejection of being labeled 
as one of the “sweeper caste.” At the same time, it is interesting to observe how 
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he talks about the Balmiki caste in a positive manner, having severed the linkage 
to cleaning work. Kumar argues that “for our samaji, to develop further, we have 
to be proud of being descendants of the legendary saint Valmiki. Then we have 
to acquire jobs that command people’s respect by working hard.” His story is a 
typical one among the elite Dalits who have “achieved wealth and social status 
through self-help and hard work.” He argues that negative images embedded in 
the caste must be wiped out.
Initially, Kumar was rather suspicious of me and wanted to know complete 
details of the people I had interviewed to date and the Balmiki events in which 
I had participated. He talked about his work and current situation fluently in 
English, but when I asked about his personal history and home village, he became 
suddenly quiet, merely saying, “My story? Just a line. I was born in a poor and 
downtrodden family,” which left a deep impression on me (I have not managed to 
confirm his year of birth, family composition, or name of the village and school).
Based on the limited information I received, I was able to infer that Kumar was 
born in a rural area in the western part of Uttar Pradesh near Delhi. His parents, 
who were landless peasants, worked in the field for a landlord and cleaned houses 
in the area to make ends meet. When he was young, Kumar helped his parents in 
their work. He talked about his parents:
My father and mom were uneducated. Both of them were uninterested in 
their children’s education. Only I among our siblings had become educated 
and had attended graduate school. My father never knew about how prestig-
ious a school I had studied in. One day, an upper caste sadhu (Hindu ascetic) 
asked my father, “what is your son’s qualification?” Then he answered with 
arms spread, “bahut parha! (studied a lot)!” (Laughing) You know, my father 
didn’t know about my education that much.12
Kumar’s narrative describes his family leading a life in which education had little 
role or meaning. At the same time, it conveys his “toughness” in surviving by 
making light of the past about his father, who was uninterested in his son’s edu-
cation and even “ridiculed the possibility.”
When asked about life in the village, while saying “there is nothing special to 
talk about,” he described his life.
KUMAR: Our only happy time was when we received leftovers from big marriage 
parties and ceremonies in our native village. If we took the leftovers, upper 
caste people were also happy. We respect them . . . can you understand our 
feeling? In the village I used to wash cars owned by others. But what happens 
now? I hire people to come to clean my car and house. Isn’t it miracle?
AUTHOR: Have you told your son about your past life?
KUMAR: No! Never! If I tell him, it might negatively affect him.13
The practice in which Dalits are given leftover food from higher castes is often 
described as a symbol of discrimination against the untouchables (Valmiki 2003). 
Kumar’s narrative suggests that Dalits live in such poverty-stricken conditions that 
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they must rely on leftover food. Then they are aware of the fact that by receiving left-
over food, the discriminating–discriminated relationship between the higher castes 
and Dalits is reinforced. B.R. Ambedkar is said to have called for boycotting the prac-
tice of receiving leftover food as part of the liberation movement, but it was a form 
of resistance that could put one’s life at risk because it could invite violent reprisal.
Kumar organizes regular meetings to celebrate the tradition of Saint Valmiki. 
In 2008, he organized a three-day International Valmiki Workshop in Delhi. In 
addition to Balmiki politicians, researchers, and activists from across India, sev-
eral Balmikis who had migrated abroad were invited. He says he is concentrat-
ing on building a global network. While saying “there is nothing special to talk 
about,” his reluctance to talk about his past reflects his wish that his son not 
know about it. This reluctance is the driving force behind Kumar’s activities. One 
glimpses his internal conflict related to his inability to escape from a discrimina-
tory “sweeper caste” category despite severing his links to a cleaning past.
Next, we examine the case of Vijay, who, while emphasizing his escape from 
cleaning work like Kumar described earlier and keeping his distance from scav-
enging as a lawyer, tries to maintain his link to the caste of his community by 
engaging with a movement to improve the life of sweepers. Vijay (in his early 
seventies) was born in Ludhiana, a city in the state of Punjab. After graduat-
ing from the governmental college, he moved to Delhi on finding employment. 
Having retired from his civil servant position (middle-ranking clerical position in 
the central administration), he works as a barrister at the Delhi High Court and 
is engaged in social activities. Similar to Kumar’s statements, Vijay emphasizes 
severance of the link to cleaning work:
My father worked as a sweeper in Indian Railways. My mother also worked 
as a sweeper in the British cantonment area in my childhood. When I started 
to go to school, she quit her job because my father did not allow her to con-
tinue. I have seven sisters. No one does the job. It is the same with my wife 
and two sons. I will never let them do it!14
Vijay used to live in a sweeper colony for New Delhi municipal government 
employees. At the time of my fieldwork, he owned two apartments in public 
housing in South Delhi, which he had purchased before his retirement. When 
he first moved to Delhi in 1962, he was unable to find a place in the government 
accommodations and lived for a while in a flat that belonged to his wife’s relative 
who lived in a sweeper colony. In contrast to Kumar, who is mostly engaged in 
religious activities of the community and who keeps his distance from scaveng-
ing labor, Vijay lives in an area where sweepers are concentrated. He is aware of 
the pressing problems in their working environment, such as irregular employ-
ment and bribery. Consequently, his position is that we should prioritize practical 
improvement in life support, such as by establishing a car repair workshop as a 
vocational school for youngsters, helping them resolve legal matters, and voic-
ing demands to revise the SC reservation policy. Therefore, he is involved in a 
movement to recover ownership of a colony of residents. He helps with document 
production and in negotiating with the authorities.
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What left a deep impression on me after fieldwork in sweeper colonies was 
the attitude of the Balmiki residents in trying to “find a compromise.” Frankly, 
they want to leave their scavenging work, which engenders discrimination. If 
they have a permanent job, they can live in governmental accommodations in the 
city center, send their children to school, and support the family. To my question, 
“Are you satisfied with the work you do now?” many briefly replied, “[K]arnā 
hae” (Cannot be helped), and continued working as a sweeper for two or three 
generations.15
Sanjay, a college student in his early twenties, has been brought up by his 
grandfather and father, both government sweepers, and by his mother, who com-
mutes to a nearby residential area for her cleaning job. When I asked, “When 
you graduate, what kind of job do you want to have?” he immediately answered, 
“[S]arkari naukri ” (Government job). When asked a difficult question, “If you 
get only a cleaning job like your father, what will you do? He answered, “I cannot 
answer immediately . . . but if it is the only available job, it cannot be helped.” This 
was followed by, “In the past, in my grandfather and father’s time, it was easy to 
obtain a sweeper job, but now there is so much competition. It is not easy because 
we have to pay a bribe.”16 Sanjay’s narrative suggests that although he has studied 
up to college level, his opportunities for finding employment are restricted. It was 
also confirmed that he has not experienced discrimination because of his caste at 
the college because many of his friends are from the same sweeper colony. The 
next section presents an examination of narratives about schools and education as 
a place where Dalits are first made aware of their caste.
Schooling experience: learning about one’s caste ancestry  
and reservation policies
Persons belonging to the lower castes, such as Balmikis, often find it “awkward 
and troublesome” to reveal their caste. Fieldwork has also revealed that people do 
not refer to their caste by name but instead refer to it as “yeh samāj” (this com-
munity). This tendency is apparent even during indoor conversations with people. 
During the course of a conversation between the previously described Vijay and 
me, when our conversation became excited, his wife would come in from the next 
room to say, “Hey, please be quiet. People can hear you from outside.”
Another interesting incident occurred. One day, when I was having lunch at 
Vijay’s home, a neighbor dropped in. On seeing me, a stranger and a Japanese 
person, he asked me, “What relationship do you have with Vijay ji?” As I was 
about to introduce myself, Vijay’s wife interrupted and replied quickly, “She has 
come to help my husband with his computer.” Later, it turned out that Vijay’s 
caste was not known to the neighbors (more precisely, although it is known that 
he is from the SC, his exact caste is not known). She was worried: “As soon as 
they learn we are Balmikis, their respect for us will immediately disappear. They 
will try to hide it, but I will know.”
This concern is shared by many informants, not just Vijay’s wife, who has told 
me about similar experiences. The worry about one’s caste is most likely expe-
rienced for the first time when one leaves one’s familiar sweeper colony to start 
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schooling with others. How they deal with the situation that arises there and how 
they overcome it to establish their identity differs among individuals.
Rajesh (in his early forties) is a former member of the Legislative Assembly 
of Delhi. He was active in politics while studying at the University of Delhi. 
He served as the representative of the Delhi Pradesh Youth Congress, consisting 
mainly of young Congress activists. He was first elected as a member of the 
Legislative Assembly of Delhi (in the constituency reserved for SCs) at the age of 
thirty-four. He served two terms (2003 and 2008 elections), but he was defeated 
in the 2015 election by a candidate of the Aam Aadmi Party who gained popular 
support on the promise of eliminating corruption.
Rajesh’s family is in the trade business. He was brought up in a financially 
comfortable environment. His parents did not attend school but understood the 
importance of education. All their five sons and two daughters received an edu-
cation. Of them, only Rajesh became a politician. Rajesh’s family members were 
all of strong build; his father practiced wrestling. His grandfather served as a 
bodyguard to Mahatma Gandhi. At an early age itself, Rajesh was noted for being 
good at academic work and sports. He was elected as a class representative. The 
first turning point in his life occurred when he was an adolescent:
It happened in the tenth grade. Until then, I had no idea about my caste, 
Balmiki. My parents didn’t tell me. I used to go to private English medium 
school where no one cared about caste. One day in the tenth grade, a teacher 
gave a small piece of paper only to SC students. I didn’t know what to do, 
and wrote “NA” on the paper and submitted it. After that, the principal 
called my father and told [him,] “Your son doesn’t know he is SC.” On that 
day, my father explained to me about my caste, Balmiki. I was so upset 
and cried all night. I clearly remembered how I felt in my classroom the 
next day. I could not stop feeling all the stares from a girl sitting next to 
me. Now I can understand she was just looking at me as usual, but at that 
time, I couldn’t help thinking that she was watching me because I was 
from SC.17
He was shocked. His view of life changed completely. He was deeply hurt when 
he was informed of his caste, but his father encouraged him, saying, “Although 
your caste cannot be changed, you can still go on to become a great person. To 
put the others to shame, make efforts to be the best in studies and everything 
else.” It is not rare for Balmikis from financially comfortable families to be 
brought up without being ever told by their parents about their caste. However, 
when carrying out the formalities for admission to a school or applying for 
scholarships, various certificates are required. They come to know that they are 
Balmikis, SC.
At college, Rajesh was absorbed in politics. When he was elected as the presi-
dent of the Delhi Pradesh Youth Congress, he decided to become a politician sup-
porting the Congress Party. He says that later he had to face a situation in which a 
recommendation for his promotion was withdrawn because he was a Balmiki, but 
each time he motivated himself by recalling his father’s words.
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Arun (in his late forties), the chief doctor of the medical department of a gov-
ernmental institution, says he is proud not only of his current occupation but also 
his leading role in resident welfare association:
The condominium where I live had 260 flats. I was first in the president elec-
tion. Everyone respects me so much that I am very happy.18
Arun’s father moved to Delhi from a rural village in the state of Uttar Pradesh. 
His grandfather was a supporter of education. Therefore, Arun’s father and his 
two older brothers received education up to the tenth grade. Arun’s father wanted 
to continue his studies, but because the family did not have the financial resources 
to fund further education, he found a clerical post in the central government in 
Delhi. Supported by his father, who was a firm believer in the importance of edu-
cation and the opportunities it would bring, Arun and his two younger brothers 
were educated. Each found a job of their choice: One is an engineer with a private 
airline. The other is a sanitary inspector of New Delhi Municipal Council. Arun’s 
first son is studying at the famed Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, to become 
a computer engineer. His wife is a devout Hindu (a devotee of the peer Sai Baba) 
and a Balmiki. Arun does not make any effort to conceal his caste. In fact, when 
using the SC reservation to study, get a scholarship, or find a job, one must prove 
one’s caste by submitting the relevant certificates. Nevertheless, he also does not 
actively publicize it. He rarely participates in any Balmiki meeting or function. 
Arun emphasizes that for Balmikis to be respected in Indian society, it is essen-
tial that they be educated. Then they must improve their standing through their 
own efforts.
The narrative that “education is the only way to improve the community” is 
shared by all people from the educated Balmiki background, such as Arun, who 
have achieved upward social mobility. They pay the utmost tribute to Ambedkar, 
who played a leading role in incorporating affirmative action policies in the Con-
stitution. Arun explains his own success:
I am deeply obliged to Babasaheb (Ambedkar) for what I am now. I couldn’t 
go to medical school without the SC reservation. I was a top student, but not 
a first ranker. General students (without reservation) were so brilliant that 
I always felt inferior to them. But I had good senior friends who were SC; 
they helped my study and reading lists with “mantra” (secret methods) to 
have confidence. I faced discrimination at school. It happens everywhere, so 
I have learned to be prepared for any difficult situation. I tried doing my best 
to be equal to general students or above them.19
In his own narrative, Arun’s success is attributed to (a) the reservation policy, 
(b) Ambedkar who devised it, and (c) his own efforts.
Ram, a former Indian Administrative Service (IAS)20 officer in his mid-seventies, 
is well known in the community as the first Balmiki IAS officer. Ram’s elder 
brother is also a former IAS officer. He is a cautious man who declined my 
request for an interview three times before finally accepting it. Ram originally 
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hailed from the Pakistani part of the state of Punjab before the partition. His 
father moved to Delhi after the partition. The family was not wealthy, but almost 
all the five brothers and five sisters became senior or general civil servants with 
the IAS and other agencies. Ram married a woman from a higher caste. He has 
two children. His son is working for an information technology company in 
Bangalore, having graduated from the renowned Indian Institute of Technology. 
His daughter is preparing to study in the US after graduating from the National 
Institute of Fashion Technology. When describing his children’s achievement in 
education, Ram emphasized that they chose not to use the SC quota. Ram talked 
about SC in general but did not provide much detail about the Balmiki in par-
ticular. Referring to how the standing of the SC can be improved, like Arun, he 
emphasizes the importance of education:
Getting education is the only way for SC to improve themselves. If you get 
high education, other things should follow naturally. In my office, I never 
experienced discrimination. Once you become an IAS officer, the pro-
motion simply depends on individual performance. Because I held a high 
post, nobody openly mentioned my caste background, but it was obvious to 
assume that they had in mind my lower caste status.21
There is an SC quota in recruiting for the IAS. However, competition within the 
SC quota is fierce. It is extremely difficult to pass this exam when compared to 
other civil service exams. As in the case of Arun, even when one becomes an IAS 
officer after successfully completing the competitive exams, caste awareness will 
linger. When I asked Ram, “When will caste awareness disappear?” his answer 
was “[I]t will take another four to five generations.”
One oft-used phrase by Balmikis when discussing caste awareness and aware-
ness of being discriminated against is “deeply rooted.” The awareness is deep and 
embedded as a stigma for multiple generations irrespective of their upward status 
or profession. While accepting such awareness, can Balmikis simply be viewed 
as those who are trying to invest in hope for a future in the long term by acquiring 
academic achievement and serving in respectable occupations?
Solidarity or exclusion? Rising awareness of the “role model”  
and “moral imperative”
Earlier studies have identified the following two points as features of Dalits who 
have achieved upward social mobility. One is “assimilation” with the new group 
while concealing their caste and making efforts to move away from the past of 
discrimination. These people are designated as the “harijan elite” (Mendelsohn 
1986; Mendelsohn & Vicziany 1998; Sacchidananda 1976). The term harijan 
elite is often used critically. For instance, they are often accused of a strong 
tendency to monopolize political/social/economic privileges acquired for their 
community through affirmative action. Criticism of this kind forms the posi-
tion of those opposing affirmative action including the SC reservation policy. 
Current policies designed to uplift the Dalits benefit only some Dalits and do 
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not engender improvement of Dalits overall. However, the census shows gaps 
between the SCs and other social groups. Reservation policies can be regarded as 
effective in “securing representativeness.” Therefore, the policies must continue 
for the time being.
A second feature that contrasts with the “harijan elite” is the active commitment 
to the cause of education among caste members and social and political activi-
ties by those who have achieved upward mobility and who continue to maintain 
relations with their caste members. In this regard, Naudet (2008), who conducted 
interviews of SCs with white-collar jobs in the public and private sectors, makes 
an interesting point. His work describes the strong influence of “moral impera-
tive” on the inner worlds of those who strengthen their relationship with their 
caste ancestry after achieving upward social mobility.22 Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that this awareness is conditioned by a situation that is unique to the 
Dalits: even if they have managed to emerge from material poverty, it has not 
brought about any fundamental change in their status. In other words, in Indian 
society, caste never disappears: no one can ever escape from the caste either by 
trying to conceal their caste to the very end or by positively transforming it with 
a sense of “pride” by making it public.
A similar expression of “moral imperative” is advocated by Kanshi Ram, 
who founded the All India Backward and Minority Communities Employees 
Federation (BAMCEF). The phrase “to pay back to society” is commonly used 
by activists and participants in Balmiki caste groups and by the BAMCEF. It 
is the key phrase in arguing for the activities of caste organizations. However, it 
is assumed that the “society” described here does not refer to Indian society as a 
whole but to the “samaj” of their affiliated caste.
Additionally, we should devote attention to the term role model. Among the 
Balmikis who have achieved upward social mobility by studying at the university 
and by joining professions such as law and medicine, which would have been 
impossible to even dream about in the past, many are engaged in community 
activities self-identifying themselves as “role models” for community youngsters. 
They argue with confidence and pride that only the practice of a “proper” lifestyle 
will bring about a positive influence on the community. This role model narrative 
is accepted widely irrespective of whether people are involved or not with the 
collective actions of the caste group. For instance, Ramesh (in his early sixties), 
who had just retired from his post of the assistant commissioner of Police, Delhi, 
described his life in his interview:
I was born in a village of Bulandshahr district, Uttar Pradesh. I went to a 
village school until fifth grade. The village life was so hard that I have only 
bad memories. Our community had to serve upper caste landlords as slaves. 
I could not wear good clothes because my family was poor. I was always 
worried about how I was looked upon by my classmates. After a while, when 
my father got a central government job in Delhi, I requested that he take me 
to Delhi. With admission to sixth grade, I could continue my education in 
Delhi. I did not experience discrimination there and was able to concentrate 
on my study. It was my great honor to get admission to a famous school: 
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Shri Ram College of Delhi University. After graduation, since I passed a 
Delhi police examination, I kept doing my best to pass promotion exams and 
obtain my present post: the Assistant Commissioner of Police. Now I am 
thinking that the hard time in my village made me strong and competent for 
future success.23
Ramesh says he is not involved in political/social activities of his caste com-
munity. From his narrative, it is clear that while his relatives continue to live in 
his home village, he seldom goes there; he deliberately maintains some distance 
from his community. When the interview touches on his children’s wedding, he 
says, “I did not invite people from my village. If I had invited them, they would 
have come and behaved badly by getting drunk and becoming unruly at the wed-
ding venue, which would make a poor impression on my neighbors in Delhi.” He 
continues to criticize the community’s lifestyle:
I am polite, do not drink and smoke. Moreover, I am a pure vegetarian. For 
these reasons, I receive respect from everyone in society. But most poor 
Balmikis are not (respected). I think there are three reasons why Balmikis 
have been left far behind in development. Firstly, they are uneducated. Most 
of them don’t send their children to school. Secondly, it’s a harmful habit. 
They habitually drink and eat meat, often pork, which prevents their men-
tal development. Thirdly, it’s a bad custom. For instance, while they spend 
more, they borrow for marriage and other ritual occasions; they can’t afford 
to invest in their children’s education. Education is most important for devel-
opment. If they get good education, they will definitely have a good job and 
mind like I have.24
The awareness of being a role model is commonly apparent among those who 
have achieved upward social mobility. Members of caste groups become aware 
of this because of the repeated talk of a “role model,” “moral imperative,” and 
“pay back to society.” This is regarded as a motivating factor for them to commit 
actively to such activities.
At the same time, aside from having to commit to such activities for strength-
ening the members’ motivation and their sense of unity, they realize that the 
scope of their activities is restricted to members of their caste of origin. This 
fact implies that they tend to suppress their sense of solidarity with people from 
other Dalit castes. This motivation is regarded as positive within the same caste, 
but it excludes other castes. Moreover, it can engender fragmentation of Dalit 
communities and overall movements. The problem with this exclusive element 
is apparently justified by the so-called moral imperative. Given this situation, we 
must examine whether awareness of this type can have universality.
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 19 Arun, interviewed on March 18, 2010.
 20 The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is a profession that constitutes the All India 
Services (AIS), which plays a central role in the Indian bureaucracy. It is a highly selective 
group: about sixty to eighty persons are selected from more than five hundred thousand 
candidates annually. The All India Services include, in addition to the IAS, the Indian Police 
Service and the Indian Forest Service.
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6 Homogenization of social 
movement dynamics under a 
“clever” Nepali state, 2007–2012
Lokranjan Parajuli
Following the success of the 2006 popular movement (janaandolan two) in 
Nepal, there was a sudden upsurge in the number of “successful” protest move-
ments—it was successful, in that they were able to force the state to respond as 
well as agree to their principal demands. Starting with the Janajati movement 
in August 2007, the Nepali state reached agreements (or understandings) with 
18 agitating groups by May 2012.1 This chapter focuses on those movements, 
the agreements/understandings that were reached, and the subsequent adherence 
or lack thereof to the agreements. Through this focus, this chapter attempts to 
provide commentary on the particularities of both the protest movements and the 
Nepali state during those five years.
First, I very briefly describe the historico-political context under which the 
movements experienced an upsurge and the deals that were reached, as well 
as examine their contents by grouping them into three broad categories—the 
Janajatis, the Madhesis, and the “Others.” In the subsequent section, I endeavour 
to make sense of the protest movements and the agreements by linking them 
with the broader social movement literature. I argue that these protest movements 
should be viewed as new social movements (NSMs) and their sudden upsurge can 
be attributed to (a) the “volatility” of the state, owing to the political transition 
(political opportunity structure; see Tarrow 1989; Kriesi 1995) and (b) the dis-
course that was generated around the writing of the new constitution.
While describing the movements, I show that they have largely followed a 
similar trajectory before concluding with an agreement with the Nepali state. In 
so doing, I argue that they have entrenched a specific template of a “successful” 
movement (i.e., demonstration effect; cf. Kongkirati 2006), thus contributing to 
the homogenization of the movement dynamics in Nepal.
Meanwhile, I will appraise the deals, the negotiation processes, and the 
“achievements” (or consequences; cf. Giugni 1999, 2008; Amenta et al. 2010) of 
the movements. I will also show that some points contained in these agreements 
were not clearly worded and were even mutually exclusive. That is to say, if the 
government of Nepal (GoN)2 were to honour the agreement with one group in its 
entirety then it would definitely be obliged to renege on the deal it had reached with 
other groups. I argue that both parties (that of the state and those of the agitating 
groups) deliberately opted for vague wording to achieve a “win–win” situation, 
contrary to the charges of treachery levelled against the state by movement activists.
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It would be tempting to show that by even agreeing to mutually exclusive 
demands, the Nepali state was particularly “weak” (cf. Migdal 1988; Kriesi 1995) 
during this period. Instead, I argue that the agreements into which it entered and 
the subsequent implementation of the deals show that, during these five years, the 
Nepali state was neither weak nor strong but was instead particularly “clever.”
The primary data for this study comprised the press clippings of the various 
protest movements during the period from 2007 to 2012. For the official versions 
of the “agreements,” the publications of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruc-
tion (e.g., MoPR 2068v.s., 2069 v.s.) and its website (www.peace.gov.np) were 
consulted. Many interviews were also conducted and particularly targeted the 
movement’s activists/signatories.
The historico-political context and social movements
After the political change in 1990 (the first janaandolan), Nepal experienced a 
plethora of campaigns and movements. Social groups that have been historically 
oppressed, marginalized, or excluded, organized themselves and launched move-
ments using their newfound civil liberties. Some of these movements that gained 
momentum after 1990 were successful, in part because they were gradually able 
to persuade the state to address some of their concerns.
After the 2006 janaandolan, which eventually led to the abolition of the 
monarchy from Nepal, these, and additional movements—some of which were 
very nascent—came to the fore. During this period, various social groups—the 
Janajatis, the Madhesis, the Muslims, the Dalits, women, people with disabili-
ties, and others launched movements that were sometimes solitary efforts and 
other times took the form of coalitions with other social groups. They managed 
to “extract” more concessions from the otherwise insular state in a very short 
span of time. In the period following 2006, these social movements seem to have 
three principal agendas: (1) identity, (2) rights, and (3) participation in the gov-
ernance system or access to the state that is proportionate to their population size. 
We could call these movements successful in that they forced the state (govern-
ments of various hues and colours) to listen to their demands, eventually reach an 
agreement or understanding, or sign pacts with them. The GoN is found to have 
honoured some aspects of those deals while ignoring others.
The “rapid successes” of the movements following the 2006 janaandolan 
were achieved in a particular historico-political context: The post-2006 state was 
in flux—the “old regime” was in a state of decline but had not completely lost 
power and there was no single leader/party in the “new regime” that could call 
the shots. The elections held for the Constituent Assembly (CA) were intended 
to provide much-needed leadership, and it was hoped that a new direction would 
emerge from the state of flux, but the elections themselves were uncertain. On 
the one hand, they included the Maoist Party (Communist Party of Nepal–Mao-
ist or CPNM), with a large contingent of armed combatants (now overground 
with one-third of the representation in the reinstated parliament via the peace 
accord) who threatened to take over the state. On the other hand, there were many 
groups (from bureaucrats, teachers, or so-called professional bodies, to traders or 
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social groups) who sought to maximize their own gains by exploiting the volatile 
situation.
Without reaching agreements with the protesting groups, the CA elections did 
not seem possible. The CA elections, however, were necessary for the political 
transition to reach a new stage. Therefore, the GoN held a series of talks with the 
agitating groups (including the Janajatis, the Madhesis, and the Chure Bhavar) 
and signed pacts. Subsequently, the Interim Constitution was amended and other 
legal/policy changes were introduced. This created a kind of “demonstration 
effect” and similar sorts of “movements” became the norm. The movements fol-
lowed the same modality and similar trajectories.3
Only after reaching the agreements with the protest movements, the chances of 
holding the CA elections increased and the elections were eventually held. When 
the CA elections were held in April 2008, the Maoist party (CPN-M) became 
the largest with about 40 per cent of the seats in the 601-member CA and its 
chief, Prachanda, became the prime minister of Nepal, leading a coalition gov-
ernment. However, there was no end to the movements, even after the transition 
moved to a new stage and had newly elected leadership. After the formation of 
the Maoist-led coalition government, the state signed further deals with other 
social groups (some of which were Maoist-affiliated fronts). Towards the end 
of the first CA tenure (in April/May 2012), Nepal witnessed a rise in the protest 
movements once again; all major groups held strikes or bandhs to emphasize the 
fulfilment of their demands. The GoN once again signed deals with these groups 
to restore peace and tranquillity (see Annex 1 for details). The sudden demise of 
the first CA in May 2012, which occurred before the delivery of the constitution 
it promised to Nepali citizens, also seemed to have an impact on the aggressive-
ness of the social groups, perhaps due to the absence of the “political opportunity 
structure” (see the following discussion). Let me now describe the movements 
of these groups and the agreements they reached with the GoN by dividing them 
into three broad categories, namely, the Janajatis, the Madhesis, and the Others.
Janajati movements
Of all the social movements of Nepal, the Janajati movement is the most active, 
persistent, prominent, and successful. This social group, which was initially 
called the Janajatis and later the Adivasi Janajatis, has recently been fighting for 
the recognition of their identity (pahichan in Nepali), their rights (“special” as 
well), and for access to resources, as well as representation in the state organs 
that is proportionate to their population strength. The movement has been largely 
successful, as the state has gradually fulfilled the group’s demands.
In February 2005, when the then king Gyandendra took control by violating 
the 1990 constitution, Nepali society saw an intense political polarization. Most 
of the political parties eventually resisted the royal takeover and the groups that 
were successful in expanding their activism in the open environment also became 
part of the political protest movement. When the political movement against 
the royal regime achieved success, the reinstated parliament/state fulfilled one 
major demand of the Janajatis by declaring Nepal a secular state rather than one 
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espousing the Hindu religion. The interim constitution further legitimized this 
change. Furthermore, it was avowed by the political parties and clearly stated 
in the constitution that the country was to be restructured and made inclusive. It 
was also allowed, in principle, for the local languages to be used in the respective 
local governments, which had previously been restricted after the Supreme Court 
interjection on June 1, 1999.
All these changes were also demands of the Janajatis. However, their demands 
were not limited to these changes alone. One of their main concerns has been to 
increase their access to the apex bodies of the state to achieve representation that 
is proportionate to their population strength. When the CA elections were to be 
held, per the provisions in the 2007 Interim Constitution, they sought to increase 
their level of participation in crafting the main law of the land. In the hereto-
fore practised electoral system (i.e., first past the post [FPTP]) their participation 
was limited; as such, they wanted to change the electoral system. The Janajatis 
launched their protest programs in various stages, demanding changes in the elec-
toral system (from the FPTP to a system that was fully proportional to population 
strength) as well as other demands. The government at that time perceived that 
the possibility of holding CA elections without reaching a compromise was slim, 
so talks were held in various stages; eventually, a 20-point agreement was reached 
on August 7, 2007. The major points of the deal included the following aspects: 
elections held on a proportional basis, representation for all ethnic communities 
in the CA, the formation of a state restructuring commission, a commission for 
the Adivasi Janajatis, language rights, education in mother tongues, inclusiveness 
in the state organs, implementation of the ILO-169, and others.
As the agreement between the GoN and the Janajatis was reached before the 
CA elections were held, therefore, some of the points of the deal were related 
to the elections themselves. Per the agreement, a third amendment was made to 
the Constitution and a mixed electoral system was adopted, thereby guarantee-
ing that a specific percentage of the CA members would hail from the Janajati 
groups. The other point of the agreement—to ensure the representation of almost 
all Janajati groups in the CA—did not reach the point of full adherence, as the 
first CA lacked sufficient representatives from smaller Janajati groups. However, 
bigger Janajati groups, such as the Newar, the Gurung, the Sherpa, the Thakali, 
the Limbu, and the Rai, had higher representation than that warranted by their 
respective population strength. The two biggest Janajati groups, the Tamang and 
the Tharu, had lower representation than warranted by their population strength.
Per the agreement reached with the Janajati group, the GoN ratified the ILO-
169 convention and also passed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The deal related to local and mother tongues 
in local governments was also addressed by the third amendment to the Interim 
Constitution, which permitted the use of local/mother tongues in the local gov-
ernments. Likewise, the GoN reserved 45 per cent of the seats in public services 
for various social groups. The agreement regarding the formation of a Janajati 
commission was not fulfilled until the demise of the first CA.4
Just three weeks prior to the holding of the elections for the CA, a pact with 
another ethnic group, the Federal Limbuwan Autonomous Council, was signed. 
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The five-point deal signed on March 19, 2008, by the representatives of the sev-
en-party alliance (the ruling coalition) included the following main points: com-
mitment to the federal governance system, along with a Limbuwan province, and 
representation of the council in the yet-to-be formed state restructuring commis-
sion. While one main point of the deal reached between the GoN and the Federal 
Limbuwan State Council before the CA elections was related to Limbuwan prov-
ince, the GoN did not commit in clear terms to the Limbu province; the language 
used was vague and ambiguous. The deal related to the Limbus’ demand to have 
their representative in the state restructuring commission was also eventually 
reneged on.
After the completion of the CA elections and the formation of a new gov-
ernment under the leadership of Maoist chair Prachanda, another Janajati group 
launched protest programs with the aim of persuading the state to fulfil their 
demands. The grand coalition of various Tamang organizations, the Tamsaling 
Joint Struggle Committee, which had made a number of political and socio-cul-
tural demands, reached a 19-point understanding with the state on April 11, 2009, 
after following a similar trajectory to that of other “successful” movements.5 Of 
the 26-point demands, those falling under the jurisdictions of the CA were left 
undecided, but the remaining demands were settled via the signed agreement. 
Some of the points in the agreement overlapped (e.g., with the Janajatis) and 
had been agreed on or met, for example, related to ILO-169/UNDRIP or mother 
tongue.6
Upon approaching the final deadline of the first CA (May 2012), the Janajatis 
once again took to the streets to force the state to fulfil their demands (some 
new and some old, as they felt that the pact they had reached had not been hon-
oured). This protest movement was also a reaction to the agreement that the GoN 
reached with the Bahun-Chhetris. The GoN had agreed to the Bahun-Chhetris’ 
demands after two days of a nationwide strike (see the following discussion). 
This time around, racial slurs were also hurled, threatening the communal har-
mony. Afterwards, the GoN held talks with the Janajatis and signed another pact. 
Since many of the demands would fall under the ambit of the CA, the GoN agreed 
to table the Janajatis’ demands, such as federal structure based on ethnicity, pro-
portionate representation in every organ of the state, and granting full autonomy 
to the provinces with first rights (agradhikar, of Janajatis), among others. One 
point related to the GoN was the statement on the Janajatis’ opposition to the 
GoN’s agreement to grant an Adivasi status to the Khas-Arya group.
Madhesi movements
The people of Nepal’s southern plain have long complained that the state has been 
discriminatory towards the Madhesis, treating them as second-class citizens and 
restricting their representation and access to the state organs. Grievances and agi-
tations have been raised against what they perceived as unjust practices and polity 
since the 1950s, but the Madhes-centred movements of the past were not very 
successful. However, that began changing after the popular movement of 2006. 
After the promulgation of the Interim Constitution of 2007, the Madhes-based 
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political party, Sadbhavana, called for a nationwide strike (bandh) to protest the 
decision to keep the old electoral constituencies intact for the purpose of the CA 
elections. The strike turned violent and led to a communal riot in Nepalganj, 
dividing the society in the Madhesi and Pahadi folds. The riot that began in 
Nepalganj subsequently spread to other areas of the southern plain.
After the promulgation of the Interim Constitution (IC), 2007, the Madhesi 
Janadhikar Forum (MJF, an NGO as well as a loose network also launched pro-
test programs. Security forces arrested the MJF’s chair, Upendra Yadav, as well 
as 28 other members in Kathmandu when they were setting the IC, 2007 alight. 
The police arrested them under the public security act. This led to further agita-
tions, mainly in the Tarai, which included bandhs. As the movement was gaining 
momentum, the Maoists disregarded the strike called by the MJF, which led to 
scuffles and eventually killings. This further increased the polarization between 
the Pahades and the Madhesis, and subsequently, the Madhes movement swelled 
enormously and engulfed the whole southern plain. The GoN was forced to hold 
talks with the agitating groups and finally reached an agreement (samjhauta, not 
understanding) with the MJF. After holding eight different stages of talks over the 
course of three months, both parties reached a 22-point agreement on August 30, 
2007. The agreed-on points included proportional representation, state restructur-
ing commission, federal governance system, recognition of the dress, language, 
and culture of Madhes, trilingual policy (mother tongue, Nepali, and English), 
citizenship distribution teams in the villages, just distribution of the revenue gen-
erated from the Madhesh, formation of an industrial security force, and the imple-
mentation of laws for inclusiveness, among others.
The first three points of the deal related to the victims of the protest move-
ments; the release of arrested activists, treatment for those injured, compensation 
packages for victims and honouring the dead were all addressed, to a large extent. 
The state restructuring commission was also a concern for both the Madhesis 
and the Janajatis. Per the agreement, the state sent out citizenship distribution 
committees and distributed 2.6 million citizenship certificates. Likewise, in 
2065 v.s. an ordinance was issued to make the civil service inclusive by reserving 
45 percent of seats to various social groups. The ordinance was later approved by 
the legislative body.
Even after the agreement was reached with the MJF, some quarters of the Mad-
hesis have been protesting against the constituency-boundaries delineating rep-
resentation in the CA for the Madhes-based groups; parliamentarians thought it 
unjust that the Madhes, which hosted about half the country’s population, was 
sending a smaller number of legislators to the parliament. They wanted the con-
stituencies to be redrawn based on the population distribution per the most recent 
census, which had been conducted in 2001. However, since the other political 
parties did not show much interest in addressing their demands, several Madhesi 
members of parliament, who were part of the interparty Madhesi network, 
resigned from the respective parties to form new party(ies). They then formed 
the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) and organized various protest 
programs, including bandhs. Six weeks prior to the elections for the CA, the 
GoN and the agitating front of the Madhes-based parties, the UDMF, reached 
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an eight-point agreement on February 28, 2008. Per the agreement, the consti-
tution was amended to proclaim Nepal a federal country. Likewise, the electoral 
law, as well as the public service act, were amended to honour the agreement. 
Only after reaching agreements with the Madhes-based groups did the holding 
of the CA elections seem possible. The most important point of the agreement 
was related to Madhes province, but the wording of the agreement was vague. 
It spoke of honouring the “Madhesi people’s wishes of autonomous Madhes 
province including the desire of the people of other regions to have autonomous 
provinces in the federal structure” and agreed that the “provinces would be fully 
autonomous with full rights.”
The state was also required to make the state structures inclusive in proportion 
to the population strength of the major social groups, per the agreement. However, 
the provision of the electoral law that required that parties filing candidates for 
more than 20 per cent of seats in the CA elections be inclusive themselves was 
changed and the threshold was increased to 30 per cent. This meant that only the 
bigger parties had to be “inclusive” and the requirement did not extend to the 
smaller parties that filed candidacies for less than one-third of the constituencies. 
This was somewhat paradoxical, in that the agitating Madhesi parties wanted 
the state and other so-called national parties to be inclusive, but they themselves 
did not want to meet this requirement. Another agreed-on point was to ensure 
the inclusiveness of the state organs, including the Nepali army. The deal on this 
issue, particularly as it related to the army, was also not worded clearly despite its 
inclusion of the term group entry, which the Madhesis demanded.
After the GoN signed deals with the two major groups/fronts of the Madhes, 
deals were also signed with other social groups and the armed outfits of the Tarai. 
The GoN and the federation of the Backward Society (Pichhada Varga Samaj) 
reached a five-point deal on March 24, 2009. Agreed-on points in the deal included 
the following: the backward community development board created through the 
ordinance was to become fully functional with appointments of all members, and 
to broadcast news in the Magahi language, among others.
Other movements
Apart from these two broad social groups, the GoN also held talks with various 
other social groups during the period between 2007 and 2012. The pattern, how-
ever, was similar—first, these groups organized various sorts of protest programs, 
and when they called strikes or bandhs, which brought daily life to a halt, the 
state invited these groups to talks. These groups included the Badis, the Haliyas, 
Muslim organizations, the Tharu resistance committee, the Chure Bhavar 
Rastriya Ekata Samaj, the Bahun-Chhetris, and the like. Among these, the Badis 
and the Haliyas had demands that were more related to economic and social or 
social rehabilitation issues rather than “political” ones, whereas the others also 
had “political” demands. Three of these protest movements, namely, the Chure 
Bhavar, the Tharu, and the Bahun-Chhetri emerged in reaction to the Madhes and 
Janajati movements to a large extent. The Muslim movement was also partially 
a reaction to the Madhes movement, although it was not in direct contradiction 
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with the Madhes movement—the Muslims also wanted to carve a distinct identity 
of their own, and did not wish to be subsumed within the Madhesi fold.
The newest of these movements, that is, those of the Bahuns and the Chhetris, 
and especially the latter, was a reaction to both the Janajatis and the Madhesis, 
and especially to the former. In later stages, we also saw regional movements 
whose sole interest was to shape a federal unit based on certain region/ethnicity. 
Especially in western Nepal, the Tharus and particularly the Bahun-Chhetris 
launched protest programs which were specifically aimed against the claims of 
the other group.
The Tharus have been situated into the Tarai Janajati fold, in the “official” eth-
nic categorization. However, the Tharus were also an integral part of the revolt in 
the Tarai—which hardened the Madhesi identity—this was also a reaction against 
the hegemony of the Pahades/state. Meanwhile, a group of the Tharus felt that 
their own identity had been subsumed by the newly recognized Madhes identity. 
In addition, the pan-Madhes single-autonomous province (the most contentious 
demand of the Madhes movement) also subsumed the territory that the Tharus 
had been claiming as their own. This made a group of Tharus angry. They not 
only protested the Madhes province but also claimed that although there were 
Madhesis in the country, there was no Madhes. They would call the southern 
plain Tarai instead of Madhes, the latter of which was the name championed by 
the Madhesis.
After the completion of the CA elections, the GoN issued an ordinance to 
amend the act related to public/state services on February 3, 2009, to honour the 
agreements reached with the Madhesis and the Janajatis. It reserved 45 per cent of 
the seats for various underrepresented social groups. A schedule listing 92 caste/
ethnic groups in the Madhesi category was prepared. In the scheme through 
which the distribution of the quotas was provided, the Tharus were placed into the 
Madhesi category. On February 26, 2009, the Kantipur Daily published a news 
article with the title “Who are Madhesis?” which made Tharu activists angry, par-
ticularly those who had been part of the Janajati movement. They thought that this 
would not only subsume their identity but also feared that most of these quotas 
would also be taken away by the high and medium caste groups of the Madhes.
Against this backdrop, the Tharus launched protest movements against, in 
their own words, Madhesization, and formed a resistance committee that was 
also supported by the federation of Janajatis.7 Eventually, the government agreed 
to address the Tharus’ demands by signing a six-point pact on March 14, 2009, 
in which the representatives of the federation of the Janajatis were also signato-
ries. In the first point of the deal, the following was stated: “recognizing the fact 
that the Tharus, and the Adivasi Janajatis, Madhesis, Dalits, Muslims, and the 
minority groups have their own distinct identities and any legal constitutional 
provisions that would cloud such identities would be amended.” This also led to 
the constitutional amendment, in which Madhes was replaced by Tarai Madhes, 
in an attempt to please both the groups. The GoN had also agreed to amend the 
act related to inclusion in public service.
The other group with which the state reached a deal is called the Chure Bhavar 
Rastriya Ekata Samaj, which was basically a loose coalition of the Pahades or 
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people from what is usually referenced as the “hill origin.” The Madhes move-
ment had witnessed increased polarization between the Madhesi and Pahade 
populations. In some places in the Tarai, the Pahades bore the brunt of the anger 
from Madhesi activists during the Madhes movement. Fearing the worst, many 
Pahades even fled north, to the Pahade-dominated areas along the Chrue hills. 
When the Madhes movement gained momentum (and also turned violent), the 
Pahades, who were mostly residing along the Chure hills, formed an organiza-
tion to counter the Madhesi agitation. This organization had a 27-point list of 
demands, such as the formation of the Chure Bhavar province. After two weeks 
of the agreement with the MJF, the GoN signed a nine-point pact with the Chure 
Bhavar group on September 13, 2007.8
Likewise, after similar protest movements from the Badis and the Haliyas, the 
GoN reached deals with the agitating groups. Most of their demands were related 
to economic and cultural rights, which the government agreed to fulfil to a large 
extent. The GoN also reached agreements with the Muslim groups (signed on 
March 16, 2009); however, some of their demands were already part of the agree-
ment with the Madhesis.9 Apart from these, the GoN had also signed pacts with 
a front called the Federal Republic National Front. This front thought of itself 
as more radical than the Janajati federation, with whom there was already an 
agreement. One important distinction was that this front also had members from 
the Dalits and Madhesi communities, who were participating in the leadership. 
This front signed a five-point deal on March 1, 2008, with a seven-party alliance, 
including the Maoists.10
Demands were made for ethnicity-based federal structures from the Janajati 
fold, whereas the Madhesis wanted a single Madhes province in the southern 
plain. Shaping a federal structure had become one of the most contentious issues 
in the drafting of the constitution. Every group wanted a province of its own. 
The GoN had failed to form a state restructuring commission, which was also 
mentioned in the IC 2007,11 and the CA committee had also failed to come up 
with an agreeable proposal regarding the issue of proposing a federal structure. 
Following the draft concept paper of the CA regarding the state restructuring 
and especially following the report on the state restructuring commission, Nepali 
society became divided into two broad camps—those who supported ethnicity/
identity-based federalism and those who opposed it. The proposals of the draft 
concept paper and the commission, as well as the special privileges, irked the 
Bahuns and the Chhetris, as they felt insecure. The proposal to reserve the apex 
post of the province for the “ethnic” majority group of the province made by one 
of the eleven committees formed by the first CA added insult to injury. Moreover, 
the demand of the Janajatis (being Adivasis) to have privileged access to natural 
resources in their areas was equally problematic for the Bahun-Chhetri collective.
The Bahuns and the Chhetris (individually and collectively, had also built coa-
litions with the Sanyasis and the Dalits) then took to the streets and resorted to 
strikes/bandhs to ensure their demands would be fulfilled, which were in opposi-
tion to those of the Janajatis and the Madhesis. One of the demands of the Chhetri 
group was to recognize the Chhetris as Adivasis. The GoN and the Chhetris 
agreed to form a task force to undertake a study regarding this demand, that is, 
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the Adivasi-ness of the collective. Interestingly, the GoN formed the task force 
under the leadership of Dil Bahadur Chhetri, an organizer of the Chhetri struggle 
committee; the task force submitted its report, which has not yet been made pub-
lic. The deal the GoN reached with the Bahun-Chhetri–Dalit–Sanyasi–Thakuri 
joint struggle committee had no specific points—except the statement that the 
GoN would address “justifiable” demands within one month. Likewise, while 
restructuring the state, it was agreed to recommend and request that the CA also 
consider the “national indivisibility, communal harmony, geographical proximity, 
administrative feasibility (anukulata), availability of resources, economic viabil-
ity, and lingual and cultural similarity.”12 Later, upon approaching the final dead-
line of the first CA tenure (May 2012), the same group called on strikes to ensure 
that its demands would be fulfilled. One point within the pact that was reached 
was the removal of the “Other” category from the constitution and its subsequent 
renaming in legal documents as the Khas-Arya group. The second point of the 
deal was to grant them the Adivasi status. The GoN also agreed to give the final 
authority of naming the provinces to the provincial legislature.
The other movement—the counter movement, if you will—that temporar-
ily paralysed the country was the movement of the Akhanda Sudur Paschim 
(Undivided Far West) group. When the GoN agreed, in principle, to the demands 
of the Tharu movement for a Tharuhat province, people from the existing far-
west region, but mostly those from the hilly areas, demanded that their region be 
kept intact in the federal structure. They called for strikes, which continued for 
21 days, and finally, the GoN (the three main ruling parties, namely, the Nepali 
Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist [CPN UML], 
and the CPN-M) held dialogues with them. The three-party leaders agreed not to 
divide the far west, and if required, a referendum was to be conducted to make a 
final decision on the issue. This then irked the Tharus, who had been demanding 
the formation of Tharuhat, which included the two southern districts in the far 
west, namely, Kailali and Kanchanpur. After a series of bandhs, the GoN agreed 
to accept the proposal to make three provinces in the Tarai into one Tharuhat in 
west Nepal, which included the two disputed districts.13
Making sense of the movements and the agreements
How do we then understand this sudden upsurge in various social formations 
launching andolans, their “successes” in extracting various concessions from the 
state, and the state’s agreement to even mutually exclusive demands? To make 
sense of these andolans with which the GoN reached deals, we must examine 
them holistically. There are at least three phenomena that seem to be occurring, 
and they are as follows.
First, several social formations, both new and old, became organized at a par-
ticular historical juncture (quite suddenly, in a few cases) and launched protest 
movements. One way to approach these contentious collective actions (see Tilly 
1978) is to view them as (new) social movements. Social movements broadly con-
sist of “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in 
sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 1994: 3–4). 
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The contemporary social movements are also often called new social movements 
(NSMs) given their emphasis on being different from those which preceded them 
(see Buechler 1995). The NSMs are said to emphasize quality of life, lifestyle 
concerns, and call into question, for example, the representative democracy, and 
the like (Pichardo 1997). Identity claims are said to be the most distinctive feature 
of NSMs (Kauffman 1990). According to Tarrow (1994), NSMs prefer to remain 
outside of normal political channels, employ disruptive tactics, and mobilize pub-
lic opinion to gain political leverage.14 Furthermore, some NSMs are also said to 
have become integrated into the party system (Pichardo 1997)—this is the case in 
Nepal (see the following discussion).
Particularly when their political significance is higher, the NSMs usually 
also become a precursor to what some scholars call “counter movements” (see, 
e.g., Mottl 1980; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Kongkirati 2006). According to 
Meyer and Staggenborg (1996: 1642), “[w]hen a movement succeeds in posing a 
real threat to a powerful interest, some elites may conclude that the social move-
ment form is a highly effective political tool and so they try to foster a counter 
movement.”15 In our case, too, it is tempting to brand a number of social move-
ments post-2006 as “counter-movements,” for they follow earlier movement(s) 
and make direct or indirect references to those which preceded them. For exam-
ple, the movement of the Bahun-Chhetris or that of the Tharus, the Chure Bhavar, 
or the Akhanda Sudur Paschim can be categorized as such, in a sense. However, 
other movements have taken place that were not “counter” but were what I would 
call “parallel” movements, as they borrowed largely from the playbooks of the 
earlier movements but are not necessarily in conflict with the gains the other 
movements had made. Therefore, rather than branding certain movements at the 
outset as “counter,” it would be much more useful to examine the process, the 
actions they take, and how they are implemented.
While a number of theories attempt to explain the emergence of social move-
ments, for example, political crisis (Skocpol 1979)16 political opportunity struc-
ture (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1983, 1989; Kriesi 1995; Goldstone 2004),17 resource 
mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977),18 or relative deprivation (Gurney and 
Tierney 1982), our case is slightly different here; we are mostly discussing the 
“sudden upsurge” and are focused less on the emergence of the movements them-
selves. Two factors are particularly important for understanding the “upsurge” 
(i.e., of the movements): (a) the “volatility” of the state owing to the political 
transition and (b) the discourse that was generated around the writing of the 
constitution.
If we examine history as well, we see that political transitions usually provide 
certain types of traction or “opportunity structures” (cf. Meyer and Staggenborg 
1996; Goldstone 2004) during which a plethora of organized interest groups try 
to apply pressure on the state, and even extract resources/concessions. Whether 
the focus is placed on the political movement of 1951, 1990, or, most recently, 
2006, this trend is clearly observable; various unions—those of teachers or civil 
servants, doctors, and even traders—have all seized the moment. In addition, 
the distinctive element this time around was the context in which the writing of 
the constitution took place.19 It is not that the same context was not present in the 
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previous political transitions, but the discourse generated was different. During 
the 2006 transition, the constitution writing through the CA was presented as a 
lifetime opportunity, particularly for the historically marginalized communities 
to “settle the scores” of centuries of oppression/exploitation and the injustices 
that had been meted out by the ruling groups. This opportunity was first seized by 
the Janajati movement, which was no surprise, given its position as the foremost 
social movement with a long protest/mobilization history and powerful intellec-
tual backing. The Madhesis, who were also no less resourceful, also jumped into 
the fray and made their mark. Subsequently, other social groups also joined in 
to safeguard the interests of their respective groups in the new, yet-to-be written 
main law of the land.
The second fact that becomes apparent is the following: Almost all these agree-
ments or understandings have protest movements in their background. These 
agreements suggest that the Nepali state does not simply listen to people’s demands, 
concerns raised through memorandums or petitions, or even peaceful unobtrusive 
protest programs; it wakes up and agrees only when the movements bring aspects 
of the public life to a halt or turn violent. Furthermore, the movements have all 
followed a particular trajectory; regardless of whether they have been initiated by 
the Madhesis, the Janajatis, the Chure Bhavar group, or the Bahun-Chhetris, all 
went on strike or threatened to strikes or call for bandhs—some may have called 
for strikes in particular regions, whereas others may have pursued a nation-wide 
strike. Regarding the movement modalities and the deal-making processes, one 
could hardly observe any distinction between, for example, the Janajati and the 
Bahun-Chhetri movements, or the Madhes movement, despite the fact that their 
demands were very different. In some instances, they were outright contradictory. 
In fact, the political movements (of 1990, 2005–2006) seem to have had “demon-
stration effects” (cf. Kongkirati 2006) on these social movements. These protest 
movements have subsequently entrenched a particular template of a “successful” 
movement, contributing to the homogenization of movement dynamics in Nepal. 
Here, “success” may be “debatable,” as a number of movement activists were 
unhappy with the “achievements” despite some tangible impacts that one could 
observe in the form of immediate relief packages, constitutional/legal provisions, 
and policy documents (see Giugni 1999, 2008; Amenta et al. 2010).20
One aspect of these movements, which made deals with the GoN, is that many 
built intra-group coalitions or united fronts and launched various protest pro-
grams, which increased their strength and collective bargaining power. For exam-
ple, the Janajati activists united under the banner of the Adivasi Janajati Struggle 
Committee; the Madhesis came together and formed their own united front, that 
is, the UDMF; the Tharus created the Tharuhat Struggle Committee; the Muslims 
had the United National Muslim Front; the Tamangs had the Tamsaling United 
Struggle Committee; and so on. Despite these fronts/coalitions of various social 
groups, serious inter-social group coalitions were not formed.21
However, the coalitions, or fronts, that were formed during the study period did 
not last long. Within five to seven years, most of the coalitions—from that of the 
Madhesis to those of the Tharus, Muslims, and Chure Bhavar—were all divided. 
While the Janajati front, particularly the Federation, still seems intact, its stability 
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was undermined when another Janajati front was formed in which a significant 
number of leaders from the Federation’s early days participated. The split caused 
a weakening in the movements’ collective bargaining power.22 Another impor-
tant feature of these movements is that prior to the division of the movements, 
a majority had joined the political process by converting into political parties—
another feature of the NSMs, as discussed earlier.23 Furthermore, some of the 
leaders of the movements also found other ways to participate in the political 
spectrum—through their nomination by one or the other political parties in the 
CA.24 This also begs a serious study of not only the consequences or impacts of 
the movements but also the transformations that take place within the movements 
themselves, or their life cycle.
The third important phenomenon is related to the “deals” themselves—their 
lack of mutual compatibility and the issue of the type of language used. If we 
examine the wordings of the deals, the parties seem to prefer cryptic language in 
the sense that more than one interpretation could be made from the same text. This 
preference is particularly evident in some of the more contentious issues. While 
the agitating groups usually level blame at the state (represented by seasoned 
politicians and backed by bureaucrats) for such unclear sentences, this unclear 
language is typically consciously selected to create a “win–win” situation and 
“save face” for both groups. For example, let us examine the issue of one autono-
mous Madhes province—one of the most contentious points of the deals made in 
the post-2006 period. The controversial point speaks of honouring the “Madhesi 
people’s wishes for an autonomous Madhes province, including the desire of the 
people of other regions to have autonomous provinces in the federal structure.” 
According to the Madhesi participants/signatories, the agreement was to estab-
lish a single autonomous Madhes province covering the entire southern plain, but 
those who represented the GoN in the talk disagree with this interpretation. The 
opponents of the movement argue that a “single province” was not mentioned 
anywhere in the deal and refer to the addendum “including” in the same sentence.
Apart from the language used in the deals, the other striking observation is 
that some were reached with movements that were “not compatible,” if not out-
right contradictory. This was so because the two protest movements had diverg-
ing aims/objectives and were sometimes fighting for the same constituencies—or 
were in a sense, “counter-movements”—and the state reached an agreement with 
both groups and agreed to fulfil even the apparently contradictory demands. For 
example, the GoN agreed to the demands of the Janajatis and to those of the Khas 
Aryas; it also agreed to the demands Madhesis and those of the Tharus and the 
Chure Bhavars. Likewise, the GoN agreed to the demands of the Tharus and those 
of the Akhanda Sudur Pashchim. These groups’ demands, however, contradicted 
each other; therefore, the state could not honour one group’s demands without 
dishonouring those of the other.
The state’s signing of the mutually exclusive pacts with two or more social 
movements may be seen as a characteristic of a “weak state,” succumbing to 
the pressure applied by “strong” society/ies or organized groups. In the strong/
weak state and strong/weak society matrix (Migdal 1988; cf. Kriesi 1995), Nepal 
may seem to be a textbook example of a weak state that is forced to agree to all 
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demands made by an organized, strong society. Nepal’s portrayal of a “fragile” 
or “failing/failed” state or a crisis-ridden, doomed state from various quarters 
also gives this impression (see, e.g., Riaz and Basu 2007; Blaikie, Cameron and 
Seddon 1980; cf. Tamang 2012). While the Nepali state may seem to have been 
overwhelmed by societal forces and protest movements at particular junctures, it 
was never “very weak,” not even during this period of uncertainty. According to 
Kriesi (1995), a weak state may be forced to give in to a movement’s demands, 
but it is not likely to have the capacity to implement the required policy changes. 
If the Nepali state was very weak, as has been claimed, it would not have had the 
capacity to introduce all the constitutional/legal and policy changes mentioned 
herein.
While the Nepali state has acted upon certain points of the agreements, 
it has also not followed through in many cases. Its “cleverness” becomes 
apparent when we examine the way it reached deals, particularly with the 
so-called “counter”-movements. While it is true that it signed pacts with these 
“counter”-movements only after they mobilized a large section of the masses and 
brought public life to a halt (as did other previous social movements), it also is 
true that the state gave in relatively easily (some even blame the state for instigat-
ing the “counter”-movements). With clear knowledge of the demands and agree-
ments of certain protest movements, and not because of “historical amnesia,” as 
some would argue, the state agreed to the “counter”-movements’ demands. These 
contradictory pacts should therefore be viewed as an attempt on the part of the 
Nepali state to pit one movement against the other, and nullify and redress the 
pacts that had been made previously when it “unwillingly” signed under “duress.” 
Therefore, rather than perceiving the Nepali state as weak, it is more appropri-
ate for us to view it as “clever,” performing its job in accordance with current 
demands.
Notes
 1 While the Nepali state reached sahamati and samajhdari (an understanding) with the vari-
ous groups, it did samjhauta with the Madhesis. Although both sahamati and samjhauta 
could be loosely translated as “agreement” in English, the Madhesi agitating groups con-
sider the latter more important—that is, the contract between two “equal” forces. The list 
of agreements maintained on the website of the Ministry of Peace shows 45 such agree-
ments/understandings, which also includes talks and pacts reached with a number of 
armed outfits of the Tarai (see http://www.peace. gov.np/content.php?id=167). However, I 
do not discuss the pacts with the armed groups in this chapter. Annex 1 provides a 
brief summary of the agreements reached with the various protest groups, which I do 
address herein.
 2 While there is difference between a state and government, both the Nepali media and the 
public often use the two interchangeably. Throughout this chapter, I also use government of 
Nepal or GoN, government, Nepali state, or state interchangeably.
 3 It is noteworthy here that the trajectories of these movements themselves are modeled after 
the successful popular movement of 2006.
 4 This point has been addressed in the new constitution, which was promulgated in 
November 2015.
 5 The Tamang front and the leaders that spearheaded the movement were aligned with the 
Maoist party itself.
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 6 Some of the points included are as follows: making the army inclusive by abolishing dis-
criminatory practices against the Tamangs, among others, as well as a number of cultural 
rights and recognition issues, for example, changing the national animal, education in the 
mother tongue, the ending of cultural discrimination, and so on.
 7 When the situation became tense and violence erupted in some places, the GoN 
claimed that it was simply a suggestion of the research committee and no decision has been 
taken.
 8 The agreed-on points in the GoN–Chure Bhavar deal included the following: compensation 
for the victims, securing, safeguarding, and advancing national unity, indivisibility and sov-
ereignty while shaping the federal structure; and consultation with local people while 
exporting resources from the Chure area.
 9 The following were major points: amendment of the legal constitutional provisions that 
affected their distinct identity, formation of a Madarsa board, a national Muslim commis-
sion, a public holiday during Muslim religious festivals, and so on.
 10 The agreement that was reached contained the following points: the proclamation of Nepal 
as a federal country, federal provinces, and proportional representation in the state organs, 
among others.
 11 The commission was eventually formed in the final months of the fourth year (on November 
22, 2011) of the first CA, but it failed to produce a unanimous report.
 12 The other points were as follows: to also consider “economic-class” in the reservation 
system.
 13 Some of the demands that the various social movements had put forth were essentially to be 
decided by the CA. When the constitution was finally prepared and promulgated by the 
second CA in 2015, the demands of the dominating group, that is, the Bahun-Chhetris, 
seemed to have more or less fulfilled. The demands of the other social groups, particularly 
those related to federal units, were not met, which led to violent protests in the eastern and 
western plains, mainly by the Madhesis and the Tharus. respectively.
 14 “Actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transforma-
tions through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action” are also 
called political social movements (see Amenta et al. 2010: 288).
 15 There seem to be three conditions that promote the rise of counter-movements: first, a social 
movement shows signs of success; second, the interests of some people are threatened by 
the movement’s goals; and third, political allies opposing the social movement are available 
to aid in oppositional Mobilization (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). However, these are, 
according to Kongkirati (2006), necessary but not sufficient conditions. Furthermore, a 
counter-movement might not necessarily be a “reactionary” one.
 16 According to Skocpol, social revolutions are typically triggered by a political crisis that 
weakens the control exercised by the political system over the population.
 17 According to Tilly (1978, see also Tilly 2004), the rhythm of the collective violence was 
directly linked to shifts in the struggle for political power rather than to the structural trans-
formations of society. Per Tarrow (1983, 1989), the concept has the following dimensions: 
the degree of openness of formal political access; the degree of stability or instability of 
political alignments; the availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners; and 
political conflicts within and among the elites.
 18 According to McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1213), “[t]he resource mobilization approach 
emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It exam-
ines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to 
other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the 
tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements.”
 19 Even before the GoN reached agreements with the Janajatis or the Madhesis, it had signed 
pacts with the agitating civil servants (trade unions of all hues and colours) and drivers’ 
association and agreed to increase their pay and benefits.
 20 There is disagreement among scholars on the issue of whether social movements 
are generally effective and can account for important political changes (see Amenta et al. 
2010).
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 21 However, there were a few exceptions: the United Federal Democratic Republic front had 
representatives from among the Dalits, the Janajatis, the Madhesis, and the Tharus; mean-
while, the Bahun Chhetris had the Thakruis, the Dashnamis, and even the Dalits on board. 
While building alliances, the partners seem to have accommodated each other’s (also some-
times contradictory) demands, but they do not seem to have fully owned them.
 22 A number of these movements have since then disbanded. Those involved in these move-
ments, that is, activists, say that the root causes for the split among the group are both 
internal and external. On the external side, they blame the state’s divide and rule policy. The 
internal cause is the “suspicious” roles played by members of the “talk teams.” They blame 
the team members for the sellout (for “posts” and money). Not only in the coalitions, but 
also within a single group, group members are suspicious. Each one would desire to take 
credit for the good deals and blame the others for bad ones. After the deal was made, some 
members of the movement called it an act of deception and then either distanced themselves 
from the group or even took action against their team members by dismissing them from the 
movement/talk team.
 23 The chief protagonist of the Madhes movement, MJF, became a political party and eventu-
ally became the fourth largest force in the first CA. All members of the UDMF were also in 
the first CA, through either MJF or another political outfit, the Tarai Madhes Democratic 
Party (TMDP). The group that called itself a non-political entity, Chure Bhavar, converted 
itself into a political party and was also represented in the CA. Likewise, the United Federal 
National Front was also in the CA.
 24 Apart from these movement-turned parties, the Janajati activists, who were involved in the 
Janajati movement, were also part of the first CA: Pasang Sherpa, chair of the Janajati fed-
eration; Suryaman Dong of Tamsaling; and others. The movements’ or leadership’s partici-
pation in the political process have important consequences. Earlier, those in civil society or 
who were outside of the political spectrum became part of political society and part of the 
state (cf. Chatterjee 2004). This provided them with the opportunity to: first, directly engage 
in producing the constitution, and second, resolve the conflicts within the constitutional 
framework.
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7 Abul Sattar Edhi
The modern incarnation of a Pacifist Sufi
Tahir Kamran
Abdul Sattar Edhi, “a truly selfless spiritual sage” (Oborne 2011), embraced sim-
plicity typical of a dervish who, while sitting in his dargah (hospice) cares for 
humanity without provincializing it. In that hospice, all are welcome irrespective 
of religion, caste or creed and in many instances gender too.1 “From the cradle 
to the Grave” is the motto of Edhi s mission which caters to the needs of “a 
suffering humanity.” Edhi and his wife Bilquis Edhi embraced the newborn and 
the old who have been abandoned, the girl who has run away from home, the 
drug addict who is trying to recover, the handicapped and terminally ill (Raponi 
and Zanzucchi 2013: 35). According to Hussain Ahmad Khan (2015: 24–25), a 
historian of Sufism, hospices in the pre-colonial era, provided refuge to the mar-
ginalized and outcaste which at times incurred the ire of those in power. Thus, 
Edhi can at best be explained as a dervish, devoted to the service of humanity 
who instead of renouncing modernity, embraced it. His motivation and lifelong 
goal, however, transcended the man-made boundary splitting medieval and the 
modern, the human welfare. It was, of course, among the very few constants and 
universals.
Hailing from the state of Gujrat in India, a region known for nestling and 
nurturing personalities such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, to quote a few, Abdul Sattar Edhi epito-
mized a multicultural ethos in which he was reared up. Edhi also influenced peo-
ple markedly different from the rest. He attained the status of an icon in service 
to humanity without resorting to high politics. Unlike Imran Khan, he steered 
clear of using high politics to be the messiah of the deprived and dispossessed. 
Like many South Asian dervish, he also gave a wide berth to a high lifestyle. It 
is important to assert here that Edhi himself never indicated about his any adher-
ence with any Sufi or dargah. As it will be noted in the pages that follow, all those 
having inspired him to choose a life that of a dervish were all modern people. 
However, the austere and simple life of Edhi appears to have a profound rub of 
medieval Sufis. In the medieval period, among several functions of the Sufi dar-
gah, one was that of a charity organization. That is the only possible context that 
may help us to make sense of Edhi’s gargantuan undertaking to ameliorate the lot 
of the poor and the dispossessed.
It was in the 1950s that Edhi established the Edhi Foundation, which is the 
largest social welfare network in Pakistan. The dynamic nature and the range of 
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social services provided by the Edhi Foundation make it starkly different from 
other organizations, operating in and outside Pakistan. It claims the credit of 
becoming the most active welfare organization in the country at the grassroots 
level. The Foundation is a home for over 6,000 destitute, runaways and mentally 
ill people, and it provides free dispensary and hospital services to over 1,000,000 
persons annually in addition to 45 other wide-ranging services (Durrani 1996: 23). 
The Foundation “rescued over twenty thousand infants, rehabilitated over fifty 
thousand orphans and has trained over forty thousand nurses—operating more 
than 330 welfare centres” in Pakistan. In 1991, “the Foundation provided aid to 
victims of the Gulf war and earthquake sufferers in Egypt and Iran. The organiza-
tion has held the Guinness record, 2010, for the world’s largest volunteer ambu-
lance organization” (Khan 2017). That fleet of ambulances maintains an enviable 
record of quick response for the affectees of any disaster. Its nation-wide network 
equipped with the latest communication system now covers the remotest areas of 
Pakistan. A fleet of over four hundred ambulances, field mobile units and rescue 
units, which compose this network, are maintained in a state of readiness to meet 
any emergency in the shortest possible time anywhere in Pakistan.
My contention in this study is that despite his persona like a dervish in a dargah 
Edhi was influenced by socialist ideologies, too, and he used modern tools and 
institutions to advance his cause, but he lived like a dervish who had risen above 
material gains. He explained to his friends, “[M]uch as my palm turns up to take, 
it simultaneously turns down to give” (Durrani 1996: 262). That, in fact, was the 
true essence of Edhi, a dervish, who earned respect worldwide, but more impor-
tant, he was the most trusted man around. His style of praying was reminiscent 
of the dargah. Women prayed with him. Women played an important role in dar-
gah culture. He has been shown praying along with girls in Apna Ghar is a clear 
elucidation of indiscrimination among the male and the female (Durrani 1996: 
262). His ultimate wish was to be buried in the clothes he wore when he died and 
for any of his usable organs to be donated. His eyes were donated after his death 
(Khan 2016). Having only two pairs of shalwarkameez, most of the donations 
for the Edhi Foundation came from middle-class people. Like a dervish, Edhi 
selected a place for his grave on the outskirts of the Edhi village in Karachi:
When I die, I will be buried here. There will be a sign on my grave saying: 
‘Those who do not give a donation to Edhi will have an accident on the Super 
Highway’! Since accidents on the Super Highway are common and peo-
ple are superstitious, they will donate. In this way I will continue collecting 
funds for the foundation even after my death.
(Jaffer 2016)
To assess the role and contribution of Edhi and his philanthropic endeavour, it 
is pertinent to cast a close look at his early life which may enable us to ascertain 
the source of inspiration for Edhi to choose such a challenging career path. It will 
not be out of place to mention that in this study the writer has benefitted from 
Tehmina Durrani’s (1996) book on Abdul Sattar Edhi or K. H. Awan’s (1987) 
work which is quite insightful. A major part of this chapter is based on newspaper 
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reports and features. Unfortunately, despite Edhi’s status that his contribution to 
the poor and dispossessed warrants, very little scholarly work has so far been 
carried out.
Early life: influences of socialism, corporate world and Islam
Abdul Sattar Edhi was born in 1928 in Dhobiwar quarters of a small village of 
Bantva near Junagarh, Gujarat (India). He was number three among four brothers 
and a sister (Awan 1987:13). His father was Abdul Shakoor, a small-scale cloth 
trader who belonged to the Edhi tribe of the Memon community.2 About the his-
tory of Memon community, it is noted in his biography that “[t]hree centuries 
ago, a religious leader in Thatta converted them from the Hindu faith to Islam 
and named them, Momins, meaning true believers. This was later distorted to 
Memons”(Durrani 1996: 23) That account goes ahead to say,
The Memons moved from Hala in Sindh, through the Thar desert or via the 
Rann of Kutch and migrated to Kathiawar in Gujrat. Wherever they settled 
became their future identity. The Viravel Memons, the Dorajee Memons and 
Kotyana Memons and the Bantva Memons.
(Durrani 1996: 23)
Abdul Sattar Edhi hailed from Bantva Memons. As described earlier Bantva 
was a village of Edhi s birthplace which stuck with him as a part of his identity.
Edhi in Gujrati language means “lazy,” but contrariwise the tribe was known 
for its vigilance, hard work, commitment, and humanism (Durrani 1996: 23). His 
father was widowed twice before marrying Ghurba— a daughter of the Diwan 
family, renowned for its business. Ghurba, Edhi’s mother, was divorced and had 
a son and a daughter before marrying Abdul Shakoor. Edhi got his primary edu-
cation in a local Islamic madrassa, where the medium of instruction was Gujrati. 
His lack of interest in studies forced his parents to abandon the dream of their 
child getting further education. Edhi started doing menial jobs at the age of 11. 
He worked as a salesperson at a local cloth store. He also used to sell betel leaves. 
He was endowed with the zeal to help the poor right from his childhood. He 
worked as a compounder in the village and wished to go to Bombay or Allahabad 
to earn money to help the poor. His friends used to make fun of him.
At the age of 11, Edhi became inclined towards philanthropic work while look-
ing after his mother who was suffering from paralysis. For the next eight years 
until her death, young Abdul Sattar devoted all his energies to look after her and 
took it on himself responsibilities of personal care that a physically handicapped 
person requires. This experience had a profound influence on Edhi, which also 
distracted him further from his studies. For him, the world of suffering became 
his tutor and source of wisdom. He would recount many years later how his 
mother was the first person to inspire him to practice charity. According to Edhi, 
his mother would give him two paisas, of which she would instruct him to spend 
half on himself and half in charity on some other person. She also advised him, 
“Always find out if the person is really in need. It is poisonous to give charity to 
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useless people, or to embarrass those who do not need it” (Durrani 1996: 26). It 
will not be out of place of mention that the suffering his mother endured when 
she contracted cancer had been the principal motivation for Imran Khan to a build 
cancer hospital in her name. Thus, the role of the “mother” is quite decisive in 
galvanizing both the philanthropists onto an altruistic path.
Edhi began to think of the millions, suffering like his mother, with nobody 
to look after them. He thought that he had a call to help these people. He had 
a vision of chains of welfare centres and hospitals that could be opened to 
alleviate the pain of those suffering from illness and neglect. He also became 
aware of the fact that the mentally ill, the insane and the disabled persons had 
not been treated well as the country lacked an effective and fully functional 
system and the institutional support by the state to take proper care of the 
mentally retarded and physically incapacitated members of the society.
Apart from his personal experiences, socialist ideas also influenced Edhi’s world 
view at the young age of 13. He became acquainted with Marxist ideology through 
a number of local newspapers and magazines that had been published in Gujrat 
in the late 1930s and the early 1940s. Some of them included The Muslim Gujrat 
Gazette, Bombay Samachar and Sandes (a Hindi word that means “message”) 
(Tahir, n.d). He also read works on Karl Marx and Maxim Gorky’s novel Mother, 
which left an indelible impression on him. He was particularly impressed by the 
perseverance Karl Marx (1818–1883) had demonstrated while pursuing his mis-
sion. He began to believe that people’s nature was shaped by their circumstances.
Edhi began to take interest in Islam and drew its similarities with socialism 
by studying the life of the Prophet of Islam, the tragedy of Karbala and Lenin’s 
implementation of Marxist philosophy. For him, rebels and reformers addressed 
the same issues related to humanity. This understanding enabled him to approach 
the history of Islam from the perspective of the struggle between the haves and 
the have-nots. The life of the Prophet’s poor companion, Abū Dharr al-Ghifari 
(d. 652 BC),3 fascinated him in considerable measure who criticized Muslim rul-
ers for accumulating wealth and not bringing in any social reform. According to 
him, “every reformer renounces his own comfort, he doesn’t even need to build a 
house. When you think of others you stop thinking of yourself. There is no space 
for that small character” (Durrani 1996: 263) He viewed Yazid,4 the villain of 
Karbala, as a class enemy who represented wealth and repression. To him,
the tragedy of Karbala was not a mere event, it is a living example. It confirms 
the extent of commitment required when man becomes aware of an injustice 
done to another human being. It highlights God’s demand for humanitarian-
ism above all us, especially your own self.
(Durrani 1996: 140)
It is important to note that Edhi did not embrace any ideology without criti-
cally analysing it. He possessed a unique ability to scrutinize every concept or 
a notion before coming to terms with it. That exactly was the reason he viewed 
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communism as a system which “quashed personal uplift and killed individual ini-
tiative altogether.” In its stead, he considered Islam that “aroused human energy” 
(Durrani 1996: 304) which opens possibilities not only for the common good and 
welfare but for uplifting of the individual as well. He was quite categorical in say-
ing that his system was not “confined to individual help or charity, it was collective 
work conducted by personal motivation” (Durrani 1996: 304). That, in fact, was 
the secret of Edhi’s phenomenal success. He believed in the decisiveness of the 
role of the individual as well as the collective, not privileging one over the other.
Study of the lives of reformers and revolutionaries made him more rebel-
lious and he began to detest big investors. Various nationalist and anti-imperial-
ist movements in India led by M. K. Gandhi, Inayatullah Khan Mashriqui5 and 
M. A. Jinnah (1876–1948) deeply influenced him. Jinnah was elected president 
of a leading trade union of British India, the All India Postal Staff Union in 1925 
(Wolpert 1984). He was moved by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s (1890–1988) 
Khudai Khidmatgar Party,6 which was reaching out to the common man in vil-
lages and striving hard to solve their problems. He was appreciative of Gandhi’s 
decision to remain in Calcutta (in 1946) until the Hindu–Muslims riots ceased. 
He was cognizant of the seething anger that people felt against colonialism, 
which aroused his interest in the struggle of Muhammad Ali Jinnah for Pakistan.
All these personalities were a source of inspiration for him, but he had his own 
philosophy of life which had a Sufi ring to it. That is what made him distinct. He 
assumed “the responsibility of the elevated human position of Ashraful Mukhlu-
kaat, (best of God’s creatures) where God is one and each man encloses His 
spirit” (Durrani 1996: 305). That seems to me that the kernel of his philosophy 
which draws him very close to the ideology of Wahdat-ul Wujud, propounded 
originally by Ibne Arabi.7 Hence, Edhi was a Sufi and a dervish. That spirit that he 
partook from God, his “own judgements and decisions had become instrument[s] 
of success.”8His humanism essentially was predicated on this postulate, which 
I reckon was embedded in Sufi ethos.
The egalitarian principles which Edhi embraced during his childhood and ado-
lescence fed into the progressive agenda of the institutions he came to subse-
quently establish. Of these principles, he gave top-most priority to humanism. He 
openly proclaimed the faith that was “[his] religion is humanitarianism which is 
the basis of every religion in the world.”9For him, “three evils: mullahs (clergy), 
politicians, and social workers/NGOs [non-governmental organizations]” are at 
the heart of the social malaise that Pakistan is plagued with (Jaffer 2016). He kept 
on following the creed which prioritized humanism over everything else through-
out his life and was able to earn the respect of all sections of society (Jaffer 2016). 
Edhi and his family migrated to Pakistan in 1947. Initially, he was forced to eke 
out his living as a vendor, but later, he became a local agent for the cloth whole-
salers (Durrani 1996).
Beginning of charity work
Immediately after Indian partition, Edhi, along with his family, migrated to 
Karachi and settled in a Memon neighbourhood called Mithadar. In 1948, 
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Edhi became deeply involved in the charity work, as a rich businessman had 
established a dispensary in the neighbourhood. He started collecting medicines 
from that dispensary and distributed them among the poor and needy. Later on, he 
decided to establish a free dispensary; some of the members of the Memon com-
munity supported him in the endeavour. Edhi also established an “Adult Literacy 
Center” [presumably] in the late 1940s.10 Like, the other projects that Edhi had 
launched, the latter had humble origins. He enlisted the support of some of his 
friends to start the initiative. The centre was established in a single room, where 
only one teacher taught the adults in the evening. Edhi also allowed the Young 
Muslims Association, a local charity organization, to organize religious sermons.
The prominent feature of the services that the Foundation offers, is that they 
are provided on a regular basis. For instance, the Edhi Foundation offers round 
the clock emergency services across the country through its 250 centres. The 
foundation runs on a voluntary basis. It does not rely on the grant-in-aid by the 
government. Significantly enough, the Edhi centres provide the services regard-
less of creed, race, colour, language, religion or politics (Tahir, n.d).
In 1951 he purchased a van which he named as the Gharib van (van for poor).11 
He bought it for Rs. 2,400. At that time, he had the total amount of Rs. 3,000 in 
his bank account. He allocated the rest of the money for paying the salary of the 
driver. Edhi used the van for collecting/finding unclaimed and decaying dead 
bodies/corpses. He used to give them the ghusal (the Islamic ritual of bathing the 
dead bodies before burial) before giving them Islamic burial. In a Muslim state, 
that is a responsibility of the government to arrange for the ghusal and burial 
of the unclaimed bodies. In the 1990s, when the law and order in Karachi had 
considerably deteriorated, the gunplay and internecine crossfire among various 
factions could not deter him to collect the corpses and bury them honourably. 
Reverting to his other philanthropic ventures, Edhi founded a free dispensary in 
1954 in the Bolton market area. Later, he expanded the service by purchasing a 
plot adjoining the dispensary for rupees 14,000.
The year 1957 was of critical significance in Edhi’s philanthropic career. That 
year Hong Kong was badly afflicted by a deadly epidemic. Edhi headed the team 
of relief workers and because of his zeal to ameliorate the lot of those hit by the 
epidemic, Edhi not only won plaudits but also worldwide recognition. His ser-
vice towards the suffering of humanity in Hong Kong contributed significantly in 
building the public trust in his philanthropic work. Edhi’s biography offers us clear 
hints that he had earned respect as a renowned social worker, and it was then that 
he came to be known as “angel of mercy” (The Guardian 2016). Now, more gen-
erous funding from various donors started pouring in for his philanthropic work.
In 1958, Edhi set up a maternity clinic that was attached to the dispensary 
which he had established in 1954. The clinic provided maternity care free of 
charge, even the mothers had not to pay for the vaccination of their children. 
The maternity clinic had humble origins. In the initial years Edhi found it diffi-
cult to attract the attention of women of other communities towards the nursing 
profession, as most of the women were reluctant to get training in nursing care. 
However, Edhi initially could only manage to persuade the girls from Memon 
families, the community which he belonged, to training in nursing services. 
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Similarly, in the beginning, only a female doctor used to examine the patients. 
But with the passage of time attitudes and perceptions changed and sharp-edged 
gender distinction was blunted over time. Edhi understood that the social norms 
and practices take time to evolve; therefore, he did not hasten things. The per-
severance and patience are needed to make such an evolution possible, in Edhi 
these attribute had been in abundance.
The year 1965 holds considerable significance in Edhi’s life and his human-
itarian mission. That year, he got married to Bilquis.12 In fact, seven women in 
rapid succession refused his offers for marriage (Oborne 2011). Bilquis worked 
as a nurse in his maternity clinic. Although the choice of a marriage partner is 
regarded as essentially a personal affair of an individual, in the case of Edhi, his 
marriage was much more than merely a personal and private affair. His marriage 
with Bilqius proved to be a turning point in his life. Bilquis Edhi, herself a selfless 
philanthropic worker, turned out to be a great asset for Edhi philanthropic mis-
sion. She stuck by Edhi through thick and thin. The couple devoted their entire 
lives to the humanitarian work. Her active involvement in the philanthropic work 
shows that she possessed an extraordinary talent for managing and supervising 
philanthropic projects. Edhi, later, handed over the responsibilities of maternity 
clinics and such affairs relating to women to his wife. He appointed Bilquis, as 
the head of one of the affiliates to the Edhi Foundation, and named the organiza-
tion after her.13 The couple had three sons, Faisal Edhi, Kutub Edhi, Almas Edhi, 
and a daughter, Kubra.
A very important task that Edhi assigned to Bilquis was managing of the jhola 
(baby cradles) service for the neglected/abandoned children, which also triggered 
controversy. Religious clerics raised serious objection to such a service, which 
according to them was encouraging people to bear children out of the wedlock.
“Jhoolas” are installed at most of the emergency Edhi centres, where unwanted 
infants can be left. These abandoned babies are then taken into custody and given 
shelter in Edhi Homes. Although initially, Edhi was subject to a lot of pressure 
from several quarters on initiating Jhoola service, gradually the idea caught on. 
He faced trenchant criticism from the clergy; some of them incriminated him of 
encouraging the “sinful” act of producing illegitimate children.14 Now people 
even come forward to hand over the babies themselves to officials at the Edhi 
centres. Such infants are thereafter given in the care of suitable deserving families 
not having children of their own, for adoption. Mrs. Bilquis Edhi, the head of 
this service, through a centralized system, checks the credentials of the adopt-
ing parents and conducts a regular follow-up. Babies left over in garbage dumps 
outside Karachi are air-lifted to the central nursery located in Karachi, where 
medical and nursing care is provided before adoption. All documentation of this 
service is kept confidential to save the child from facing social problems after-
wards. That initiative draws our attention back to dargah where abandon children 
were accepted. We do find references to abandoned children, fatherless children 
or orphans, being sheltered in shrines. We can conjecture that since shrines were 
spaces for the marginalized, the Sufis protected such children as it was also their 
religious obligation. The Sufis probably did not reveal identities of such children 
to protect their honour and future. Even at the state level, Ottomans protected 
120 Tahir Kamran 
such children, who later become part of janissaries. Janissaries were always con-
nected with local Sufi Silsila (Order). It was the Ottomans’ strategy for making 
them valuable citizen (see Bhaduri 2001: 125; Dhaul and Kamath 2006: 38; Vald-
inoci 2012: 34).
Another manifestation of Edhi’s progressive outlook was that he continued to 
encourage greater participation of women in economic activities. About woman, 
Edhi thought that she is “a natural social worker, child bearer and child rearer. 
She has greater social guts, stronger nerves and superior sensitivity towards injus-
tice than the male” (Durrani 1996: 114). That is why one is not surprised to find 
out that women constituted a substantial part of the paid employees of the Edhi 
Foundation. A report that was published in Pakistan Times quoted that
Of the 2,000 paid workers of the Edhi Foundation around 500 are women. 
They work in various capacities, in-charges of Edhi centers, heads of mater-
nity homes and dispensaries and office workers. Moreover, several women 
volunteers help Edhi Foundation in fundraising. Edhi encourages women to 
do all sorts of work without differentiation.15
Pakistan and India were entangled in another armed conflict in 1971.16 Edhi 
played a proactive role during the war in helping the people, who suffered, despite 
his meagre financial resources. He visited the places affected by bombardment of 
Indian artillery and air force and brought a fleet of three ambulances that trans-
ported the wounded to hospitals. He also provided mats/terpolain bamboo poles 
for shelter, food grains (rice and pulses), quilts, clothes and the other articles of 
daily use to the Behari-speaking refugees who came to Karachi in large numbers 
from East Pakistan.17 When Swat was hit by a severe earthquake in 1974, Edhi 
and his wife stayed there for eight days and distributed Rs. 16,000 worth of med-
icines besides some other relief goods like blankets.
The establishment of the Edhi Foundation (1974): a brief  
overview of its activities between 1974 to date
Till 1974, Edhi’s philanthropic network had expanded to such a scale that he 
decided to get the organization registered under the name of the “Edhi Trust.” 
The organization grew over time into the most vibrant social welfare institution 
of the country. Edhi made an appeal to the public for funds, which triggered an 
enthusiastic response. Edhi managed to collect donations of Rs. 200,000.
K. H. Awan’s work provides us useful insights about the expansion of Edhi’s 
philanthropic network till 1987. The dispensary from which Edhi had launched 
his humanitarian mission in the early 1950s had developed into a large building 
with three stories. The emergency centre and office occupied the ground floor, 
whereas dispensary and maternity homes were on the upper floors. The trust 
owned 80 ambulances. The numbers of vans had increased to 175. The number of 
Edhi centres had risen to 24. The annual funding of the Edhi Trust had increased 
to 50 million rupees (Awan 1987: 24–25). The free dispensaries had been provid-
ing treatment services to 500 patients per day on average. The Maternity Home 
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(Clinic) had provided maternity care to 21,000 cases since 1958 (Jaffer 2016). 
We can add that the Apna Ghar, a community project for the shelter of homeless 
persons, which the Edhi Trust had launched in Sohrab Goth, had been providing 
shelter to 41,000 people. The Edhi centres also started providing free meals to 
indigent patients in the tuberculosis and civils hospitals in Karachi. Edhi Home, 
also called as “Apna Ghar” (Our Home), is a home for the mentally ill destitute, 
for orphans and for runaways. There are 13 such homes in the country, of which 
seven are in Karachi. About 6,000 persons live in Edhi Homes. A destitute or 
homeless person becomes a member of Edhi’s family once he enters its premises. 
All boarding, lodging, clothing, and logistic arrangements are entirely free. If a 
person dies within these homes, the burial arrangements are made by the foun-
dation according to the religious rites of the deceased (Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, 
Christian, or any other religion).18
The provision of blood to save human lives remains an essential element of 
emergency services. In major accidents, natural calamities and bomb blasts, 
among other emergencies, blood is supplied to the needy on an emergency basis. 
All welfare centres of major cities in Pakistan regularly keep an updated list of 
donors of all blood groups and conduct campaigns for enlisting more donors for 
the collection of blood. Blood is pooled in hospitals from the volunteer donors 
and is provided free of cost in cases of heart surgeries and other major operations 
to poor patients. Two blood banks, one at Karachi and the other at Mirpur, have 
proper facilities for storing and screening blood, from where hundreds of pints of 
screened blood are being regularly dispensed to the government hospitals.
The Edhi Foundation was a pioneer in starting its marine services. Thus, qual-
ified divers were recruited, and other amenities were acquired. Rescue teams had 
been organized at all rivers, lakes and dams, who “relayed advanced signals in 
hazardous areas. Air dropping of provisions for the entrapped ships and fisher-
men in the ocean, as well as recovering bodies from the sea” (Durrani 1996: 267).
Another excerpt of K. H. Awan’s work provides us insights about the effec-
tive role that the Edhi Trust had been playing in the country. He wrote about 
Edhi that:
[h]e is not narrow-minded, makes no distinction between this man and that 
man on the basis of color or creed. He is out to serve all suffering humanity. 
His ideological bent led to opposition from a vocal section of his community 
but he ignored it and founded institutions under the name of EdhiTrust, small 
though it was in the beginning, it is now a large organization well known not 
only in Karachi but throughout Pakistan and beyond and calamity, natural 
or otherwise be it an earthquake, a cyclone and epidemic or a bomb blast by 
terrorist or any other man made tragedy, Edhi arrives there with his men and 
materials for rescue and relief operations.
(Awan 1987: 9)
The existing centres provide first aid to accident victims and arrange for their 
speedy transfer to the nearby hospitals. Moreover, these centres are being used 
for providing medical facilities in rural and semi-urban areas. Also, they provide 
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ambulance service at nominal charges, a facility for vaccinating newborn babies 
and children against diseases, and other welfare services. The dispensary and 
mobile dispensary at each centre cater for medical assistance to approximately 
250 patients daily. Edhi divided Pakistan into 16 zones, and each zone was respon-
sible for raising its own funds and meeting its own expenditure, which was quite 
like the commune system in socialist countries, particularly in People’s Republic 
of China. More so, it also demonstrated extraordinary organizational skills of 
Edhi. His organizational skills came to him naturally despite lack of apparently 
sophisticated education. He was compassionate but extremely meticulous and 
led others by example. Despite the vastness of Edhi Foundation, it never seemed 
wanting in the efficiency or management. He at times acted like a corporate head. 
The Edhi management style was to assign a task to a person you trust completely 
and then get out of his way (Jaffer 2016). That is yet another trait that Edhi shared 
with Imran Khan.
One of the blog posts of the foundations contains the profile of its founder 
Abdul Sattar Edhi, which is a vivid reflection of his humane and austere nature. 
The post reads:
He involves himself in every activity at Edhi Foundation from raising funds 
to bathing corpses. Round the clock, he keeps with him an ambulance, which 
he drives himself and makes rounds of the city regularly. On finding a desti-
tute or an injured person anywhere on the way, he escorts him to the Relief 
Centre where immediate attention is given to the needy person. In spite of 
his busy work schedule with the Foundation, Edhi finds enough time to spare 
with the residents of the orphanages called “Edhi Homes.” He is very fond 
of playing and laughing with the children. A short strongly built man in his 
early seventies with a flowing beard and a ready smile, Edhi is popularly 
called “Nana” (Grandfather) by the residents of “Edhi Homes.”19
He still rests or sleeps at night on a wooden bench of his breakfast, and 
eats his breakfast, which is a leftover loaf of bread baked a day earlier. He 
neither chews betel leaves nor smokes doesn’t like to view T.V. programs 
or listen to radio broadcasts. His heart throbs with the desire to do as much 
good as possible for his country for his people and for the humanity at large.
(Oborne 2011)
The last paragraph is a vivid testament of Edhi as a genuine and authentic 
being. Sleeping on a wooden bench, eating leftovers and abstaining from such fri-
volities like smoking and chewing betels, among others, prove him to be a dervish 
who effortlessly defied all worldly enticements. In this day and age, when mate-
riality reigns supreme, a person of so little wants and needs cannot be defined 
other than the dervish. He is said to be on the guard in the face of flattery and 
praise by the media and other sources and kept reminding himself that he was an 
ordinary man. About the eulogizing newspaper articles, he once said, “Do not let 
them exaggerate your position. Many have fallen flat by forgetting their ordinari-
ness. You (Edhi himself) are a small man trying to prove that the extraordinary is 
ordinary” (Durrani 1996: 107–108).
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For the meritorious services that Edhi rendered to the suffering humanity, he 
was acknowledged both nationally as well as internationally. His profile indicates 
that he got 12 national and 14 international awards. He received the Philippines’ 
national award for social service, Ramon Magsaysay, in 1986. But the awards 
like Lenin Peace Prize (in 1988) and Ahmadiyya Peace Prize were contentious 
as the religious impulse of Pakistan’s public takes strong exception to anything 
associated with communist ideology or the Ahmadiyya community. Among the 
choices he made in his life, one inference can easily be drawn that Edhi lived his 
life on his own terms. He was never intimidated by anyone nor was he overawed 
in any situation. Until he breathed his last on July 2016, Abdul Sattar Edhi lived 
as brave man who was answerable only to his own conscious.
Conclusion
An individual will practically be recognized as a citizen of Pakistan if he is 
Muslim, and in many cases, he has to be a Sunni Muslim. Human as a category 
does not exist in Pakistan’s national discourse. However, Edhi, despite all odds, 
remained engaged with humans, which makes him what he eventually became: 
a social icon; some called him the richest poor man whereas for some, he was 
beloved of all but a very few. He was well conversant with Karl Marx and Lenin, 
and he might have drawn inspiration from their works. But by embarking on a 
philanthropic path and subsequently establishing Apna Ghar and the Edhi cen-
tres, he seemed to have drawn much of his inspiration from medieval institution 
of dargah. Dargah catered to the human, irrespective of the attendee’s religious 
identity. Langar (free kitchen) was its hallmark where everyone was welcome. 
That, in fact, was a unique symbol of rebellion against the entrenched hierarchy 
imposed through the caste system.
Edhi, too, was an advocate par excellence of social equality. His own persona 
was no different from that of a dervish with his simple attire and unpretentious 
lifestyle and mannerism. The biggest attribute of a dervish is his indifference to 
the material gain. In the South Asian culture, only dervish can wield the trust of 
the masses—and Edhi not only wielded that trust but also honoured it.
“Edhi placed a little cradle outside every Edhi Centre, beneath a placard 
imploring: Do not commit another sin: leave your baby in our care” (Oborne, 
2011, italics added) Edhi has been insinuated by a (Deobandi) maulvi for adopt-
ing children, abandoned by those who would have sired them. In the medieval 
era, dargah was a place where such “unwanted” children were deposited. Many 
of those children used to grow up into malang or sadhu, and some became the 
servants of dargah. Edhi’s adoption of these children seems to me as another 
legacy of dargah. However, he treated such children with greater kindness and 
compassion than the medieval dargah. Thus, we can argue that Edhi’s set-up is a 
far more evolved form of the medieval dargah. Peter Oborne (2011), a reporter of 
the Daily Telegraph, writes,
In the course of my duties as a reporter, I have met presidents, prime minis-
ters and reigning monarchs. Until meeting the Pakistani social worker Abdul 
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Sattar Edhi, I had never met a saint. Within a few moments of shaking hands, 
I knew I was in the presence of moral and spiritual greatness.
All the time he prayed to God, “Make me do big work for you. Such big work 
that will change the direction of the world. I want nothing more.” But for a Sufi it 
indeed was far too ambitious. I quote a tribute paid to him by the Washington Post; 
Abdul Sattar Edhi was a beacon of hope in a country too often mired in despair:
He was an ascetic in a country where politicians regularly skim millions of 
dollars through corruption; a humanitarian in a country rife with sectarian 
hatred and violence; and ultimately the provider of public services in a coun-
try where the government often fails to provide even the most basic ones, like 
adequate hospitals and ambulances.
(Bearak 2016)
Edhi was a unique phenomenon. But whatever he achieved had its historical 
antecedents. But it was extremely daunting to carry it out. No one else can do it. 
That probably is the reason hardly anyone aspires to emulate him.
Notes
 1 For the role and status of women in Sufism in South Asia, see Kelly Pemberton (2004).
 2 The term Memon refers to a Muslim commercial community from Gujrat (India), including 
Memons historically associated with Kathiawar. It can also refer to Kutchi Memons and 
Sindhi Memons. Many Memons migrated to Karachi after the partition of India in 1947. 
They became leading businessmen like Dada Ltd, Araak Ltd. and Adam Ltd.
 3 Abū Dharr al-Ghifari al-Kinani also known as Jundab ibn Junādah was one of the early 
converts to Islam. He belonged to the BanuGhifar, the Kinanah tribe. No date of birth is 
known. Abu Dhar is remembered for his strict piety and his opposition to Muawiyah I during 
the CaliphUthman ibn Affan era. He was regarded by many acclaimed scholars, including 
Ali Shariati, Muhammad Sharqawi and Sami Ayad Hanna, as a principal antecedent of 
Islamic socialism, the first Islamic socialist. He protested against the accumulation of wealth 
by the ruling class and urged the equitable redistribution of wealth. For further details, see 
https: //www.al-islam.org/the-great-companion-of-prophet-abu-dharr/chapter-20.
 4 Yazid bin Muawiyah I (647–683 CE) was the second ruler of Umayyad dynasty. He is 
known to be the adversary of the Holy Prophet’s grandson Imam Hussain, who was assas-
sinated at his behest at the battle of Karbala (in Iraq). Because of that act, he is widely 
regarded as a tyrant and ruthless ruler who could go to any extent to retain his power.
 5 Inayatullah Khan Mashriqui, also known as Allama Mashriqi (25 August 1888–27 August 
1963) was a mathematician, logician, political theorist, Islamic scholar and the founder of 
the Khaksar movement. Around 1930, he founded the Khaksar movement, aiming to advance 
the condition of the masses irrespective of any faith, sect, or religion. For further details see, 
Nasim Yousaf, Pakistan's Freedom & Allama Mashriqi; Statements, Letters, Chronology of 
Khaksar Tehrik (Movement), Period: Mashriqi's Birth to 1947. AMZ Publications, 2004.
 6 Khudai Khidmatgar (literal meaning “servants of God”) was a Pashtun non-violent movement 
against the British Empire by the Pashtun people of the North-West Frontier Province (now 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) in Pakistan. It is also called Surkh Posh or “Red Shirts,” which was 
originally a social reform organization focusing on education and the elimination of blood 
feuds. Another name of that movement was the Anjuman-e-Islah-e Afghania (Society for the 
Reformation of Afghans). The movement was led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known 
locally as Bacha Khan or Badshah Khan. For more details see Mukulika Banerjee (2000).
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 7 'Abū 'Abdullāh Muhammad ibn 'Alī ibn Muhammad ibn `Arabī al-Hātimīat -Tāʾī was a Sufi 
mystic, poet, and philosopher of pre-eminence. He was born in Murcia, Spain on 26 July 
1165 CE. He is renowned among practitioners of Sufism by the names al-Shaykh al-Akbar 
(“the Great Shaykh”), Muhyiddin ibn Arabi, and was considered a saint. He was also known 
as Shaikh-e-Akbar Mohi-ud-Din Ibn-e-Arabi throughout the Middle East. He died in 1240 
at the age of 75. For further details about Ibne Arabi, see William Chittick (1989, 1994).
 8 Chittick (1994).
 9 Cited in Waqar Hashmi, “A Life Well Lived: A Tribute to Abdul Sattar Edhi,” Pakistaniaat: 
A Journal of Pakistan Studies 3, no. 2 (2011).
 10 It did not mention the exact year.
 11 The work of Tehmina Durrani informs us that he had purchased a dispensary “for rupees 2,400, 
out of a total fund amount of rupees 3,000 which he had in his account at that time” (1996: 57).
 12 Bilquis Bano Edhi, widow of Abdul Sattar Edhi, is a professional nurse and one of the most 
renowned philanthropists in Pakistan. She has been named the Mother of Pakistan. She was 
born in 1947 in Bantva. Along with her husband, she was the head of the Edhi Foundation. 
With her husband she received the 1986 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public Service. 
In 2015, she also received the Mother Teresa Memorial International Award for Social Justice.
 13 The section shows that how the A. S. Edhi’s family continued to play central role in the 
organiazational structure of Edhi’s Foundation.
 14 Edhi’s that initiative has been discussed at length in Raponi and Zanzucchi (2013: 32–49).
 15 https://www.pakistantimes.com/topics/abdul-sattar-edhi/.
 16 It is beyond the scope of our discussion to delineate the causes of the 1971 war.
 17 “Edhi Foundations, “Details of Relief Works, http://www.contactpakistan.com/socialwork/
Edhi/nerwork.htm, accessed on 13 August 2018.
 18 “Graveyard Services,” https://edhi.org/graveyard/, accessed on 13 August 2018.
 19 We can presume that this profile would have been written in the early 2000s as the brief 
allusion to Edhi’s age indicates. See “Founder Profile,” https://edhi.org/founder-profile/, 
accessed on 14 August 2018.
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8 Movements of flats and citizens
Notes on spatial politics in Mumbai
Yoko Taguchi
Middle-class citizens and urban development
“Basically, I would say the citizen’s movement in Bombay is more or less born 
out of garbage.” As this activist points out, the control and cleanliness of public 
space are major sources of controversy in urban India. Conflict over congested 
and filthy public spaces has been prominent since at least the colonial era (Anjaria 
2016). Spatial conflict and negotiation are, therefore, embedded in the ongoing 
formation and development of the Indian city, especially Bombay/Mumbai. This 
chapter focuses on Mumbai’s middle-class citizen movements that engage in such 
spatial politics. Drawing on the literature and my own fieldwork with Mumbai 
activists, I suggest a perspective for considering different ways of being diverse 
and coexisting with the “other.”
Although this is a familiar problem, citizen participation has again gained 
renewed importance in the realm of urban governance since the 2000s. Contem-
porary public–private partnerships are characterized by an emphasis on “depoliti-
cization” and market-oriented reforms (Coelho, Kamath, and Vijayabaskar 2013). 
This tendency reflects the tension between “political society” and “civil society”; 
in other words, the popular politics of the governed/subalterns (Chatterjee 2004) 
are seemingly being taken over by the claims of autonomous and property-owning 
individual-citizens. In this context, the urban middle classes, self-representing as 
the proper members of “civil society,” accuses “political society” of being fun-
damentally corrupt and nepotistic. Such “civil society” upholds instead the logic 
of the free market and promotes its own positions as “apolitical.” As this chapter 
examines, the practices and effects of these avowedly “apolitical” politics of citi-
zens are closely related to their recognition of urban space and personhood.
This renewed conception of citizen participation should be located within 
broader middle-class activism in contemporary India, exemplified by the recent 
anti-corruption movement and various clean-up campaigns. Contrary to pro-poor 
social movements, this trend has been criticized as a “new middle-class” activism 
that facilitates increased control over the city’s public space (e.g., Baviskar and 
Ray 2011; Chatterjee 2004). It must be noted that, in mass media and literature, 
“new middle class” as a category is used to address a certain social imaginary 
rather than a specific class or income group.1 Members of this category have been 
identified as consumers and the main beneficiaries of economic liberalization, as 
well as the body of support for Hindu nationalism (e.g., Fernandes 2006).
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The main criticism regarding the new middle class in India, as in other emerg-
ing countries in Asia, has been centred on global capital and post-colonial studies. 
Within the dualism of the “global” (colonialism and predatory capitalism) and 
the “local” (the resistance and agency of the subaltern), the premises of dominant 
arguments have been either the “global” controlling the “local” or the “local” tam-
ing the “global” (Ong 2011). In this context, the prominent Indian cases, includ-
ing the gentrification of beaches by excluding the poor in Mumbai (Fernandes 
2006) and the demolition of slums by private housing societies in Kolkata and 
Delhi (Chatterjee 2004; Ghertner 2012), appear to represent the irresistible power 
of world-class aesthetics and global capital oppressing the local subalterns.
We cannot underestimate the influence of world-class aesthetics and citi-
zens’ increasing control over public space based on such aesthetics. However, as 
already noted, spatial conflicts had existed before the current waves of globaliza-
tion and the rise of the new middle class (Anjaria 2016).2 Moreover, when exam-
ined closely, practices of civic activism in Mumbai do not quite fit the dichotomy 
of global power versus local resistance. Other than the logic of global capitalism, 
local logics on space and personhood play significant rules in Mumbai activ-
ism. Therefore, instead of assuming that a singular neoliberalism encompasses 
everything everywhere, this chapter investigates how concepts and practices are 
negotiated when different realms of power and control are entangled. I do this 
by focusing on Mumbai citizens’ groups called Advanced Locality Management 
(ALM) and by analysing how this new type of urban development was informed 
by the (“global” or “Western”) notion of the public and private, in relation to the 
(“local” or “Indian”) notion of the inside and the outside, and how this new par-
ticipation practice is intervening in urban space as well as activists’ selves.
Generating inside/outside
Thinking based on a comparison between “global/Western” and “local/Indian” 
frameworks is commonly observed not only in scholarly discourses but also in 
everyday conversation among middle-class Indians. The conception of “inner/outer” 
or “inside/outside”—through interaction with “public/private”—depicts this type of 
lateral comparison.3 The concept of inside/outside, originating from the Bengali 
middle-class spatial category of “ghar/bāhar” (home/outside), was superimposed 
onto the moral distinction between India and the West during the colonial era. As a 
result, this framework, which is neither fundamentally traditional nor a colonial con-
struction, has become widespread across India, and, in turn, has influenced contem-
porary citizens’ movements. In other words, inside/outside was shifted from a local 
folk framework to a local academic framework, and it is now generating its own 
reality by being applied to architectural styles and activism. The following sections 
therefore illustrate the lateral movements between the empirical and the conceptual.
Contact with public and private
The vivid contrast of the clean inside and the dirty outside in Indian cities has 
struck many visitors, who have described it in travelogues, essays, and novels 
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(Chakrabarty 1992). This has been also a major source of concern for gener-
ations of Indian middle classes. Activists especially often blame this problem 
on Indian people’s alleged lack of “civic sense.” Against this account, however, 
South Asianist scholars have explored other “local” points of view by theorizing 
the inside and the outside.
Partha Chatterjee (1989) notably argues that Indian nationalists discursively 
reorganized the Indian cultural realm into “inner” and “outer,” representing the 
“spiritual” and the “material”; namely, while the West is advanced in the out-
er-material realm—including in science and technology and the institutions of 
nation states—India is superior in the inner-spiritual realm. The image of inner 
and outer was based on the socio-spatial division of “ghar/bāhar,” or the home 
and the world. The world was considered the men’s realm, where material ben-
efits were pursued, but the home was considered the women’s realm, which was 
more important for Indian national values and identity and which has to be pro-
tected from the outside. This dichotomy was undeniably influenced by colonial 
discourses, but it also created different values which couldn’t be completely sub-
sumed by them.
Sudipta Kaviraj (1997) also pays attention to the inside and the outside, taking 
inside/outside or ghare/baire more literally as “inside the house/outside” (93). 
Kaviraj argues that inside/outside has partly incorporated the norms of public/
private: the private as the realm of the nuclear family was not accepted, but the 
inside as the realm of the large joint family was reinforced. Moreover, the inside 
had to be kept clean to reinforce its superiority. Cleanliness does not mean merely 
hygienic but also auspicious and safe. Meanwhile, the outside was considered 
dirty and dangerous because there are unknown people from different commu-
nities with various substances that threaten one’s well-being (Chakrabarty 1992; 
Kaviraj 1997). In colonial Calcutta, the parks, reflecting the British sense of 
“public space,” were also placed in this realm of outside. However, this “public” 
was considered by the poor as the opposite of inside, as no one’s property. As 
a result, parks crowded with vendors and homeless people became filled with 
“filth.” Kaviraj (1997) describes this process as plebeianization, or democratiza-
tion, and suggests that this is the resistance of the poor in Indian modernity.
Delineating the entangled relations of inside–outside and the public–private 
helps us to better grasp the logic and spatial recognition of contemporary activ-
ism. In Delhi, more than a million slum residents were displaced in the last dec-
ade due to the demands of private property owners (Ghertner 2012). To explain 
the reasoning of the housing society activists in Delhi, Asher Ghertner, drawing 
on Chatterjee (2004) and Kaviraj (1997), elaborates the intersections between 
the “private” and the “inside.” For the Indian middle class, the inside was a 
secured domain of family and caste/class groups. Yet, when it overlapped with 
the private, the boundary of the inside gained the connotation of private prop-
erty and legal rights. Meanwhile, as Kaviraj noted, the plebeianization of the 
outside proceeded, the poor expanding the space for their livelihood. Thus, as 
the safe and stable inside for the middle-class shrank, the middle class is now 
trying to expand it beyond their home to their neighbourhood and even to the city 
itself. Thus, Ghertner (2012) argues, urban middle-class activism aims to extend 
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the renewed inside, or “public space”; yet in their logic, their former inside had 
been “encroached” on by the poor, so now they have to act to “reclaim” their 
“inside-public space.”
Moreover, this “inside-public space” is imbued with not only middle-class 
aesthetics but also a sense of the personhood that is inseparable from one’s sur-
roundings. By using this concept as an analytical tool, it becomes possible to see 
contemporary activists’ reformation of “public space” not as the privatization of 
the given public space but instead as the expansion of a fluid and person-centric 
“inside.”
Inside as mine/self
The writer Suketu Mehta (2004), describing the familiar distinction of inside/out-
side (i.e., clean flats and dirty public spaces in Mumbai), states that “the boundary 
of the space you keep clean is marked at the end of the space you call your own” 
(128). This is another important connotation of inside/outside as “mine, self/not-
mine, not-self” (Kaviraj 1997: 93). In this conception, Kaviraj (1997) explains, 
“the street was the outside, the space for which one did not have responsibility, 
or which was not one’s own, and it therefore lacked any association with obliga-
tion” and it was “merely a conceptually insignificant negative of the inside” (98). 
Additionally, this distinction of inside/outside as mine/not-mine has to be under-
stood in relational terms; the boundary changes depending on the context, such as 
the self/not-self, the home/outside, and the village/outside. Here, personhood as 
self-inside is continuously shaped and reshaped through interaction with outside 
substances and the environment (Daniel 1984).
This aspect of inside/outside is commonly observed in contemporary Mum-
bai. At local railway stations in the Mumbai, this announcement emphasized this 
for me:
The station is your property.4 Please help us keep the station and coaches 
clean. Please do not throw wrappers and foods, etcetera, on the platform or 
inside the train.
A familiar scene on Mumbai trains is passengers eating snacks and then littering 
waste underneath the benches or, for those who want to keep their immediate 
surroundings cleaner, out the windows. Against this behaviour, the announce-
ment asks them to consider the station “your property” and thus keep it clean. 
In other words, it tries to persuade people to consider the station as their home, 
or inside.
Tokyo Metro’s similar campaigns provide a good contrast with this reasoning. 
For example, in 2008 and 2009, Tokyo Metro designed a serious of posters depict-
ing passengers eating and drinking, applying make-up, or using cell phones on 
the train along with this message: “Please do it at home” (Ie de yarō).”5 This high-
lights the very different perceptions of public space. In Japan, the public manners 
emphasize that the trains are outside and thus one shouldn’t behave as if at home/
inside. Yet in India, the announcements ask people to “do it as if at home.”
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This type of logic is commonly used by civic activists as well. For example, at 
a workshop on the right to information I attended in Mumbai, an activist and lec-
turer explained, “When you are on a bus and you find a hole in the seat, have you 
ever poked it, picked out the sponge from there and played with it? I have done 
it as a kid. But why do we do that? This is because we think “Yeh to sarkār kā 
hai, merā nahīṁ” (This is owned by the government; it’s not mine). You should 
think it’s yours.”
The framework of “mine” and “not-mine” is also used in the practices of activ-
ists to employ a concept of “public space.” Saaf Aangan, or clean courtyard, is 
a concept that a citizens’ organization and Mumbai’s municipality started using 
around 2006. In one municipality’s leaflet, they define aangan as “the public 
place in front of, or adjacent to any premises, extending to the kerb side and 
including the footpath kerb and water table.” The shopkeepers or workers who 
are considered not keeping a saaf aangain are fined by municipal workers named 
“nuisance detectives” and “clean-up marshals.”
The use of aangan, an architectural metaphor, evokes an image of inside, which 
helps people conceptualize public space as an extension of their house. One activ-
ist explained the saaf aangan concept to me this way: “We are asking the shop-
keepers and street vendors to treat the street as yours.” In this system, even if 
a street vendor himself is not littering, for example, if someone passing by his 
chai shop on a footpath throws garbage in front of his shop and he doesn’t clean 
it up, then the vendor will be held responsible. In one case, a paan vendor was 
scolded by an activist and a marshal for not cleaning up the garbage in front of 
his shop. The vendor first collected the garbage with two pieces of wood plates 
and dumped it in a roadside ditch. But then the activist demanded that he pick up 
the garbage from the ditch. The vendor then collected the garbage again and put 
it into the dustbin. So, in this case, the vendor first thought the ditch was outside 
of aangan, and there was no shared understanding of what aangan was. In another 
case, a vendor showed his frustration and asked the activist, “Who are you? Is 
this street yours? Or your fathers?” to which the activist replied, “It’s not mine, 
but is it yours?”
In this way, activists’ evocation of “public space” is very ambiguous. As is 
shown in the second case, aangan is after all not owned by anyone. It stays out-
side. But the campaign tries to make it temporarily inside for the vendors and 
attributes the responsibility to clean the area to them. Meanwhile, the activists 
care about the cleanliness of the area because they also see it partly as inside 
themselves. These cases show that the activists and municipality tell people to 
take “public space” as “inside,” and by doing so, they try to reallocate proper-
ty-owning subjectivity and transform spatial distinctions. The campaign inter-
venes in the inside as the fluid boundary centres on particular persons.
History of Bombay flats
The dynamics of inside/outside are not only conceptual but also related to architec-
tural styles and physical living spaces. The development of Bombay flats, first built 
for Europeans in the reclaimed island city in the 1910s, exemplify this interaction. 
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Indian migrants creatively reorganized their new living spaces in colonial Bombay. 
In the process, the former inside not only shrank with the Western notion of private 
property but also expanded and incorporated things that used to belong to the out-
side, both in terms of the building structure and the sense of community.
The historian Nikhil Rao (2013) argues that the lifestyles and identities of 
Mumbai’s middle class are closely related to the flat buildings. The flat here means 
“self-contained” flats with attached toilets inside, which appeared in Bombay in 
the early twentieth century. In terms of the changing inside/outside, the grad-
ual inward movement of toilets is especially interesting. Bombay Development 
Directorate, established in 1919 when Bombay was rapidly developing, started 
building chawls (one room tenements) to accommodate migrant workers. In those 
days, toilets in India, both in cities and villages, were located outside the house. 
In chawls too, the washing area (or nahānī, used for bathing, using the toilet, and 
washing dishes) was not located inside the rooms but shared among people in the 
same building (Rao 2013: 109–111).
Yet this chawl design was considered unsuitable for the emerging urban mid-
dle-class families, and some of these chawls gradually transformed into distinc-
tive self-contained flats. In the early 1930s, these newly designed flats had an 
attached toilet for each house, but it was kept in a separate block or accessed 
through a veranda. By the 1940s, houses with inside toilets had become common. 
This was not only because of the improvement of infrastructure but also due to 
the enlightenment mission of Indian engineers and architects who tried to educate 
people to discard their conservative and religious beliefs and accept the logic of 
modern western hygiene. Still, even inside the house, the toilet’s position was 
controversial. For example, Brahmans’ houses often had two entrances: one for 
family members and another for servants to go directly to the toilet without pass-
ing through the family’s residential area (Rao 2013: 122–132).
Meanwhile, various ambiguous realms were created around the flats. For 
example, underneath the stairs and stair landings, being inside the building and 
outside the flats, were often also used for servants’ and their families’ accommo-
dation. The compound, located around the flat building surrounded by the wall, 
is another example of intermediate space. Children were told to play inside the 
compound, not in the street, and women could come down to the compound to 
buy vegetables in their home dress, or “maxi” (Rao 2013: 163–166).
Moreover, a new conception of “community” in the urban context was forged 
by cooperative societies, which also made possible the building of flats itself. 
In the 1910s, the colonial states promoted cooperatives by offering reasonable 
loans to building societies. In this system, family members of a cooperative soci-
ety purchase shares, which serve as security against which the society borrows 
money to buy land and build the buildings. One characteristic of colonial Indian 
cooperative societies was that membership based on “community,” or caste, was 
allowed by the state. Early cooperative societies had strict membership politics, 
such as the case of the Saraswat Brahmins; however, the definition of community 
gradually expanded. Cooperative societies created metacaste identities, grouping 
castes, religions, or areas, including “Zoroastrian” (a fusion of Parsi and Irani), 
“Catholics” (East Indians, Goans, and Mangaloreans), and, more broadly, “South 
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Indians.” On the other hand, housing styles and areas created new boundaries as 
well, as the lower-caste and labouring classes in slums were not considered a part 
of the “South Indians” living in flats (Rao 2013: 171–197).
The development of Bombay flats as the living space of the middle class shaped 
inside/outside particular to the city. While toilets moved inside, a new interme-
diate realm such as the compound was generated. Flat ownership was made pos-
sible by cooperative societies, which created new communities and a realm of 
inside that shares a house as one’s property. It is unsurprising, then, that flats as 
spatial-personal units play an important role in contemporary Mumbai activism.
Expanding inside? ALM and the civic realm
Advanced Locality Management
Today, another inside is materializing as housing cooperative societies are 
reshaped anew under the framework of civil society. ALM, initiated by the 
Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), specifically its Solid Waste 
Management Department, is a project to promote partnership between Mumbai’s 
municipality and its citizens.6 This might imply the “public” nature of their pro-
ject, but here, too, various forms of “inside” infiltrate. The cover of the ALM 
brochure7 advises, “Treat City as your Home” (ghar), in English and in Marathi, 
reflecting the familiar logic of asking people to regard “public space” as “inside,” 
an extension of their house, and thus their own property. Particularly, in this 
project, citizens are invited “inside” the municipality to engage in a negotiation 
between inside and outside.
Isa Baud and Navtaj Nainan argue that the neoliberal model of urban govern-
ance, popular in the 1990s, assumed that the private sector could provide urban ser-
vices more efficiently and effectively than government, but recently, there has more 
appreciation of the importance of the government’s role independent from the mar-
ket demand. Organizing “invited spaces” is a renewed attempt of local governments 
to work together with its citizens (Baud and Nainan 2008). This is a part of gentrifi-
cation in Indian cities, promoting the idea of being “world-class” and incorporating 
the middle-class citizens into the institutional “invited space” while excluding the 
poor. This is another move towards “depoliticization” in the sense that the citizens 
are invited to talk directly with local bureaucrats, skipping the elected councils. 
That is, the municipality has created another privileged channel for “civil society” 
parallel to electoral democracy and especially in contrast to reservation systems, 
which have been one of the important realms of “political society” for the poor to 
demand their rights and their share (Singh 2012; see also Ghertner 2011).
In Mumbai, the municipality began the ALM project in 1996 to tackle the 
city’s garbage issues. The city’s brochure states that they “recognized the need for 
greater public participation for good governance and better delivery of civic ser-
vices,” and they expect an “active Citizenry” to identify “pressing problems and 
possible methods of redressal and thereafter, voluntarily come forward as a body 
to assist MCGM [BMC] in improving infrastructure services.” They also expect 
citizens to suggest “simpler and more transparent procedures.” The messages 
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recall the ideology of the European post-welfare states, where the states demand 
citizens’ voluntary participation to cover their costs (cf. Giddens 1998). This can 
be problematic in Europe because the state incorporates civil society and thus 
undermines its critical role; however, in India, where city services have not been 
sufficiently provided to begin with, only the idea of the post-welfare state was 
imported into this different context.
Since the late 1990s, already-existing housing cooperative societies and resi-
dential associations responded to the municipality and registered themselves as 
ALMs, and in 1998, all of Mumbai’s 24 wards had ALMs. Although the data was 
being updated, about 700 ALMs had reportedly been registered in 2013. I mainly 
worked with one ALM formed in 2007 as “citizens’ federation” of pre-existing 
societies in a Mumbai suburb. About 50 residents were registered as members, but 
active members who paid the membership fee and attended the meetings num-
bered about 15 people. Their main activity was the monthly ward meeting, where 
a dozen group members and the ward officers would meet and discuss cleanliness 
and the beautification of the area. Mostly the citizens complained about street 
hawkers, footpaths, and garbage and requested the ward officers to work on these 
issues. Before each ward meeting, the core members met at one of the activist’s 
houses and discussed what they should bring up at the upcoming ward meeting.8
Inside as invited space
The citizens who are “invited” into the conversation with the municipality are 
involved in various forms of the “inside.” Their activities are limited in this realm 
and their effects often uncertain, but they work to make sense of the situation. 
For example, a Parsi lady in the ALM started sorting household waste into “wet” 
and “dry” waste following the BMC’s guidance from 1999, and she persuaded 
other residents in her flat-building to do likewise. As a result, she told me, 80% 
of the residents followed the rule on one occasion, yet only one type of garbage 
truck came, and it recombined this sorted waste when it collected it. The residents 
eventually stopped sorting, and she was one of the few people who still sorted 
their waste. When I asked her why she continued with the ALM activities and 
joining the meetings, she explained:
I continue going because it gives us at least one opening. At one time we 
had no access to any officers. Now at least if you go regularly, you build up 
a little, you have a good relationship with some of the officers and really 
sometimes, there are nice people and they will help you if they can.
The ALM’s “invited space” is obviously not an open-to-all public space because 
BMC invites only flat-residents/middle-class citizens into the “inside” to work on 
specific issues. ALM members sometimes regret that the areas of activity are lim-
ited, but acquainting themselves with the officers and directly negotiating their 
particular concerns are key advantages. Maintaining access to this special space 
is one reason why ALM members attend the meetings even when the results of 
the activities do not seem successful.
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The particularities and limitations of ALMs also reorganize the activists’ sense 
of space and their everyday life interests. The active members of the ALM I 
observed devoted themselves fully to the beautification of their immediate neigh-
bourhood: their flat compounds, the streets in front of their buildings, the nearest 
parks, and so on. For example, when Mr. A, another ALM member, gets infor-
mation about road construction in his area, he goes to the site to observe. One 
day, he was at the construction site both in the morning and from 10 p.m. to 
1 a.m. He came across it when he was walking in the morning, so he watched 
the construction workers. He then asked the workers about the night-shift timing 
and went back then. Usually roads get potholes after a few months, but his roads 
are nice even after several years. He says that you have to make the centre of the 
road a little higher so that water drains down to the ditches on both sides. Also, 
you have to use cement in the connecting parts of asphalt roads and tiled streets 
to preserve the shape. The municipality’s engineers do not bother to supervise 
themselves, but leave it to the contractors, so Mr. A has to ensure himself the jobs 
are done nicely.
Care primarily for their own backyard is also due to the specific forms required 
by BMC. For instance, if a citizen complains about something at the ward meet-
ing, the officers ask him to submit “proofs,” namely, a letter and photographs. If 
he couldn’t submit these, the complaint is considered false. Thus, the activities 
have to remain within their eyeshot. Moreover, just like the segregated waste col-
lected together, when they prepare these letters and pictures, they are often just 
sent from one office to another. This situation appears to encourage the activists 
to focus on internal issues such as gaining “satisfaction.” Within the given issues 
in which intervention is possible, another “inside” increases its importance.
Inside as self and negotiation with the outside
The activities of ALM have special significance for the activists to perform their 
duty as citizen-educators, a mission inherited from colonial elites and adapted 
into the neoliberal form (Chatterjee 2004; Taguchi 2013). Mr. A, now in his mid-
60s, took an early voluntary retirement from a big company at the age of 44 and 
since then has been devoting his time to social service. He now focuses on the 
local ALM because it gives him “satisfaction.” He started explaining the ideas of 
“success and satisfaction” when I asked him why he was doing this kind of work.
This is serious and you need to know. I was talking about “success and satis-
faction.” … Gandhiji had said, there is enough and sufficient for everybody’s 
needs but not for everybody’s greed … What I mean to say is “success and 
satisfaction.” You can be satisfied if you have your needs fulfilled …
Contrary to “success,” corresponding to “greed,” “satisfaction” is achieved when 
your “need” is met. He further relates “satisfaction” to “serving others”:
When you go on further in age, you will realize the reason why people are 
born is not for themselves; it is for serving others. The greatest satisfaction 
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is in serving others in the process of doing something good … money, this, 
that, you are not interested in all that. You are interested in your satisfaction.
In his explanation, “serving others” and gaining one’s “satisfaction” are seam-
lessly connected. The concept of “service” in India often connotes the Hindu 
concept seva—understood as “selfless service” to a deity or a community, which 
since the colonial era, has been used for the country, political parties, and civic 
associations (Watt 2005). When I asked other members if they think of their 
activities as seva, however, many people expressed some reservations. They say 
seva means something grander, reserved for more serious work such as help-
ing poor people. Meanwhile, their work, focused on “my area” and their “back-
yard,” is their obvious duty or responsibility, or it is a natural demand on them 
as taxpayers.
Their explanation implies that seva and civic activism are contradictory, yet 
they are apparently in the process of conceptual and practical reconfiguration. 
I asked another member of the ALM, Mr. B, if his work was seva, and he also 
stated that it was not seva but satisfaction. He added that he hates the word seva 
and continued:
No, no, no social worker. I am no worker. No, no, no. I don’t get dictated by 
anybody, number one. Number two, when I myself have my own time going 
around, and whatever thing I find not proper, I think it is my duty to bring it 
to the notice of whichever authority.
Moreover, Mr. B also mentioned “success and satisfaction”:
There is a term “success and satisfaction.” I would rather go for satisfaction. 
Success is one which is decided by others … But satisfaction is you decide. 
You get satisfaction when you agree with yourself that you have done some 
good thing. I get immense satisfaction when nothing related to me—now 
this garden or this footpath I never walk on … but still when I see one 
irregularity and if I am able to present it and it gets solved I get tremendous 
satisfaction.
They emphasize that satisfaction is given only by oneself, and the self does not 
seek personal reward. I told Mr. B that I had heard “success and satisfaction” 
elsewhere and asked if he had read it in a book or something. He said he did not 
remember where he got it but elaborated:
B: Even our religion, there’s Gita, like Bible is for Christian and Quran is for 
Muslims, we have Gita. Gita says that, in Sanskrit language, karmanyevā-
dhikāraste mā phalesu kadācana. They say that you do your job. Don’t 
bother about the fruits. Whether I will get credit, whether I will get success. 
No, simply go on doing your job. The God will give you the fruits and the 
benefits.
Y: So would you call what you are doing as …
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B: I will tell you last 10 years I have no major illness … , so in a way God com-
pensates. I am able to walk from here to [neighbouring area] every day. Peo-
ple complain of old age and joint pain. People have this, why should I bother. 
All these things are none of my business. I pay tax …
Y: You call what you are doing as dharma or …?
B: I told you I get tremendous satisfaction out of it.
Mr. B quotes a verse on karma from the Bhagavad Gita and explains that God 
compensates him for his good karma with health. The Gita, a section of the 
ancient Indian Sanskrit epic the Mahabharata, consists of dialogues between 
Krishna and Arjuna. Arjuna agonizes over the dilemma of war between kins-
men, but Krishna tells him to do the right thing according to his dharma, which 
is to fight. The quoted part, verse 47 of Chapter Two, is one of the main themes 
of the Gita, and it says “Action (karma) alone is the province, never the fruit 
thereof.” (Gandhi 2009: 24, parenthesis added). M. K. Gandhi, who connected 
the Gita to modern social movements through his translation and interpretation of 
it, explains this part in his 1926 talk:
The slave-owner tells the slaves, ‘Mind your work, but beware lest you pluck 
a fruit from the garden. Yours is to take what I give.’ God has put us under 
restriction in the same manner. He tells us that we may work if we wish, but 
that the reward of work is entirely for Him to give.
(2009: 24)
This verse and the Gita more generally are often mentioned or included in 
activists’ documents in today’s civic movements. However, when I tried to ask 
Mr. B if he would call his activities dharma, he repeatedly insisted that it was 
“satisfaction.” He emphasizes the satisfaction he can feel from the action itself 
rather than from being acknowledged by other people for successful results.
Contrary to prevailing analyses of the consumer middle class controlling the 
city at large, citizens’ activities are quite limited in the realm proscribed by the 
municipality. The given civic realm can be seen as the expanding “inside,” canter-
ing on the activists’ houses and spreading to the compound and neighbourhood. 
Although the concrete effects of their actions are unclear, the activists’ expla-
nations reveal that “satisfaction” drives their activities. As Mr. B emphasizes, 
references to satisfaction seem oriented towards the realm of the private self, 
independent from others’ evaluation. Yet at the same time, he also tells us that 
even if the results of his activism are unseen, God will provide fruits of the labour 
in the form of a healthy body. Here, then, is the juxtaposition: a neoliberal form 
of the individual-citizen, who prioritizes personal “satisfaction,” and a form of 
“selfless service” that acknowledges that the results of actions are beyond one’s 
control. Civic activities and satisfaction are explained using the Gita and karmic 
logic, revealing one’s satisfaction through one’s bodily condition.9 Thus, actions 
motivated by satisfaction are not limited to one’s private “inside,” but are con-
nected to one’s surroundings. In this manner, activists’ work for the “inside” is 
not accomplished without intervention in the “outside.”
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Negotiating inside and outside
Citizen participation, with its “apolitical” appearance, is a field of intricate polit-
ical practice where the public/private has been connected to inside/outside and 
thus differently divided and articulated. As discussed in the literature, today’s 
urban activism has a tendency to expand the middle-class activists’ “inside” by 
superimposing the sense of “public” onto it. This chapter suggests, however, that 
this process is not so smooth or straightforward. A final scene from an ALM 
meeting further illustrates this. When an ALM activist complained about the fam-
ily living on a footpath in her neighbourhood, a ward officer replied, “We can 
pick up and clear away things, but we cannot do it to people.” The outside that 
the activists try to incorporate can thus also be the inside of people who work and 
live there, and their lives must be protected. This basic sense still appeared to be 
shared among Mumbai activists.
Because the notion of inside/outside is inseparable from self/not-self, the 
image of the individual citizen keeps changing its form in practice. The activ-
ists are invited to help BMC according to neoliberal citizen participation logic, 
and they accommodate themselves in this scheme through talk of satisfaction. 
Nonetheless, their image of self is partly based on the modern developmentalist 
and educational citizen, and their satisfaction is partly supported by the norm of 
selfless service. This complex figure of the citizen also generates gaps in their 
activities. Activists who interfere in the outside can achieve their goal (getting 
satisfaction) without really succeeding (in terms of actualizing sorted waste col-
lection or eliminating street vendors). Such gaps in effect also prevent the endless 
expansion of the “inside-public space,” which would exclude the other.
The effect of not making everything “inside” or part of the civic realm may exem-
plify one aspect of South Asian sociality as the field of negotiation among different 
and often conflicting values. Mumbai citizens’ political endeavours and dilemmas 
may thus help us to think about how to coexist with the “outside” or others, in other 
words, how to reimagine diversity without ignoring real differences and subsuming 
“them” into “our” realm, a pressing issue in our contemporary world.
Notes
 1 According to one definition, the top 26 per cent of Indian households are estimated to 
belong to the middle class (Baviskar and Ray 2011).
 2 Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria (2016) notes three historical moments that formed contemporary 
Mumbai’s special contestation: “(1) late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century efforts by 
the colonial state to contain a landscape of congestion, blockages, and encroachments; (2) 
late nineteenth-century spatial transformation in the name of public health; and (3) early 
twentieth-century middle-class civic activism around the condition and appearance public 
space” (41).
 3 In contrast to empirical or quantitative comparison, lateral comparison attends to the 
abstraction, comparison, and translation done by not only the researchers but also by the 
informants and the subjects of the study. For a discussion of “lateral concepts” in anthropol-
ogy and in science and technology studies, see Gad and Jensen (2016).
 4 The announcements are made in Marathi, Hindi, and English—in this order. For the term 
property, they use “station aaple sampatiya hai” (Marathi) and “station appke sampatti 
hai” (Hindi).
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 5 Tokyo Metro explains the campaign in its press release (http://www.tokyometro.jp/
news/2009/2009-17.html) this way: “Different from the private space, certain behaviors and 
actions are unsuitable in the public space. ‘Please do it at home’ series shows drawings of 
the situations in which anyone would think ‘why don’t you do it at home …’ and make 
people reflect upon their own behaviors.”
 6 Delhi’s Bhagidari Scheme, stated in 2000, is a similar project (see Ghertner 2011; Coelho, 
Kamath, and Vijayabaskar 2013).
 7 I obtained one from BMC’s ALM officer. She did her master’s in social work in Mumbai 
and did a graduate course on governance and democracy in the Netherlands. Isa Baud, 
whose work I quoted earlier, was her supervisor in the Netherlands.
 8 As a part of my approximately two-year fieldwork in Greater Mumbai, I joined the ward 
meeting of this ALM four times and the internal meeting five times from October 2011 to 
February 2013. I conducted interviews with 11 active members (seven male and four 
female) from January to March 2013. All of them were born and brought up in Mumbai and 
were highly educated in English. Although their mother tongues varied (e.g., Gujarati, 
Tamil, and Kannada), English was the main language at the members’ internal meetings, 
with Hindi and Marathi added.
 9 Karma (karmam) is considered as one of substances to maintain a good balance of persons. 
Karma is stored in part of the body and comes to fruition when it is ripe (Keyes and Valentine 
Daniel 1983; Daniel 1984).
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Part III
How does a conflict end?

9 Life beyond the paradox
Peace, ethnic conflict, and everyday realities 
of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh1
Ranjan Saha Partha
In the contemporary understanding of the relationship between Jumma and 
Bengali people in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), two key concepts, peace and 
conflict, have become the dominant lens through which daily life in this region 
is viewed. This “peace and conflict frame” has remained in frequent use since 
the 1990s in Bangladesh. This invention of the peace and conflict frame has 
its own wider history; it has been used to identify war or war-like zones within 
and between nation-states. The invention of the peace and conflict frame was 
initiated and proliferated by the United Nations. Concurrently, many academic 
and strategic institutions in the global north introduced separate fields of study 
under various names, that is, Peace Study, and thereby a peace and conflict expert 
would emerge to help mitigate the conflict and establish peace. It was not sur-
prising when Dhaka University in Bangladesh established a separate department 
of Peace and Conflict Studies. The participation rate of Bangladesh’s military in 
various UN peacekeeping missions had increased significantly, and around the 
same time, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord was enacted in 1997. This 
particular way of looking at people’s lives through these two binarily opposed 
concepts not only reduces the complexities evident in real-life situations but also 
forces them to fit into a state of either peace or conflict.
These two concepts continue to increasingly engulf and reshape the academic, 
political, and development (non-governmental organization [NGO]) discourses. 
Even after the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord was enacted in 1997, the 
public perception of CHT was bifurcated into two major domains. Some of the 
public believe peace is prevailing in CHT that can be measured by the state, 
based on criteria decided by people other than the local inhabitants. The other 
domain believes conflict has been developed in new forms; however, generated 
from resistance against state and non-state oppression, the new conflicts are crim-
inalized. This chapter reflects on how local people talk about political issues in 
their everyday context. The purpose is to explore the alleged paradoxes in the 
prevailing perceptions of being 'more peaceful' and 'more conflictual' regarding 
contemporary CHT.
While conversations of ethnicity and politics are common in political spheres, 
these discussions often significantly alter and obscure local lifestyles. This is the 
politics of invisibility that the peace and conflict frame renders, generating a bipolar 
binary by asserting only two distinct understandings of a complex situation in CHT.
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The research tradition focusing on CHT often falls into the trap of a binary 
understanding of the events. This means the research understands different phe-
nomenon in opposition to one another, such as Bengali versus Jumma, Army 
versus Shanti Bahini, Peace versus Conflict, United People’s Democratic Front 
(UPDF) versus Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti Party (PCJSS) and so 
on. Related questions also emerged, such as “Who is more violent?” or “Who is 
more marginalized?”: Army or Shanti Bahini, Bengali or Jumma. These binary 
oppositions are important in understanding CHT, but they are not enough.
The central argument of this chapter is that this paradoxical understanding of CHT 
through comparison is inherently exclusionary and neglects the everyday experi-
ence of ordinary people. It is true that binary divisions are imposed and repeatedly 
used as reference points, but Bengali–Jumma or UPDF–PCJSS binary entities are 
not homogenous. These are not ethnic identities but politically constructed iden-
tities. When conflicting issues arise, not everyone participates in the same man-
ner, and their survival strategies differ as well. Even in the case of political parties 
belonging to the same group, the relationship between the varied actors in CHT 
marginalizes the local people. These hierarchical differences, the paradox of bipo-
larity, and the local people's experience are presented in this chapter.
This chapter is organized into eight sections. Following this introduction, the 
second section introduces the theoretical paradigm of peace discourse: how para-
dox is framed by classical social science literature and how it has been addressed 
by contemporary scholars. The third section identifies the local people of CHT. 
Section four examines the historical circumstances of the conflict in CHT. Then 
the way in which villagers have experienced the Bengali resettlement process at 
the grassroots level is investigated. The sixth section examines the major clauses in 
the CHT Peace Accord of 1997 and describes how satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
among different groups resulted in conflicts between various political stakeholders. 
Then the consequences of the peace accord at the village level are investigated. In 
this section, I argue that the lack of political will for implementation and the lack of 
applicable measures to identify root causes of conflict both contributed to conflict 
dynamics in the post–peace accord period before bringing the chapter to a close.
Theoretical discussions: investigating the paradox  
in peace discourses
Peace discourse, a widely known concept in the peace studies literature, is used to 
identify the root causes of conflict (Galtung 1969). In conventional peace studies, 
the concept of peace is mostly focused on state politics and structural factors, 
and primarily discusses the dialogue and negotiation between political parties. 
However, many recent investigations of peace and conflict have looked within 
particular cultures and emphasized the culturally specific nature of conflict. For 
instance, Galtung (1990) listed six cultural domains of conflict: religion, ideol-
ogy, language, art, empirical science, and formal science. As he states,
[t]he study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct 
violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered 
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acceptable in society. One way cultural violence works is by changing the 
moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/
acceptable; an example being ‘murder on behalf of the country as right, on 
behalf of oneself wrong.’
(292)
Although Galtung attempts to open a space to identify root causes of conflict 
in the cultural context, the academic scholarship has vigorously rearranged this 
space in recent decades. More specifically, the anthropological contribution to 
peace studies is directing research towards cultural anthropology and providing 
an accessible framework to the paradoxical and dispute-related study of culture 
and peace (Sponsel 1994; Coulter 2009; Little 2014).
However, conceptualizing culture is itself a challenging matter, not only for 
the study of peace but also for the wider anthropological academic practices. The 
discussion of a paradigm shift of conceptualizing culture (from essentialist view 
to post-structural paradigm) is important in this regard. According to the essen-
tialist understanding, “culture” is a concrete social phenomenon which represents 
the essential character of a particular society (Hofstede 1991). The definition of 
culture is spatially bounded, based on inherited meanings and values which have 
been passed down unchanged and are shared equally by all members of the cul-
ture (Baumann 1996). In this viewpoint, the national and ethnic identities are 
portrayed as innate characteristics where some natural, biological and genetic 
traits are brought forward. As Grillo (2003) argues,
[b]y ‘cultural essentialism’ I mean a system of belief grounded in a concep-
tion of human beings as ‘cultural’ (and under certain conditions territorial 
and national) subjects, i.e. bearers of a culture, located within a boundaried 
world, which defines them and differentiates them from others. Equally wor-
thy of explanation is that loose on the streets is not just culture, but anxiety 
about culture: ‘cultural anxiety.’
(158)
However, the constructivist approach argues that culture is a product of 
socio-political practices, where various dimensions of power in a society have 
been playing a significant role (Bakhtin 1984; Milne 2009). In this approach, 
culture should be studied as a situational atmosphere and on multiple levels.
On the other hand, the definition of culture is mostly based on the self-other 
dichotomy in structural anthropology. Therefore, an explicit rejection of the 
dichotomy is found in post-structural scholarship. According to this view, oth-
erness is the outcome of a discursive process by which a dominant in-group 
(“Us,” the Self) creates one or more dominant out-groups (“Them,” the Other) 
by denouncing a difference, whether actual or fictional, and presenting a negation 
of identity and thus a motive for possible discrimination. Although it looks as if 
the other is sometimes valued, as with exoticism, it is done in a stereotypical, 
reassuring fashion that serves to comfort the Self in its feeling of superiority 
(Staszak 2008).
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The paradigm shift of theorizing culture has significantly influenced the defin-
ing of “cultural violence” in peace literature. The transition between nonviolent 
and violent forms of conflict in Galtung’s structuralist paradigm is grounded in 
the recognition of indirect forms of conflict. Violence is often split into two dis-
tinct labels: direct and indirect. Galtung (1990) goes on to say that “symbolic vio-
lence built into a culture does not kill or maim like direct violence or the violence 
built into the structure. However, it is used to legitimize either or both” (292). 
The structural categorization of cultural violence (e.g., religion, art, language and 
others) is constructed as evidence of a normative hegemony of the western value 
system with its goal for peace, in comparison to the values of “other” society 
(Staszak 2008). Yet this categorization does not accurately reflect that underlying 
social norms regarding violence may exist on a continuum running through soci-
ety. Therefore, it is crucial to recognize that grassroots people may experience 
different types of suffering during and after conflict. In some cases, local people 
may view their situations as improving, while in others as deteriorating.
In this context, the “reflectivist” scholarship created fruitful preconditions for 
re-examining the relationship between culture and conflict, starting with recon-
sidering the social role and functions of conflict itself. Rather than viewing con-
flict as a certain effect of power competitions (as in realism) or a deviation from 
the enlightened norm of social harmony (as in liberalism), conflict came to be 
seen as an avenue of social development, occurring through the clash and compe-
tition between different agents of social and political advancement (Miall 1999, 
quoted in Milne 2009).
The most significant role of cultural analysis in peace study is defining the impor-
tance of the power dimension of culture and the cultural construction of power 
practice of politics (Duffey 2000). In this perspective, the idea of politics is not 
restricted to a particular sphere (state, political parties), nor is it a novel phenome-
non. It is recognized that politics is happening “everywhere” or, with respect to spe-
cific local perspectives, it acknowledges the impracticality of absolutely isolating 
the domain of the “political” from other societal and cultural processes (Ellis 1999).
Similarly, the recent poststructuralist approach reveals numerous important 
problems that can arise if transitions to a post-conflict era are not implemented 
with an understanding of holistic society. Adrian Little (2014) develops the idea 
of “enduring conflict,” referring to both the enduring nature of political conflict 
and the endurance of people in conflict-ridden societies by looking at countries 
involved in conflict transformation. He challenges the idea that the absence of 
conflict is the foundation and norm of a stable political environment. Little argues 
that political processes need to be understood within their social and cultural con-
texts. Also in this approach, Coulter (2010) challenges the dichotomous approach 
of peace vs conflict, which has been used in mainstream peace study for a long 
period. He raises at least three arguments. First, within the peace–conflict dichot-
omy, people either belong in peace or conflict; anything in between does not fit 
into these two roles. This is a rigid scope that defines the roles of people in society. 
Second, the dichotomous approach relies on an assumption that with the arrival 
of a politically determined end to conflict comes an improvement in the lives 
of those affected by the conflict. Finally, the dichotomy raises the controversial 
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question of whether participants’ positions relative to society improve or worsen 
as a result of conflict. Rather than seeing conflict as a state of exception or a 
period of turmoil that can be contrasted with politics as usual, Coulter tries to 
show how the social interactions that drive conflict, including different forms 
of hierarchy, are deeply connected to pre-conflict and post-conflict social order. 
Coulter (2009) offers the initial assumption underlying her analysis: “War is not 
exempt from the social but creates its own social orders” (9).
By tracing out the genealogy of discourses on peace, MacKenzie (2011) shows 
that the experience of conflict can often appear as a list of numerical calculations: 
civilian casualties minus military casualties, cultural violence plus political, inter-
nal displacements compared with refugee flows. These long lists of numbers tend 
to define the intensity of a conflict and are used to illustrate conflict as a period 
of exceptionality, in which so-called normal laws, behaviours, rules, and norms 
are displaced by disorder. MacKenzie (2011) argues that “[w]hat is lost in this 
emphasis on statistics and exception are the multiple ways that war and violence 
affect the everyday lives of individuals. The conventional study of conflict seems 
to be the antithesis of the study of everyday life, or the social” (1012). Thus, Mac-
Kenzie suggests dealing with the ordinary people’s accounts, existing discourses, 
and new possibilities that emerge.
This post-structuralist paradigm influenced many anthropologists investigat-
ing the peace process of a particular society. Thus, the “Anthropology of Peace” 
(Sponsel 1994) proposed that the peace initiative should be adjusted in a holistic 
way. Such a perspective requires identifying the root causes of conflict in a broad 
historical, political, social, and cultural context, given that options for peace and 
conflict are largely the products of existing social structures. By adopting this 
approach, I attempt to investigate the relationship between these discursive prac-
tices and trace the ways this relationship has contributed to the existing peace 
discourse of CHT.
Identifying the local people: are they homogenous?
In the discussion of peace and conflict in CHT, it has been observed that the 
Bengali and Jumma people are the main stakeholders in the increasing con-
flict in CHT. While Bengalis are ethnically similar, many dissimilarities exist 
in economic, political, and, most importantly, resettlement contexts. Most of 
the Bengalis believe in Islam, and a small portion of them practise Hinduism. 
On the other hand, the Jumma are not homogenous in their religious and ethnic 
backgrounds. Most of them believe in Buddhism; the rest practise Hinduism, 
Christianity, and other indigenous religions, as opposed to the dominant state 
religion of Islam. There are also hierarchical relationships within the ethnic com-
munities. The largest group is the Chakma, who are more politically active in 
establishing their rights in the region. The PCJSS was formed by activists who 
came from different ethnic groups of the Jumma people. The activists were uni-
fied under the umbrella of “Jumma nationalism,” and the constitutional recog-
nition of Jumma people was their main demand. The chair of PCJSS signed the 
CHT Peace Accord of 1997 on behalf of the Jumma people.
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The recent in-group feuds between PCJSS and the United People’s Democratic 
Front (UPDF) severely affected the livelihoods of ordinary Jumma people. UPDF 
claims that the peace accord fails to address the basic demands of the Jumma 
people. The demands are regional autonomy, constitutional recognition of the 
indigenous Jumma people, restoration of land rights, withdrawal of the military, 
and withdrawal of the settlers from the CHT. These demands have also been 
articulated by the PCJSS. The UPDF was born as a result of a perception that the 
peace accord did not address these demands. Although their narration of the same 
event is different, both the PCJSS and the UPDF share the same goal.
Until the 1980s, only a small portion of Bengali people had been living in CHT. 
However, the Bengali resettlement project dramatically changed the population’s 
composition. The percentage of Bengalis in CHT rose from 26 per cent in 1974 
to 47 per cent in 1991 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics [BBS] 1991). While the 
Bengalis in CHT belong to the same nation, they have several differences in regard 
to socio-economic identity and occupation. The Bengali people who have lived in 
CHT since before the resettlement are referred to as “adi Bengalis,” which means 
“old Bengalis” in the local language. Over the decades, the old Bengalis have 
had a good social relationship with Jumma people and have lived as neighbours 
with Jummas with a vibrant social life. On the other hand, as part of a Bengali 
resettlement project of the Bangladesh government, many more Bengalis have 
migrated from the plains to CHT since the late 1970s. These Bengalis are known 
as “settlers.” They have been granted land, cash incentives, and monthly rations 
to maintain their lives in CHT. Although the Bengali resettlement project is spon-
sored by government funds, many Bengalis have settled in CHT through their 
own initiative or kin networks, without proper consent of resettlement authorities. 
These “unauthorized” settlers are not entitled to the government ration. Although 
the “authorized” settlers and “unauthorized” settlers did not belong to the same 
historical and economical background, Jumma people argued that these two bod-
ies sometimes played the same role in different conditions.
Along with these old Bengalis and settler Bengalis, many other Bengalis started 
to come to CHT for work, that is, NGO workers, tourism developers, government 
officials, and the like. Some of them are permanently settled, and some are stay-
ing temporarily. Thus, the Jumma peoples distinguish two groups of Bengalis: the 
Bengalis who are settled under the government resettlement program and Bengali 
people who are established in the CHT in pursuit of their occupation. While the 
settlers are creating violence, the job-holding and adi Bengalis are trying to main-
tain a good social relationship with the Jummas.
At the beginning of my study, I intended to investigate the experiences of local 
people with respect to the Jumma-Bengali conflict. After spending more time in 
the field in Khagrachari district, I realized that the context of the conflict is far 
more complex than I had envisaged. The conflict in CHT is not only limited to the 
Bengali–Jumma dichotomy but also observed in various in-group feuds. The con-
flict between PCJSS and UPDF was originated by a certain group of people, but 
it affects the whole community in the region. I thus incorporated new arguments 
in my research. The context of the CHT conflict would not be clear if the realities 
of in-group feuds are left uninvestigated. Through this, I contend that along with 
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the Bengali–Jumma conflict, the real story of grassroots people is often complex, 
involving multiple settings.
The milieu of conflict in CHT
The root causes of conflict in CHT centre on identity formation beginning from 
the British Colonial period. During this time, the colonial government introduced 
a tribalism policy in the region. Unfortunately, the policy continued to be adopted 
by postcolonial regimes, even after the independence of Bangladesh. Prior to the 
colonial period, the region and its people were independent and functioned as a 
sovereign territory under customary rules and administrative systems. The indig-
enous people were at that time identified by the Bengalis as Joomea, or the people 
who were involved in Jhum or shifting cultivation (Schendel 1992; Tripura 1992; 
Zaman 1984). The cultivation process was managed by customary rights and 
considered the key to the survival of the Jumma peoples’ identity. However, the 
politics of identity originated in the British colonial period and was adopted in the 
state apparatus as a policy (especially the tribalism policy) to deal with the CHT 
region. It is noteworthy that the notion of tribalism is not only related to the iden-
tity issue, but also to the governing policy of the colonial administrators. Colo-
nial administrators documented several aspects of tribalism: primitive religious 
beliefs, animism and heathenism, ape-like physical features, and immoral and 
exotic nature of sexualities (Schendel 1992; Xaxa 1999). The tribalism process 
in the Indian subcontinent was not a homogenous project and was undertaken in 
different ways in different parts of the empire. But in each area, the overall pur-
pose was to increase the dominance of colonial rule. In CHT, the Jumma people 
came in touch with a different kind of political economy, which, for the first time, 
influenced change in their own culture and society. The colonial administration 
started the process of land alienation by taking ownership of land rights in CHT 
to create reserve forests (Dewan 1990).
After partition, problems in CHT arose with the building of the Kaptai 
Hydroelectric Dam between 1957 and 1963, when the area was under the Pakistani 
government. This dam flooded at least 54,000 acres of settled, cultivable land farmed 
by the Jumma people (Nasreen 2002) and permanently displaced thousands of 
them without any compensation (Dewan 1990). While the policy of exclusion was 
adopted by pre-independence state government, it continued to dictate the develop-
ment of the identity and livelihoods of the CHT people in the Bangladesh period.
After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, a group of indigenous people 
formally placed their demands for autonomy to maintain their self-identity. But, 
the prime minister of Bangladesh advised them to “forget ethnic identities” and 
“to be Bengalis” (Al-Ahsan and Chakma 1989, 967). The denial of the consti-
tutional recognition of the Jumma’s diverse ethnic identity and regional auton-
omy brought social, political, and cultural chaos into CHT. A group of Jumma 
started a strong resistance movement by forming a political party PCJSS. This 
movement included an armed wing called the Shanti Bahini, meaning “Peace 
Bridged.” From 1976, the CHT became an area under military occupation and a 
training ground for counterinsurgency. Moreover, about 400,000 Bengalis moved 
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into the region between 1979 and 1987 under a government transmigration pro-
gram. This program has had multiple sociocultural consequences on the Jumma: 
the destruction of the agricultural system, the change in the names of indigenous 
localities, the attack on indigenous religious institutions, and, above all, the force-
ful eviction from their lands. This resettlement project has dramatically changed 
the demographics of the region. The percentage of Bengalis in CHT rose from 9 
per cent in 1951 to 47 per cent in 2011 (Table 9.1. Bengali resettlement project). 
The indigenous population is now at threat of being outnumbered by Bengali set-
tlers, who continue to take over their land and attack their religious and cultural 
values. Civil administration and the military are sometimes the direct patrons and 
protectors of the Bengali settlers (Mohsin 1997, 2003; Adnan 2004).
Since 1980, there have been thirteen major cases of sectarian attacks on the 
Jumma people by the Bengali settlers (IWGIA 2012). Almost hundreds of thou-
sands of Jumma people have been forced to cross the border to India, or have 
become internally displaced as a result of armed conflict (Nasreen 2002; Adnan 
and Dastidar 2011). About 8,000 people were killed from both communities, 
including security members. After a long political negotiation, the Government of 
Bangladesh and the PCJSS signed a peace accord in 1997, a major development 
in moving to settle the conflict in the region. The accord has not settled the situa-
tion; rather, several issues have arisen in the region. Before going into a detailed 
analysis of the Chittagong Hills Tracts Peace Accord, it is important to get an 
ethnographic glimpse of Bengali dominance in the village context.
Bengali resettlement: a cause of cultural violence
As described in the previous section, the resettlement project dramatically changed 
the demography of CHT, and the Jummas started to realize that they would soon 
become a minority in their own region. An ethnographic study of three villages 
shows many complex scenarios. The Jumma consider themselves to be a distinct 
group with their own identity, separate from the rest of the country. Rights and 
interests are regulated and administered by traditional institutions according to 
customary law (Roy 2000, 54). The customary systems in CHT do not refer only 
to land rights or land management issues. It also designates the way in which they 
Table 9.1 Bengali resettlement project
Year Jumma Percentage Bengali Percentage Total
1872 61,957 98 1,097 2 63,054
1901 116,000 93 8,762 7 124,762
1951 261,538 91 26,150 9 287,688
1981 441,776 59 304,873 41 746,649
1991 501,144 51 473,301 49 974,445
2011 845,541 53 752,690 47 1,598,231
Source: Bangladesh District Gazetteer (1975); Population Census of Bangladesh (BBS, 1974, 1981, 
1991, 2001, 2011).
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lead their lives – in traditional, social, political, and religious contexts. The mul-
tilayered Bengali resettlement project affects the everyday life of Jumma people 
enormously. It destroys existing livelihoods, affects the traditional administra-
tive body and community organizations and networks, and threatens the cultural 
identity of the ethnic minorities. Often, the worst sufferers are those who must 
part with their agricultural land. In the following subsections, I investigate the 
scenario in CHT by drawing ethnographic pictures of Khagrachari district.
Changes in the names of localities
The practice of changing original locality names is found often in the Khagrachari 
hill district as well as in the whole CHT region. Settlers changed many names of 
localities which were originally in Jumma languages. In most cases, the settlers 
imposed a new name in Bengali as a symbol of their settlement and claim over 
the Jumma region. Although the changes were not initiated by any administrative 
body, these new names have generally been used by the local administration and 
Union Councils (Nasreen 2002).
The Bengali language and Muslim religious values have gained importance in the 
renaming of some localities. Lamuchari village was one of the biggest villages of 
the Mahalchari Upazilla of Khagrachari district until Bengali resettlement divided 
the village into several sections by renaming Boro Para (Central Lamuchari), East 
Lamuchari, West Lamuchari, Muslim Para, and others (see Table 9.2 Changing 
names of localities). Although the place of Muslim Para was previously known 
as khas (unused) lands, many Jumma people used the land for agriculture. The 
Bengalis converted the agricultural land into a residential area by constructing many 
new houses. Thus, the Muslim Para was established by Bengali Muslim settlers, 
and the name itself represents the domination of the Bengalis’ religion in the vil-
lage. Since Buddhists and Animists are the historical inhabitants, changing village 
names to reflect Islamic ideology severely violated the traditional religious beliefs 
of the Jumma people and denied the existence and religions of indigenous people.
The rise of Bengali dominated economy: the relationship between  
culture and economy
The local economic system was significantly altered. Massive-scale Bengali reset-
tlement dramatically increased the demands of consumer goods that Bengalis 
Table 9.2 Changing names of localities
Original Name New Name
Lamuchari East Lamuchari, West Lamuchari, Boro Para, Muslim 
Para and others.
Kedachara Bon Palashpur
Chilla Pro Chowdhury Tilla Shalbon
Source: Fieldwork, 2011–2014.
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habitually used. The migration of Bengali businesspersons has increased drasti-
cally since the resettlement period, and they continue to migrate to the area for 
their commercial interests. These businesspersons fully dominate the business 
sector of CHT. For instance, although the Mahajan Para village area is not a major 
commercial area, there are different kinds of shops, a transport business, and 
hotel businesses. The Jumma owns only nine shops out of thirty-four. Because 
the Bengali-owned shops sell products that suit their own tastes and habits, the 
majority of their consumers are also Bengali, including settlers, government and 
NGO officials, and security officers residing in Khagrachari.
Unlike Mahajan Para, Khagrachari is one of the leading tourist spots in Bang-
ladesh, and people travel there from many parts of the country to enjoy their vaca-
tion. Indigenous products are in high demand by tourists. However, indigenous 
items such as clothes or food are sold in Bengali shops. Bengali-owned hotels and 
resorts now operate in Khagrachari town because tourism makes the hotel and 
transport businesses very profitable. Bengali businesspersons have established 
about a dozen hotels, in addition to the government-owned tourist resorts.
However, it is notable that the Bengali people of CHT are not homogenous, espe-
cially in terms of status and economic conditions. The Bengalis have a long history 
of business activities in the CHT region dating back to the British colonial period. 
While the social relationship between settlers and Jummas are hostile, good neigh-
bourly relationships exist between the adi Bengalis and the Jumma. But compared 
to the resettlement period, the adi Bengalis’ commercial activities in the region were 
diminutive. The new businesspersons also have a separate identity, living in cluster 
villages. This new group has a good social relationship with the settlers, but not with 
the Jumma. They have the capital to expand the Bengali economic dominance in the 
CHT region and invited many tourism companies and corporate chain shops to the 
region. Thus, the dominant Bengali establishment, dramatically changing the polit-
ical economy of CHT, has marginalized the local economy of the Jumma people.
The huge population growth has also raised the demand for different kinds of 
transportation in the region. Although there are many kinds of highway buses oper-
ating, it is difficult to find a Jumma owner. Most of the well-known bus companies in 
Bangladesh started their transport services in the CHT region. There were new bus 
routes established after the Bengali resettlement. For instance, most of the Bengali 
settlers of the Shalbon and Lamuchari villages migrated from Noakhali, Comilla, 
and other south-eastern parts of Bangladesh. Settlers often use the new route to 
travel to their place of origin and meet relatives. Here, too, Bengali dominance is 
eminent. For local transportation, rickshaws, both auto and electric, are very pop-
ular. These also developed after Bengali resettlement in the region, and only a few 
local transport businesses are owned by Jumma people. Therefore, I argue that the 
Jummas are marginal to the economic expansion. The Bengali dominance in the 
economic sector also helps to establish the dominant identity as Bengali.
Colonial legacy towards (re-)establishing the cultural rights
On December 2, 1997, the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS signed 
a peace accord. Several issues have arisen in the accord. Although the accord 
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recognizes the revival of cultural rights, it identifies Jummas as “tribal” people 
in several clauses. General Section A.1 states, “Both the sides have recognized 
the need for protecting the characteristics and attaining overall development 
of the region considering Chittagong Hill Tracts as a tribal inhabited region” 
(Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 1997, cited in Partha 2016b). However, the 
question that arises is: how does the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord recog-
nize the cultural rights of Jumma people? Has the accord clearly located the root 
causes of conflict?
As we have seen, the history of conflict in CHT is rooted in the self-recognition 
process of Jumma people. In 1992, when the International Year of the Indigenous 
Peoples was acknowledged by the United Nations, the Jumma people of CHT 
began to identify themselves as indigenous people, or adivasi, not as “tribal.” 
In addition, a number of other international laws helped to increase organ-
ization and mobilization among the Jumma. The ILO Convention 169 added, 
“Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental 
criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention 
apply” (ILO convention 1989, cited in Sumon, 2014). However, this Convention 
was not endorsed by the constitution or Chittagong Hills Tracts Peace Accord or 
1997. By using such terminology such as “tribal region” and “tribal rights,” trib-
alism was once more reproduced in the peace accord. There have been seriously 
problematic situations arising regarding the conceptualization of “tribal.”
First, while the government of Bangladesh has adopted several institutional 
policies, these are inadequate to revive or uphold the cultural rights of the Jumma 
people. The establishment of Tribal Cultural Institutes and Khudra Nri-Gosthi 
Sangskritik Pratisthan Aine (Small Ethnic Group Cultural Institute Act 23 of 
2010) are most debatable in this regard. There have been three Tribal Cultural 
Institutes established in the CHT region. However, most of the initiatives of these 
cultural institutes are focused on promoting tourism in the Hill region. As the 
institutions are located mostly at the district level, the connection with rural vil-
lages is very weak. Similarly, the activities of the tribal museum remain con-
fined to entertaining tourists with the colourful dresses and ornaments of the 
mysterious “tribals.” Local cultures are presented as exotic, showcased by the 
state during the celebration of national events like Independence Day or Victory 
Day (Guhathakurta 2003). Yet the communities are portrayed passively, never as 
thinking, creative agents seeking transformation of their lives and the marginaliz-
ing system. After a long period of criticism of the tribal notion by the civil society 
organizations, the government of Bangladesh approved the Khudra Nri-Gosthi 
Sangskritik Pratisthan Aine, 2010 (Act 23 of 2010), on 5 April 2010. Pursuant 
to the act, the “Tribal Cultural Institute, Bandarban” was relabelled as “Khudra 
Nri-Gosthir Sangskritik Institute, Bandarban.” Changing the name of the institu-
tion was considered significant, but only the title changed; the functions remained 
unchanged.
Second, the tribal notion in the revival of the Jumma people’s identity rights 
is problematic in the context of the complex historical background, and this idea 
is present in the root causes of conflict in the CHT region. The idea that indig-
enous people are tribal reflects the larger history of Orientalism. Based on this 
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concept, the colonial and new postcolonial interests are controlling the people 
(Said 1978). In colonial times, it was a sign of colonial difference, producing an 
ever-widening chasm between the subjects and objects of colonial knowledge 
(Dirks 1999). Ironically, five decades after the end of British colonialism, this 
tribalism was reproduced in the peace accord.
Third, in the post-accord period, the issue of the cultural identity of the Jumma 
people has led to much debate and controversy. On occasion, this debate has 
brought Jumma leaders and state officials into sharp disagreement. Many stu-
dent forums in Khagrachari district organize rallies, meetings, and processions 
demanding recognition of indigenous people in the national constitution. During 
my fieldwork, I observed a program in Khagrachari on World Indigenous Day on 
August 7, 2011. However, this program was attacked by the police. Some of the 
Jumma activists were injured, and many of them were arrested.
Fourth, the accord recognized customary laws as it reiterated the administra-
tive roles of the chiefs and the headmen. However, it failed to clarify the ways to 
overcome the problem of land occupied by the Bengali settlers. As stated by the 
headman of Lamuchari Dinendra Chakma (field notes, 62):
I have been serving as a headman of Lamuchari village since 1990. By tra-
dition, I am the designated person to maintain law and order of this village, 
but the Bengalis do not obey me. Moreover, the Bengalis tried to attack me 
several times. I am the most targeted person [by] the Bengalis. Most of the 
issues related to conflict resolving of this village are now managed by the 
army or police. Sometimes they invite me to the conflict resolving meetings 
but my voice [is] never heard. I am acting like a puppet during the meeting. 
The army and police make their own decisions, most of which are made in 
favour of the Bengalis.2
As reported by the Karbari of Lamuchari village, at least six Bengali cluster vil-
lages have already been established in the Lamuchari area. Most of the land occu-
pied by these clusters was previously agricultural land of the Jumma people. The 
Bengalis have forcibly occupied the land. However, without legal documents, the 
Jumma victims cannot claim ownership rights for their lost land with the legal 
authorities. In the competition for the land and resources in the CHT region, the 
state has taken the side of the Bengalis against the rights of the Jumma people. 
The accord did not specifically mention the land-based violence and made no 
provision for punishing the guilty. However, the Jumma people have been suffer-
ing the loss of their traditional culture with regard to their customary land rights.
One key problem at the village level relates to the customs and traditions 
regarding land ownership. As previously noted when discussing the setting of 
the CHT Peace Accord, not only did the customary system provide the Jumma 
people with their economic rights, but it was also a cultural value which had been 
nourished through the generations. Although the establishment of the Jummas’ 
land and cultural rights was recognized by the accord, no direct measures were 
undertaken to protect their customary rights in the CHT region. The inadequate 
protection of the customary land rights has caused complex difficulties in CHT. 
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While the Jumma people have been managing the land by customary common 
property rights, the Bengalis have frequently placed claims on the land by defin-
ing it as khas, or unused land. New settlers, with the help of Bengali officials and 
the earlier Bengali settlers, have continuously occupied the Jumma land in the 
post-accord period.
Fifth, the peace accord tries to uphold the cultural rights of the Jumma people. 
But the conflict between religious groups is yet to be identified. In the post-accord 
context, more than a dozen major conflicts have risen between the two commu-
nities in Khagrachari district. In Mahalchari subdistrict of Khagrachari district, 
at least five temples in Jumma communities were destroyed between 1997 and 
2010. For instance, in the massive attacks of August 26, 2003, in Mahalchari 
sub-district of Khagrachari, one of the Buddhist temples in Lamuchari and three 
of the temples in other villages were completely burned. Moreover, according to 
the villagers of Lamuchari, the religious freedom of the Jumma people is not only 
obstructed by the settlers but also disturbed by administrative orders. For instance, 
on September 12, 2007, the Khagrachari district authorities banned the construc-
tion of new religious institutions in Mahalchari subdivision in Khagrachari with-
out prior permission of government authorities in the area (IWGIA 2012). Such 
orders indicate that the CHT Peace Accord exists only on paper, not in practice.
While the need to uphold cultural rights was recognized in the peace accord, the 
Jumma people still demand identity recognition. The agreement was contracted 
between government and PCJSS (Chowdhury 2012; Rahman 2011). However, 
many other local political parties like the Hill People Federation, the Hill Student 
Federation and the Hill Women Federation rejected the treaty. They protested that 
the CHT Peace Accord failed to endorse many important demands, including the 
self-recognition issue of Jumma people.
Peace paradox: everyday life experiences of local people
Many recent studies have indicated deep concerns about conflicts between the 
Bengalis and the Jumma people in the post-accord context. However, too many 
concentrated only on the conflict between the Bengalis and the Jumma people. 
They have done little to investigate the recent “in-group feuds” in the Jumma 
community. By locating multiple conflict scenarios at the village level, I argue 
that the CHT Peace Accord has not only contributed to reducing conflict but, in 
particular cases, has also helped increase conflict. On one hand, the peace accord 
has reduced the armed conflict between the army and Shanti Bahini; on the other 
hand, many in-group feuds have begun around the dissatisfaction among many 
Jumma political stakeholders. Although it is important to note that the recent con-
flict scenarios in CHT line up with the Bengali–Jumma dichotomy, the Jumma 
people have experienced many difficulties in recent in-group confrontations 
between the UPDF and the PCJSS. In this section, I investigate how ordinary 
people have negotiated the multiple realities of conflict at the grassroots level.
Following the peace accord, the dissatisfaction of different stakeholders 
increased, and conflict spread in multiple layers. Conflict between the UPDF 
and the PCJSS has seriously affected the livelihood of ordinary Jumma people. 
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The UPDF believes that the accord has failed to address the basic demands of the 
Jumma people. These demands, which have also been articulated by the PCJSS, 
include regional autonomy, constitutional recognition of the indigenous Jumma 
people, restoration of land rights, withdrawal of the military, and withdrawal of 
the Bengali settlers from CHT. Moreover, the accord contains no reference to 
accountability for past human rights abuses, which have bordered on genocide. 
The UPDF has argued that, without the fulfilment of these basic demands and 
accountability for human rights abuses, a genuine and permanent peace cannot be 
established in CHT. The UPDF was born as a result of this perception.
In recent decades, both groups have become desperate to control the Hill area 
using strong-arm tactics. According to the Mahajan Para and Lamuchari, some 
of the activists and leaders of the UPDF and PCJSS are extorting money as 
“protection money” from them to maintain their parties. This scenario is emi-
nent in the whole CHT region. When a village is dominated by UPDF, the activ-
ists from UPDF are forcefully squeezing money from the inhabitants. Similar 
practices prevail in the PCJSS-dominated areas. Moreover, refusal to pay the 
extortion money results in torture or abduction by party activists. While in the 
field, I learned that when a person is working in Dhaka city or another plain-
land area, family members are forced to pay extra money as their economic 
condition is comparatively better than other Jummas. As stated by a villager 
from Lamuchari,
[i]n the CHT, it is hard to find a village where the people are not dominated 
by either UPDF members or PCJSS members. However, there appears to be 
no overlap between the two areas of control. If a village is captured by the 
PCJSS, the UPDF workers are unable to collect extortion money from the 
PCJSS-controlled area. Moreover, opposition workers have no justification 
for going into the village for any ordinary purpose3.
The dominant activists are constantly on patrol searching for opposition workers 
in the respective villages. Ordinary people who do not belong to either side can-
not go to the other villages at night due to these patrols. In the realm of UPDF 
and PCJSS politics, the strong bipolar system (Islam 2013) of the polities is 
extremely confrontational in nature. Since 1997, the near-equal strength of the 
two major local political parties has contributed to the emergence of a duopoly 
over the regional political system of CHT. The ordinary people who were not 
actively involved in regional politics felt deprived and betrayed due to their poor 
representation on the Regional Council. Similarly, the stakes of the competition 
between the PCJSS and the UPDF have helped to institutionalize political vio-
lence as an instrument of power. In this political culture, the ordinary people are 
forced to side with the more powerful party if they wish to participate in and 
receive benefits from the system. As reported by villagers,
[t]he PCJSS and the UPDF have accused each other of attacks, killings, 
abductions, death threats, and other such activities. The situation in the CHT 
has become tense as the UPDF and the PCJSS are locked in a long-standing 
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clash and have turned the total Hill region into a “valley of death.” Nobody 
comes forward to file any police cases after these murders or illegal tolls.
The painful experiences of local people during the period of militarization and 
Shanti Bahini’s insurgencies, everyday conflict due to the Bengali resettlement, 
forceful evictions to establish security camps, and the unexpected roles of the 
UPDF and the PCJSS have clearly shown that they have been living in a panicked 
environment for a long time. Furthermore, this environment is continuing, due to 
the imposition of different power structures. In particular, in-group feuds between 
the UPDF and the PCJSS have brought more fear to the local Jumma people. 
Thus, the villagers have urged that the killing and abductions must stop and that 
they must become united for the betterment of the ethnic people living in the CHT.
On the other hand, the Bengali settlers also believe that the CHT Peace Accord 
only concerned the Jumma people. The accord has failed to address the issue of 
Bengali settlers who have resettled voluntarily or without legal consent. They do 
not have any legal document of the possession of the land, and they are demand-
ing the legal rights to their occupied lands. Because of this, an organization named 
Sama Adhikar Andolan (Equal Rights Movement) was established to ensure the 
rights of Bengali settlers. As of today, the number of Bengali settlers’ organiza-
tions has increased to six.
In recent years, it has been observed that the Bengali organizations frequently 
hamper the democratic and peaceful programs of Jumma organizations. If a 
Jumma organization announces a meeting, the Bengali organizations will declare 
another program at the same place. In most cases, this compels the authorities to 
impose legal action, such as Section 1444 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which 
bans all programs by both parties.5 According to the informants of Mahajan Para 
village, “the administration is not active enough to tackle the groups from both 
sides. Moreover, the Bengali organizations have gained strength, spread their 
members and branches all over the CHT region, and led the settlers to violence.”
Similar to the UPDF, some Bengali organizations have not been in favour of 
the accord. Although their narration of the same event is different, their position 
shares the same goal. In this regard, it is important to remind ourselves how iden-
tity politics plays its role in a real-life setting. In this regard, the indigenous rights 
discourse also negotiates with the different agencies of bipolar Bengali nation-
alism. Moreover, a low level of trust has become a common feature of Jumma 
society. In general, the people of CHT possess a low and declining degree of 
trust in their political institutions and political leaders. Generally, people in these 
communities do not believe that their fellow members are engaged in politics for 
the mutual benefit of society. The people are disappointed and bewildered by the 
performance of the members of the UPDF and the PCJSS, both in their activities 
and oversight of the dualistic operations.
Conclusion
This chapter has critically examined the role of the peace process when dealing 
with the challenges of reducing conflict and has demonstrated that the nature 
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of conflict in CHT was deeply embedded both in the nature of the state itself 
and in the political institutions that link the state and society. The consequences 
of the peace accord have been investigated. Special reference was made to the 
dynamics of the negotiation process among the local people through their every-
day life experiences and realization. Ethnographic evidence has suggested that 
different stakeholders were not playing the same role at the grassroots level. The 
process of surveillance and the power apparatus have been mostly executed by 
military operations; at the same time, it was interesting to observe the negotia-
tion between different stakeholders at different levels. On one hand, the peace 
accord has reduced the extent of the armed conflict between the army and Shanti 
Bahini (Peace Force), but, on the other hand, many in-group feuds have been 
ignited through the dissatisfaction between various Jumma political stakeholders. 
The ordinary Jumma people have believed that the government was seeking to 
provoke or support these various Jumma political organizations in an attempt to 
divide and rule.
Many clauses of the CHT Peace Accord can be seen as problematic because 
they fail to identify the causes of conflict. Instead, some of the clauses create 
further conflict in the region. As we have observed, the PCJSS, the representative 
of Jumma people in the signing process of the peace accord, accepted and repro-
duced categories of tribal identity that derived from colonial knowledge and its 
postcolonial reproduction. The reproduction of colonial categories re-established 
tribal identity in CHT and made it the basis of political, social, and economic life. 
Thus, the identity formation issue still pervades the region.
In this regard, it is important to remind ourselves how the self-identity issue 
plays a role in a real-life setting. Structural bipolarity, as I have argued, is not as 
bipolar in the field as it is described by many academics. Surveillance does not 
create fear for only a certain group of people, it affects the whole community in 
that particular region. Along with the political economy, cultural resistance is also 
very conspicuous. In brief, the relationships and negotiations with different stake-
holders are sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit in practice. The peace 
accord did not clarify the way to overcome the problem of lands occupied by the 
Bengali settlers. On the other hand, the future of unregistered Bengali settlers is 
also elusive. In this chapter, I emphasized the variation and diversity present in 
the reality of the dynamics of different groups. Adopting the social interaction 
approach of peace discourse, I have investigated the dynamics of the ever-chang-
ing characteristics and many layers of real-life conflict. Through this, I revealed 
the loopholes of highly manifested bipolarity, and connected the power relation-
ships on the ground and experience of ordinary people for a better understanding 
of the field and the contemporary trend of peace discourse.
In addition, the implementation process of the CHT Peace Accord is also ques-
tionable. Withdrawal of the military camps was the central agenda of the peace 
accord; however, in practice, it was only partially implemented. A lack of political 
will on the part of successive governments has led to delays in the demilitarization 
process, and the army still holds the highest power in the region. The different 
stakeholders of the conflict are not necessarily playing a homogenous role, espe-
cially as popularly predicted. In short, these stakeholders can be narrowed down 
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to different interest groups. The local political scenario may seem in accordance 
with the gross narration from the centre, but it is actually not so. The process of 
surveilling, threatening, and searching is part of the power apparatus implemented 
by military settlement. At the same time, it is also interesting to observe the nego-
tiation among different stakeholders and different beneficiary groups. Safety is an 
important issue, not only for the Jumma people but also among Bengali settlers. 
Bengalis have a relatively good and privileged relationship with the army, but they 
also have to negotiate under the shadows of historical legacy and current reality. 
Like the UPDF, some Bengali organizations are not in favour of the CHT Peace 
Accord. But the conflict between the PCJSS and the UPDF is very different in 
nature than the other violence perpetrated by settlers and Bengali organizations.
There seems to be a consensus that the administration has failed miserably to 
protect the rights of the Jumma people, and there is a sense of bitter frustration. 
Recognizing identity, protecting customary rights, and ensuring legal practices 
are important and imperative to stop such kinds of conflict in the region. In con-
clusion, I argue that this overall dichotomous understanding of conflict is in itself 
inefficient. It falls into the trap of a dominant peace discourse, which fails to 
locate the ever-changing characteristics of conflict.
Notes
 1 The content of this chapter was part of the PhD thesis of the author at Hiroshima University, 
Japan, PhD session in 2015. The findings of this article from a functional to a discourse 
analysis approach were driven by my several periods of fieldwork in between 2011 and 
2014. The research methods were largely qualitative, involving interviews and in-depth 
interviews, focus group discussions, and, participant observation.
 2 The interview was taken at August 21, 2011.
 3 The narrative of this person was collected from the fieldwork of March 2014
 4 Section 144 is a section of the Indian/Pakistani and Bangladeshi Codes of Criminal 
Procedure which prohibits the assembly of five or more persons, holding of public meet-
ings, and carrying of firearms and can be invoked for up to two months. It also gives the 
magistracy the power to immediately issue an order absolute in urgent cases of nuisance or 
apprehended danger.
 5 For instance, when the Jumma people of Dighinala Upazilla scheduled a rally on July 3, 2014, 
to protest the establishment of Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) camps in the Jumma villages, 
the Bengali Student Council organized another meeting at the same time and at the same 
venue. The local administration in Dighinala clamped down on the meeting section using 144.
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10 Communities and mediation 
in post-conflict Nepal
Tatsuro Fujikura
This chapter presents provisional notes related to the fate of the Tharuhat move-
ment, which demanded an “identity-based” federal state for the Tharus of the 
western plains of Nepal. At a conceptual level, this chapter represents an attempt 
to explore different ways of thinking about communities and mediation in con-
temporary Nepal.
The Tharu people live in the formerly malarial southern Tarai plains of Nepal 
and traditionally engaged in rice cultivation and animal husbandry. There are 
more than 1,730,000 Tharus, constituting 6.56% of the national population, and 
is the fourth-largest caste/ethnic group, after the Chettris, Hill Brahmans, and 
Magars. Many of them lost their land to migrants from the hills, after the malaria 
eradication programs run by the World Health Organization and the United States 
in the 1950s and 1960s. A substantial number of them became bonded labourers 
(kamaiya), estimated to be about 100,000 in the late 1990s (Fujikura 2007). A 
disproportionate number of Tharus were killed or disappeared, mainly by state 
security forces, during the civil war between 1996 and 2006 (Fujikura 2017).
Demand for identity-based semi-autonomous federal states, which had been 
around for more than two decades, came to be a foremost political issue after the 
conclusion of armed conflict in 2006. The Tharuhat movement gained momen-
tum at the end of 2007. It succeeded in organizing a two-week-long road block-
ade in western Tarai during the spring of 2009. This action led to an agreement 
with the Nepali government by which the latter acknowledged specific identi-
ties of the communities such as the Tharus and agreed to the need to amend 
constitutional and legal provisions that hampered their “autonomous identity.” 
However, in 2013, political parties backing identity-based federalism, including 
the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and Madhesi-based parties, suf-
fered a major loss in the second constituent assembly elections. In the summer 
of 2015, huge demonstrations occurred in many parts of the country related to 
the form of federalism to be defined in the new constitution. On August 24 in 
Tikapur in Kalilali district in far-western Nepal, during a large (and presuma-
bly non-violent) demonstration by the Tharuhat movement, a violent incident 
took place in which eight police officers were killed. A few hours after the inci-
dent, an 18-month-old infant son of a police officer was shot and killed. On 
September 20, a new constitution that Tharuhat and Madhesi movement partici-
pants (as well as others) fiercely opposed was promulgated. By the end of 2017, 
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under the provisions of the new constitution, elections at the local, provincial, 
and national levels were conducted.
This chapter describes and reflects on certain moments along the trajectory of 
the Tharuhat movement, particularly those relating to the Tikapur incident and 
some actions taken by Tharu activists after the promulgation of the new consti-
tution. However, before presenting those descriptions, words included in the title 
of this chapter are discussed briefly: communities, mediation, and post-conflict. 
They shall be discussed in reverse order, starting from post-conflict.
Post-conflict
In 2014, Sara Shneiderman and Amanda Snellinger edited a special online 
issue of Cultural Anthropology, titled “The Politics of ‘Post-conflict’: On the 
Ground in South Asia.” Their opening article criticizes the standardized notion 
of “post-conflict” used by international organizations such as the United Nations. 
In the prevalent notion, codified according to the perspective of peacebuilding 
intervention, the post-conflict period begins with a negotiated settlement of 
conflict. Its end is marked by the successful conduct of post-conflict elections 
and the establishment of liberal democratic state institutions (Shneiderman and 
Snellinger 2014).
Shneiderman and Snellinger (2014) object to the way in which post-conflict 
is bracketed as a discreet period, leading to “election” and “democratic peace.” 
They ask: “What kind of political work does the label post-conflict perform and 
to what extent does it foreclose possibilities for substantive peace in local terms?” 
They argue that people’s living experience rarely fits within bureaucratic catego-
ries. Social conflicts might persist, hidden under formal periodization. Therefore, 
it is necessary to track socio-political tensions before, during, and after the con-
flict to ascertain “how conflict both configures and is configured into the social 
fabric” (Shneiderman and Snellinger 2014). This chapter represents an attempt 
to respond to Shneiderman and Snellinger’s call to transcend the simplifying 
dichotomies and to explore “how socio-political tensions inform people’s actions 
and meaning-making practices in everyday life.” The chapter does so, in part, by 
considering the actions of those who assert that the formal “closure” of conflict 
was forced on them.
Mediation
Debates taking place during the past decade over the nature of federalism have 
been polarizing. In many debates, speakers from opposing sides were appar-
ently talking past each other. Around 2011, when discussing the fate of Tharuhat 
movement, which was apparently facing a deadlock, partly because of confusion 
among the leadership, a long-term Tharu acquaintance of the author murmured 
that “there is a lack of mediators in Nepal.” Mediators are those who attempt to 
induce people involved in a conflict to come to some agreement. When violence 
occurs between conflicting parties, one can say that a lack of effective mediation 
exists. One can rightly ask questions about mediation in relation to the Tikapur 
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incident: whether proper efforts were made at mediation before and after the 
incidents or whether what were regarded as attempts at mediation were actually 
insincere or were based on entirely wrong premises.
In addition to these genuine questions, a more expanded notion of mediation 
can be put forth as proposed by William Mazzarella (2006). Mazzarella’s notion 
includes not only attempts to harmonize divergent interests but, more broadly, to 
harmonize social practices that reduce the particularities of diverse experience 
and “render them provisionally commensurable and communicable,” such that 
they “become the basis of self-consciousness, and therefore of affect and desire.” 
For him, mediations embed contingencies and potentialities that “comprise and 
enable social life” (Mazzarella 2006: 476). This broad notion of mediation prob-
ably helps attune the actors to the dynamics involved in post-conflict processes. 
It is not only that transnationally circulating categories such as the “post-conflict 
period” hinder our understanding of the particularity and diversity of social expe-
riences. The social experiences themselves involve, or are made possible by, a 
reduction of particularity and diversity. Therefore, it is necessary to attend to the 
ways in which notions that might appear “alien” at first sight in a local social con-
text might themselves become deeply involved in the generation of local social 
context itself by becoming “the basis of self-consciousness.” Key terms involved 
in the situation at hand include such words as identity, tradition, human rights, 
and democracy. The task at hand is not only the exploration of how these terms 
occlude or misrepresent the local situation but also how they might mediate and 
enable local experiences themselves.
Communities
In a collected volume titled The Politics of Belonging in the Himalayas: Local 
attachments and boundary dynamics published in 2011, anthropologist Gisele 
Krauskopff, who has dedicated many decades to researching the Tharus, contrib-
uted an article titled “Fluid Belongings.” There, she argues that what prevailed 
in the Dang Valley in western Tarai were “[n]on-exclusively bounded forms of 
social membership.” The societies in Dang remained open to newcomers. There, 
cohesiveness prevailed over conflicts, and social units remained non-exclusive. 
She contrasts these “fluid” forms belonging to a “contemporary tendency to foster 
barriers between ethnic groups in the name of immemorial tradition, indigenous-
ness and ascription at birth” (Krauskopff 2011: 25). What she is referring to, of 
course, includes the Tharuhat movement, which invoked their indigenous rights 
under ILO convention 169 and demanded a semi-autonomous state. In popular 
discourse, the exclusive forms of belonging and identity claims are often asso-
ciated with the risk of communal violence. Tharu activists who led the Tharuhat 
movement, as well as their sympathetic observers, insist that their politics be dis-
tinguished from communalism (e.g. Chaudhari n.d.; Tharu 2072 v.s.; Sarvahari 
and Chaudhari 2073 v.s.; Gautam 2072 v.s.; see also Fujikura 2017). They argue 
that their aim is not the exclusion or domination of other communities. Their 
demand rather should be understood in terms of demand for human rights and 
dignity and aimed not so much at other communities but to the restructuring of 
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their relationship with the Nepali state. It is important here to remember that Tha-
rus were killed or disappeared by the state security forces in disproportionately 
large numbers compared to other caste/ethnic groups, partly because the security 
forces assumed that since most of the Tharus were poor, they naturally supported 
the Maoist.
An essay written by a supporter of Tharuhat movement conveys what it is 
like to be a Tharu in western Tarai (Chaudhari 2015). The essay is titled “saha 
astitwako khoji” or “In search of co-existence.” The writer starts by discussing 
second-person pronouns in Nepali language. One addresses a person of senior 
status using pronouns indicating respect, such as tapain or hajur. One might 
address one’s own sons and daughters, someone very close, or small children 
using timi or ta. However, the writer continues, in Tarai, Tharus and Madhesis, 
irrespective of age, are often addressed by high-caste Paharis (people of hill 
origin) using ta. For example, it is still not uncommon to see a small Pahari boy 
addressing an old Tharu using ta. He writes that this is unacceptable in this day 
and age and argues that what Tharus (as well as Madhesis, Dalits, and Janajatis) 
are demanding is nothing more than equality and equal rights as citizens of 
Nepal. The argument here is not difficult to appreciate in terms of demands for 
equality and dignity.
However, the fact that these demands are made on behalf of an ethnically 
conceived group (and not individuals) complicates the issue. The difficulties, as 
noted, include vulnerability to charges of communalism and other backlashes. 
On a basic level, the difficulty stems in part from difficulties that liberal political 
imagination must confront with treating anything other than individuals as a sub-
ject of fundamental rights (see Appadurai 2006). Understanding of the politics of 
people who feel that they have been incorporated asymmetrically into a modern 
nation-state requires exploration into how “they” were historically formed into 
“communities” through interaction with the practices of the modern state. This 
process involved not only the production of “imagined communities” but also 
“enumerated communities” – communities that are categorized and counted by 
the governmental apparatus (Appadurai 1993; Cohn 1987; Fujikura 2015). The 
categories employed in censuses, by their nature, are exclusive. One cannot be 
Tharu and non-Tharu simultaneously. In other words, even if the dominant forms 
of belonging in the social world of western Tarai used to be, or are, “fluid,” as 
Krauskopff (2011) argues, and even if a Tharu is simply demanding equality and 
dignity, the person is forced to act within a social field in which the category of 
“Tharu” is already configured in significant ways in exclusive manners. In turn, 
returning to the earlier discussion of mediation, the ethnonym Tharu in its mod-
ernist form becomes an important mediator in shaping “self-consciousness” and 
“desire” of a Tharu. However, as Mazzarella (2006) also noted, because such 
mediations and identifications are always “provisional” and “contingent,” one 
cannot say, before the fact that mediation by a modern ethnonym always engen-
ders communal and violent politics.1
After presenting these brief notes about the terms post-conflict, mediation, and 
communities, the discussion can now turn to some recent events and actions in 
western Tarai.
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Tikapur incident
As stated initially, during a Tharuhat/Tharuwan demonstration on August 24, 
2015, eight police officers were killed. A few hours later, an infant son of a police 
officer was shot dead. The Nepali army was mobilized. A curfew was imposed. 
Nevertheless, despite the curfew, many Tharu houses were attacked by mobs, 
looted, and burned. During the following days, many Tharus in the villages sur-
rounding Tikapur were subjected to torture by Nepali police, armed police forces, 
and the Nepali army. Thousands of young Tharu men had to flee their homes, 
most of them across the border into India. Peace and reconciliation meetings 
were organized by the administration. Nevertheless, most Tharus soon stopped 
going there because cases were reported in which those Tharus who participated 
in such meetings were subsequently arrested by the police. When the author vis-
ited Tikapur in March 2016, about seven months after the incident, the tension 
remained palpable. Local Tharu leaders I met avoided speaking in public. At the 
main crossroad in the city was a poster with a photograph of the body of the 
infant child who had been shot and killed in the incident, with a caption saying, in 
Nepali, “The First Martyr of Undivided Far West.” At the entrance of the cricket 
field was a huge photograph of Senior Superintendent Police Laxman Neupane, 
who was also killed in the incident, with the words (in English), “We miss you sir.”
The incident was publicized throughout the country and beyond through con-
ventional media and Social Networking Services (SNS), mostly as a brutal inci-
dent of communal violence. Even a Tharu activist who strongly supported the 
Tharuhat movement recalls how his mother, who never had a formal education, 
on hearing the news, said, “[I]f you need to kill people to obtain rights, then we 
do not need rights.” He was unable to reply to his mother.
Several official investigatory commissions have investigated the incident, but 
no report has been made public. More than two years after the incident, 25 Tharus 
remain in jail without being tried in court. No one has been arrested in connection 
to the looting and arson of Tharu houses. The government distributed compensa-
tion to the victims of vandalism in June 2017.
Elections
When the author revisited Tikapur during October 2017, a Tharu journalist living 
in Tikapur reported that conditions had improved. A reduction of tension between 
Tharus and Paharis had occurred. When asked why, he reported that the conduct 
of local elections was the main reason. The first local elections in 20 years in 
Nepal were held earlier that year. Many of those Tharus who had fiercely opposed 
the new constitution also participated in the elections.
“Everyone participated in the election,” he said. “And when you participate in 
the elections, you need to talk with each other, and so the barrier was reduced.” 
When I asked if the participation in the elections meant they accepted the new 
constitution, he replied, “Yes. Participation in the election means we acted as if 
we accepted the constitution.” Then he rephrased his response: “Inside, in our 
heart, there is pain, but in going to the elections, we accepted the constitution.” 
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He added his explanation that an election is also a kind of movement [andolan]. 
In the local elections in Tikapur, six Tharus were elected as ward chairpersons 
(out of nine wards). It is good that more Tharus are involved in electoral pol-
itics than ever before, he remarked at one point. However, at another point he 
noted that Tharus are being used by different political parties. They are victims of 
“divide and rule,” he explained, using the English words. In summary, he spoke 
about the beginnings of new electoral politics and about the apparent reduction of 
social tension, with a palpable degree of ambivalence.
I also visited a jail in Dhanghadi, the headquarters of Kailali district, where 
Tharus accused in connection with the Tikapur incident are being detained. 
I was able to speak with Laxman Tharu and two other Tharu leaders. Laxman 
Tharu, a former Maoist commander, has been a prominent leader of Tharuhat 
movement since its inception. He said that he filed candidacy for the federal par-
liamentary elections from jail. Although he is accused in the murder cases, the 
presumption of innocence allows him to file candidacy because he has not yet 
been tried. Another Tharu leader sitting next to Laxman spoke strongly against 
participating in the elections. He spoke in an emotional tone: “We all burned the 
new constitution. Going to elections means that we are accepting it. We cannot 
do that.”
Laxman argued that they need to realize that they must balance and use both 
street agitations and legal struggle. “We are entering a phase of constitutional and 
legal struggle.” The phase of street-based movement and agitation has passed for 
the moment. The Tharus need to reach everywhere. Importantly, they need more 
presence in parliament and the government (see Tharu 2072: 78). (Laxman Tharu 
stood for first-past-the-pole from Constituency 5, Kailali, Province 7, and came 
in third place immediately after Arju Deuba, the spouse of Prime Minister Sher 
Bahadur Deuba).
Resham Chaudhari from Tikapur, accused in the killing of police officers, ran 
for a parliamentary seat while a fugitive in India. Resham Chaudhari, a journal-
ist, writer, musician, and owner of a Tikapu FM station, was a famous figure in 
Tikapur and beyond. He has also produced a film called Kamaiya and organized 
many events, including a pro-wrestling event in Tikapur. He was a committee 
member of Tharuhat movement in Tikapur. His Phulbari FM station and Phulbari 
Resort were looted, vandalized, and burned in the Tikapur incident. In the media, 
he is often described as “the primary suspect” in the Tikapur murder cases and is 
on the “most wanted list.”
During the election campaign, his interviews with journalists visiting him in 
an undisclosed place in India were uploaded and shared through SNS. Resham 
Chaudhari won a landslide victory in Constituency 1 of Kailali district, which 
includes Tikapur. He won 34,341 votes: almost three times as many votes as his 
strongest opponent (with 13,406 votes). In an interview given after his victory, 
Resham Chaudhari claimed that the Tharus who voted for him voted because 
they wanted a genuine and effective Tharu leader to represent them but that those 
non-Tharus who voted for him actually voted for peace and reconciliation (https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=cm3Wv5Cg6po, accessed 20 December 2017). 
What he meant was that those non-Tharus who voted for Resham Chaudhari 
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acknowledged that an injustice was done to an innocent Tharu, and their vote for 
him was a form of remedy.
Barghar system, “a traditional form of self-governance  
among the Tharus”
During October 2017, the author also visited a town in Bardiya district and par-
ticipated in a meeting organized by barghars. Barghars are Tharu local leaders 
elected every year by the Tharu village assembly called khyal. Barghar is respon-
sible for community affairs, including organizing collective volunteer labour and 
cultural events. Similar institutions are found throughout western Tarai. They 
are called Kakandar/Aghariya in Kapilvastu and Deukhuri, Matawa in Dang, 
Barghar in Banke/Bardiya, and Bhalmansa in Kailali/Kanchanpur. Barghar used 
to be part of the larger structure of chieftains in western Tarai. These structures 
were replaced progressively by new institutions installed by the Nepali state. 
Those Tharus who find values in more traditional forms of Tharu governance 
structures criticize both the panchayat regime and the political parties under 
multiparty democracy for simply dismissing traditional Tharu institutions as feu-
dal and oppressive. Recently, more Tharu activists are arguing for revaluation 
of Barghar practices as embodiments of local self-governance and participatory 
democracy.
The larger structures of the older chieftains have been mostly replaced, but 
neighbourhood-level and village-level institutions of khayal and barghar contin-
ued. Especially during the civil war and the absence of elected local governments, 
barghars played important roles in local affairs. Many of those who wanted to 
plan and implement local development projects went to barghars to seek their 
advice and support.
Before the meeting, an organizer explained to the author that barghars felt that 
they worked very hard for the local community during the armed conflict and in 
the absence of formal local government. Nevertheless, now that the local elec-
tions have been completed and the new municipality government has come into 
existence, they fear that all the important decision-making and resources will go 
through the municipality. Subsequently, they will be sidelined completely. For 
this reason, they organized a meeting of all the barghars in the area on October 16 
and invited the newly elected members of the municipality, including the mayor, 
deputy mayor, and ward chairpersons, to discuss how the barghars and the munic-
ipality might be able to “work together.”
About 20 barghars attended the meeting. One by one, they stated their opin-
ions. They all spoke in the Dangaura Tharu. Non-Tharus participants in the meet-
ing, including the mayor, who is a Pahari Brahman, said they had no difficulty 
understanding what was being said. Most of the barghars spoke of the impor-
tance of preserving traditions and culture. Some discussed specific Tharu rituals 
in great detail and had to be stopped by the emcee. Most acknowledged good 
culture and bad culture among the Tharus, and that they needed to preserve and 
develop the good aspects and get rid of the bad. Barghar practices, they said, were 
a very important part of Tharu culture that held the local communities together. 
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Several of them remarked that the institution of barghar, although not officially 
recognized by Nepali law, was part of the “unwritten law” or “unwritten constitu-
tion” of Tharus, defining what the community ought and ought not to do.
The concrete demands of the barghars at the meeting included that they be 
invited and be present in the processes of planning, decision-making, and imple-
mentation of all local development projects. For example, they wanted to be 
informed about and take part in the formation of user-groups in any infrastruc-
ture project. They also wanted budgetary documents to be sent to all barghars. 
Additionally, they wanted Tharu language to be an official working language of 
the municipality.
After all the barghars had spoken, the elected members of the municipality 
spoke one by one. They all spoke in favor of involving barghars in the work-
ings of municipality. One ward chairperson, a Gurung speaking in Nepali, stated 
that barghars are not merely a channel for disseminating information. They 
will play a crucially important role in the socio-economic development of the 
area. He added, however, that while municipal governments will openly invite 
barghars, the barghar system should also be “inclusive” and be open to accepting 
non-Tharus. To that statement, many barghars nodded approvingly. The deputy 
mayor, a young Tharu woman, said she had extensively researched barghar prac-
tices for a non-governmental organization project. She spent a large part of her 
speech explaining aspects of the system and how it is important to preserve and 
develop this tradition.
The last to speak was the mayor: a male Brahman. Speaking in Nepali, he 
acknowledged the important role which the barghar system played in the social 
development of the Tharus and explained that the municipality was ready to work 
closely with the barghars. He said the elected members of the municipality were 
actually like barghars. Each official might have fought the election carrying a 
particular party flag. However, once elected, they do not simply represent one 
political party. In fact, they represent and serve all members of the community. 
In that sense, they are also barghars. He then proceeded to say that he accepted 
all the concrete proposals made by the barghars: the presence of barghars in all 
the meetings related with local development, from planning to implementation, 
sharing budgetary information and making Tharu an official working language 
of the municipality. He declared that the municipal council will pass all these 
decisions at the meeting the next day. He added that the presence of barghars will 
help make municipal self-governance more open and transparent and help reduce 
corruption. By clarifying these matters at the very beginning, he continued with 
his speech, which lasted for more than an hour.
His speech centred on the theme of achieving the development and prosperity 
of the municipality. Because most residents are engaged in agriculture, the pros-
perity of the area depended on the profitability of agriculture. In addition, most of 
the poor and the backward population consisted of Dalits and, especially, Tharus, 
who accounted for 48% of the population of the municipality; development was 
impossible without their uplift. However, he said, most Tharus are engaged in the 
old subsistence-oriented forms of agriculture. For example, he says, there are at 
least a few chickens in every household running around in the courtyard. We offer 
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them to visiting guests and they are finished. But during these days, they sell 
“local chicken” at good restaurants at very high prices. We must consider ways 
in which we can make profits out of local chickens rather than merely consuming 
them ourselves. People can form cooperatives for the production and marketing 
of chickens. In many Tharu households, he continued, one raises pigs; they’re 
only good for making the house dirty. One must learn from the example of Dha-
rani bungur (branded pork from eastern Nepal) that are sold for such expensive 
prices in urban markets. Some way must be found to brand the products and bring 
them to the market. It is necessary to modernize and commercialize our agricul-
ture in a thoroughgoing manner.
At this point, a barghar interjected: “While we are on the topic of animals, can 
we discuss the problem of stray cattle?” Around this time, a Hindu renouncer 
was in the area engaged in a project of establishing gaushala (cow shelter). He 
had gathered stray cows in surrounding areas on to a grassy open field near a 
community forest. However, because the cattle were not restrained or contained, 
they were roaming around freely, wreaking havoc on the agricultural fields. The 
mayor responded by saying, “Yes, that is a problem. We will get back to that 
later.” The mayor, a strong supporter of the gaushala project, did come back to the 
topic toward the end of his speech, saying that the gaushala could be managed in 
a way that is not harmful to the neighbours and made profitable by, for instance, 
the production and sale of compost.
The mayor continued on and urged that Tharus had to change their habits. 
“There are of course a few Tharu here and there who are talented and active, doing 
big businesses.” He mentioned the name of a famous Tharus industrialist in the 
area. “However, please do not take this in a wrong way – Today, we have about 
two dozen people here. Were there that many Paharis in this room, they will all be 
talking incessantly, but you are quiet, sitting in the back … Today, we are living in 
a competitive world. The Tharus need to activate their capacities to advance in the 
society.” He then proceeded to discuss how Tharu culture, their festivals, dance, and 
lifestyles can be turned into tourist attractions. He said he was already discussing 
the namuna (model) Tharu village, which will invite tourists for homestay visits. 
He also promised to collaborate with the barghars in organizing Mag mahotwab, 
which falls in mid-January in 2018, as a major public festival and tourist event.
In summary, after weighing the responsibilities of the barghars and the elected 
municipal government, the mayor went on to examine the themes of development 
and prosperity specifically in his speech, which are presented as their common 
goals. Prosperity can be achieved through active and effective engagement with 
a free-market economy. In the course of the talk, the mayor invokes a common 
stereotypical contrast: simple Tharus who do not know how to speak and shrewd 
Paharis who cannot stop talking. He exhorts Tharus to change their habits and be 
more active and assertive, to “activate their capacities.”
The meeting as a whole proceeded in a cordial fashion. However, tensions 
between the mayor and the barghars sometimes became perceptible, as when the 
badhgar raised the issue of stray cattle.
After the mayor’s speech, the emcee, a Tharu journalist, speaking in Tharu, 
thanked all participants, and addressing the barghars said, “We need to focus on 
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the topic of discussion and not go all over the place. We need to meet 20 times 
before Magh and discuss on concrete topics and devise concrete decisions. We 
have no time to talk about whether Tharu culture is observed, violated or disap-
pearing. We need to focus on concrete things and measure how much concrete 
work we accomplished by Magh.”2
It was apparent that the emcee, himself Tharu, felt unsatisfied with the speak-
ing skill of the Tharu barghars and was urging them to change. However, he was 
not asking them to acquire eloquence like those of high-caste Paharis. He was 
asking for clear and concise modes of speech.
As observed, the mayor was urging the Tharus (and everyone else) to compete 
in the world as free and active individuals. However, the project of inserting the 
institution of barghar into the formal local government is apparently an attempt 
to insert a principle that is different from liberal competition.
Production of collectivities after conflict
This chapter began by citing Shneiderman and Snellinger’s (2014) criticism of the 
notion of post-conflict, which involves a highly reifying form of periodization. As 
they argued, after the successful conduct of democratic elections in Nepal, ten-
sions and feelings of ambivalence seemed to continue, especially among those 
who feel that the “conclusion of the peace process” was forced on them without 
consent or dialogue.
Whereas Shneiderman and Snellinger urge us to attend to complexity and 
diversity of particular, lived experiences, however, one finds the actors in the 
field themselves engaged in various forms of abstraction and reification, or medi-
ation in Mazzarella’s (2006) sense (e.g., when the mayor equated barghars and 
the elected representatives of the municipality or when the barghars called the 
custom of barghar as “unwritten constitution”), in a kind of equations that some 
anthropologists might find highly “inaccurate.” These are mediating terms that 
bracket all the concrete particularities and which create provisional commensura-
bility that enables social actions.
While engaged in mediation, Tharu leaders were not simply involved in consol-
idating their own community or asserting their identity. We were able to examine 
the possibilities of both inclusive and exclusive forms of belonging, as identified 
by Krauskopff (2011), being constructed in the process. In taking part in or boy-
cotting the elections or in trying to insert barghars into the official structure of 
local governance, they were involved in attempts to reconstruct the structure of a 
larger collectivity and collective life.
Notes
 1 In a recent article, Kanak Mani Dixit (2017) writes that the Nepali “citizenry feels empow-
ered for having participated in each key episode of the last decade, including the People’s 
Movement of 2006, blocking attempts at communal arson, and overcoming the five-month 
blockade of 2015–16.” This chapter is an attempt to consider some ways in which risks of 
“communal arson” increase and how varieties of actions are taken to reduce them.
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 2 The author has not been able to collect systematic data on the frequency of attempts to make 
barghars part of local governments in western Tarai. A couple Tharu leaders interviewed in 
Kailali district responded that they were not aware of such attempts. A respondent in 
Tikapur stated that the proposal to let barghars sit in municipal meetings was rejected. 
Tharu as a working language was reported as part of the manifesto, but it had not been 
implemented as of October 2017.
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11 Maps, migration, melancholia
Pradeep Jeganathan
On 18 June 2012, I thought I had found something long lost. In the face of it, 
it was something I had never had as part of my material lived world: a dwelling 
of my ancestors, the abode of my great-grandfather, Saravanamuttu, built at the 
turn of the 20th century, after he had retired as a medical practitioner. The house, 
which he called “Saravana Villa”, was in Kattudai, Manipay, a subdivision of a 
subdivision – certainly in those days a village, if you like – in the peninsula of 
Jaffna at the northern tip of Sri Lanka, then British Ceylon.
But when I grew up, in the southern capital of Colombo, in the 1970s and 
1980s, Jaffna and this place of dwelling had long been left behind. Of course, the 
ownership, by complicated rules of inheritance, had passed to a relative, but my 
mother, Saravamuttu’s granddaughter, Vijaya-Lakshmi, had never gotten around 
to taking me there, preferring other, perhaps more “educational”, sites as destina-
tions for our family trips during school vacations.
By the time I had come of age and proceeded overseas for my education, in 
1983, Sri Lanka was seeing the beginnings of a civil war that would stretch on, 
with pulsating, grotesque intensity for some 30 years. Jaffna was now a place too 
far, too unsafe, for a nostalgic visit – even though, of course, many lived there, 
migrated, and even returned in those difficult days. But their investments were 
different.
In June 2012, I had visited Jaffna at the invitation of Thamotharampillai 
Shanaathanan, one of Sri Lanka’s most serious artists and a scholar, for a short 
series of lectures in the Department of Art History and Fine Arts at the University 
of Jaffna. After that visit and teaching – as I lodged with Sana for a while – as 
he is a very dear friend – I asked him if we could try to find ancestral home. He 
agreed, and after much asking and looking – of course, Google Maps couldn’t 
know where we were going – I had my mother on aural mobile at my ear, how-
ever – we found it. It is I, who found it in the end, I like to think, because I saw 
the name of the place, etched in my mind from many childhood stories, on the 
gate post (Figure 11.1).1
I gave a little whoop of joy – “We found it! We found it” – to Sana and my 
mother on the phone, and then we walked in the garden, where Sana pointed out 
to me the distinctive double-column architecture, and my mother, through aural 
guidance, another remarkable feature, the sophisticated – for its time – private 
outdoor bathing facility that had been built for her mother, my grandmother, when 
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she had joined the household as the young bride of Karthigesu, Saravanamuttu’s 
second son.
The house was in shambles, still owned by a distant cousin in Australia but 
occupied by a refugee family from the Vanni whom neither I nor anyone in my 
family knew, or knew of, but I was overjoyed to find what was left, what I had left 
behind, and had thought lost in that space of longing, attachment and memory, 
somewhere between Roland Barthes’s the “has been”, and “no longer” (1981: 
76–77).
But when we went back to his place, I could see Sana was sad. Crestfallen. 
When we talked, he told me he grieved to see what had become of the beautiful 
house and even more so to see what had become of the finely wrought sculptures 
in the family temple behind the house accessed by walking across picturesque 
paddy fields. This is a temple where the direct male descendants of Saravanamuttu 
fund, in absentia, an annual ritual to this day. “I can tell what kind of people they 
were, and we have lost them now”, said Sana.
Shanaathanan’s statement is a dense one, and much of the work I attempt in 
this chapter is its unpacking at many levels, but I first note what I think may be 
already clear. An affective conceptualization of migrations, of differing paths and 
horizons, given varying intensities of investments in what is left behind, and what 
is travelled to is at the heart of his statement. Indeed, it is the loss, of people, 
things, and places that imbue him with sadness. This painting (see Figure 11.2),2 
part of an early moment in his oeuvre, is telling in the juxtaposition of the sharp 
claws of the prosthetic plough that lacerates the head of the grieving man, even as 
his teeth stream down, seemingly self-extracted.
Let me begin this unpacking, with a very brief historical portrait of the Jaffna 
Tamil Vellalar community, through the 17th century to the 1950s. The Jaffna 
Tamil Vellalar, it can be argued, were a community created, in part, by 17th- 
and 18th-century Dutch colonial rule as part of its strategic promotion of the 
extremely lucrative tobacco cultivation for export to the “Malabar” coast. The 
dominance of the Vellalar – which, in the contemporary anthropological sense, 
can be seen as a dominant cultivator caste —the classic account of which is found 
Figure 11.1 Ruined Gatepost, Saravana Villa, Kaddudai, Manipai, Jaffna.
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in M. N. Srinivas (1959) – was supported and enhanced by the Dutch who pro-
duced a now-familiar effect, by codifying “customary law,” which then, in turn, 
regularized private property, remade caste hierarchy, and compelled migratory 
labour from South India to live under a regime of caste slavery while working on 
the tobacco fields (Arasaratnam 1986).
The Vellalar grew rich, and this community was already well monetized 
because of a historical accident during British rule in the very early part of the 
19th century, when a dense network of American missionary schools, including 
the first boarding school for girls in Asia, led to the creation of an educated elite – 
unmatched in its density anywhere else in Sri Lanka, in Sinhala or Tamil regions 
– ready for colonial employment, by the early 20th century (de Alwis 1997). In 
fact, the products of these schools – and this is about a particular, very limited 
form of colonial education – migrated as far afield as British Malaya to serve in 
the clerical and railway services before returning to recapitalize the densely pop-
ulated peninsula with mansions – many of which may be viewed and studied to 
this day in their ruined state. Most are larger than “Saravana Villa”, I must add, 
even though the double-column architecture does date to this period.
By the mid-1920s, British Ceylon was booming, the surplus value created by 
another labour migration – to the central hills, very far from the northern tip, 
and the port of Colombo, then the third-busiest port in the empire – allowing 
for larger-scale, state-sector employment and a demand for professional services. 
The Jaffna Tamil Vellalar flowed into those opportunities, not only in the cleri-
cal services and railways but also in the more prestigious civil service and the 
Figure 11.2 “All Is Falling” (2000). Mixed media on canvas. Thamodarampillai 
Sanaathanan, Artist.
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learned professions, such as medicine, law and engineering, which took them in 
a great migration all over the island but also to the Sinhala south. But this migra-
tion, was not at that time, a final movement. Jaffna remained home – old houses 
were maintained, and families had a dual existence, living both in the South and 
North simultaneously, with the North receiving net capital transfers. So not only 
were the Jaffna Tamil Vellalar co-equals with Sinhala elites in the upper tiers of 
Ceylonese polity (Arasaratnam 1994; Sriskandarajah 2005), property prices in 
the peninsula, in the estimates of one anthropologist, were possibly in excess 
of the cost of comparable property in rural districts of England (Pfaffenberger 
1990).
One can see at once that when attempting even this brief sketch of people 
and place how central the concept of migration becomes. Conceptually, I think it 
fruitful to think the terms of region and migration, as imbricated to such an extent 
that I would like to run the two words together, as in “(mig)region”. In so doing, 
I want to keep in mind the themes I began with, the horizons of departure and 
return, from the region and the subjects’ intensities of investments in what is lost 
and what is found. I return to this theme later in this chapter.
Region, I conceptualize, as “ruled”, “lived”, and “mapped”. While perhaps 
arbitrary and certainly incomplete, it is my sense that looking in from these angles 
may allow “region” to be both an always already problematized and yet categor-
ically available in an analytical account. These are, I want to suggest, angles of 
view, not water-tight compartments; in fact, they must be seen in a conjectural 
articulation, with attention being paid to the centre of gravity each may imply. 
Region, then, may be seen as an articulation of these angles of view, always his-
torically and socioculturally constituted and creatively imagined, in the sense of 
virtual and actual. Of these tripartite axes, I would take a moment to underline 
the mapped, as process, which, of course, is implicated in life, the navigation or 
lived movement in variously mapped worlds, its making and marking, which in a 
different register is one of governmentality and rule, but even more, as object or 
artefact, as in a map that scales to the human, as in a map in an atlas. That said, 
I will return to these conceptual musings before I end this chapter. I now move 
back to the story of Tamil migrations.
If the place of the Jaffna Tamil Vellalar, in the administrative service and 
the learned professions, and in between, was made in succession by two colo-
nial states, the contestation of that place came with post-colonial democracy. 
In the 1950s, just as in India, when linguistic nationalism came to the fore, 
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the Sinhala leader who founded a political dynasty, 
took up language as his campaign slogan, promising “Sinhala Only”, in 24 hours. 
Since English had been the official language up until then, this policy, which 
began to be implemented in 1956, created two competing linguistic nationalisms. 
So the dominance of the Jaffna Tamil Vellalar was folded into a hegemony which 
worked on the idea of Tamil-speaking people, erasing caste and class domina-
tions that continued to exist.
As a consequence of this contest, given that violence began to emerge soon 
after – anti-Tamil riots in 1956 and then again in 1958, culminating in the great 
punctuation point in the modern history of Sri Lanka, the massive pogrom cum 
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riot of July 1983 – two maps of Sri Lanka began to emerge. This led to a pro-
tracted civil war, a long time of violence ended by the Sri Lankan armed forces in 
May 2009, the second major punctuation point in the modern history of Sri Lanka 
(Jeganathan 2017).
In essence, these punctuation points, which mark the “beginning” and “end” 
of a long civil war, also produce two competing maps. Superimposed on one 
another, almost, one was a Sinhala nationalist map, which claimed all of Lanka 
for the Sinhala and the Buddhists, and the other, a Tamil Nationalist map, which 
claimed the northern and eastern portion of the island for itself. This developed 
over time, and migrant bodies were crucial to its becoming; on one hand, there 
were Sinhala settlers whose movement to the North Central Province was enabled 
by successive states and, on the other, in the face of anti-Tamil violence in the 
south, Tamils who were moved back to Jaffna, at first temporarily, for their own 
safety. When these displaced persons would return to the south, they would again, 
face attack, perhaps a generation later, encouraging a more permanent movement 
back. By the 1980s, the sedimentations of violence had begun to consolidate 
these two maps; through the 1990s, and then up to 2009, a long war, with periodic 
ceasefires, produced further sedimentations.
I explicate the density of these divisive maps, with recourse to the lives and 
deaths of three imaginative figures from Sri Lankan literature and cinematogra-
phy who exemplify these punctuation points.
First, let me consider the liveability of the Sinhala south, for the Tamil who 
is the subject of violence. In Ernest MacIntyre’s play Rasanayagam’s Last Riot, 
set in July 1983, Rasanayagam, a southern Tamil who is neither a separatist nor 
a militant and who speaks both English and Sinhala well enough to “pass”, has 
faced riot after riot, which he has escaped, taking shelter in the homes of Sinhala 
friends or, more dangerously, passing through “checkpoints” of Sinhala men bent 
on perpetration, by pronouncing a Baldiya (bucket) the Sinhala way rather than the 
Tamil way, Valdiya. He continues this performance, these tactics – which I have 
called “tactics of anticipation” elsewhere (Jeganathan 2000) – throughout the play, 
negotiating the line between the serious and the parodic until finally, as it were, 
he refuses in one profound moment to do it any more – refuses to perform his 
Tamilness as Sinhalaness – and is then killed by a “mob” that has surrounded him.
Rasanayagam chooses not to treat 1983 as just another riot that might be assim-
ilated into memory, as a “has-been”, but his is not the refrain of “never again” 
of the survivor who lives on. If his death is an underlining of the “no longer”, it 
creates through a density of a null point, a new ordinary on the lived map, which 
tells of the impossibility of life. Vast numbers of southern Tamils migrated back 
to the north after the riots of 1983, many of whom joined armed movements, and 
in the embrace of the most grotesque and fearsome of these, the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), returned to the streets on which Rasanayagam walked, 
as suicide bombers, who, unlike he, took other lives as they died, even as the Sri 
Lankan armed forces began attacks, with great force, in what Tamil nationalists 
considered their homeland.
Selvi, is another such figure I take from Prasanna Vithanage’s film With You, 
Without You (2012).3 Here, we find Selvi, a young Tamil girl, out of place in the 
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central hills of Sri Lanka, in between the Jaffna Tamil north and southern south, 
among hill-country Tamils who are ethnically distinct from the Jaffna Tamils. 
Her brothers have been killed in the civil war, and she has seen terrible atroci-
ties. Selvi attempts to be a good wife to a Sinhala pawn-broker who works hard 
building his business and is gentle with her until she realizes that he was a former 
soldier who has covered up a militarized rape in the past. She can no longer be 
with him, or with herself, and kills herself.
Here, in this instance, we have the liveability of the Sinhala–Tamil marriage 
made impossible by prior atrocity. It is important, however, to note that there are 
two “migregions” here, both from where the protagonists, both Sinhala Army 
husband and Tamil wife, have come, the first from employment and the second 
from dwelling: the Jaffna Tamil north. Inhabitation there has been made impos-
sible for both, but for the Tamil woman, even the intermediate zone of the Tamil 
hill country is unliveable despite the love of a Sinhala man.
The third imaginative figure I wish to introduce is Dheepan,4 the protagonist 
of the eponymous film of 2015, which depicts a militant, defeated by war, who, 
together with two other war refugees – a grown woman and a young girl child – 
constitutes a contingent “family” so they can apply for asylum in France. Even 
though Dheepan works hard at his new job as a cleaner, drug-related “gang” 
battles in Paris, as well as the long hand of the LTTE, reinserts him in violence. 
While he survives to live on, in a remarkable climactic scene, we see Dheepan 
act out an episode of repressed violent experience, in a Parisian neighbourhood.
The battle of the Tamil homeland is embedded in the migrant.
This homeland, now thought of as much larger than the peninsula of Jaffna, is 
a region, a migration, that may be understood in the senses of the lived, ruled, and 
mapped that I delineated previously and to which I am now returning as promised 
– the map on a human scale, the map as in an atlas. The map of Eelam, then, is a 
point of reference for my analysis. It has, as a reproducible artefact, an enormous 
life, which I cannot do justice to here; I can only sketch some of its contours.
First, we must note the enormous Tamil migrations out of Sri Lanka, catalysed 
by violence. Such migrants, of course, carry complex maps with them, the map 
of Tamil Eelam, as artefact is but one. Fascinatingly, for analysis, this period of 
migration is also simultaneous with the extraordinary rise of distributed com-
puting – or, if you like, the internet – and then, by the 1990s, the availability of 
“webspace”, as a graphical screen to migrants. When I first began to address this 
puzzle of the then uncertain emergence of the map of Tamil Eelam in webspace, 
in 1997, what I noticed was the production of a kind of non-indexical space, 
which was then, quite unusual (Jeganathan 1998).
For example, the webspace of the University of Chicago, where I was at the 
time, www.uchicago.edu, invoked a sense of place or, in other words, worked 
hard to index or reference its webspace. On the other hand, the webspace 
invoked by www.fedex.com, the courier company, sort of hides its own location 
by indexing the possibility of the movement of a package from place to place; 
www.eelam.com, then a very new site, did neither. The space it invoked was 
non-indexical – while a map was drawn, it had little inside it, it did not even refer 
to the places of Tamil Eelam, that were, at a minimum, cartographically available. 
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In a sense, there was no “there there”; the there was here. Other migrant Tamil 
nationalist websites, at the time, were rich with details of place but yet did not 
invoke so centrally the bare map.
Of course, webspace has changed much since – far too much to be waded 
into here – but as far as indexicality goes, there are both Google Maps on the 
go and Google Street View. Such deep referentiality may even make the very 
idea of a certain kind of frozen web map obsolete, one may think. Interactivity 
in its infinitude is on us. And, yes, in current maps of the areas of Tamil Eelam, 
such detailed interactivity is available. For example, a US Tamil diaspora group 
(a PAC, or political action committee, in terms of US politics) attempts to map 
the militarization of the north of Sri Lanka, with state-aided Sinhala settlements 
and army camps marked. Here, that the map of Eelam’s bounds is gone; and the 
map is simply that of Sri Lanka, and the details provided that of Sinhala military 
colonization.
A map that has been: love and loss
Yet the bare, idealized imaginative map persists, as an iconic artefact, on posters, 
placards, cards, or even mugs. Thought dually, through Partha Chatterjee’s (1993) 
argument with Benedict Anderson, which insists on the material creativity of the 
national imagination, read together with Lacan’s understanding of the screen, 
which operates a split between the eye and the gaze, with the gaze being drawn 
to the stain, in a turning back which is an avoidance of “as seeing oneself see 
oneself” as in a mirror ([1964] 1978: 83), or as if we read Freud’s (1916) under-
standing of Mona Lisa’s smile, as the stain of Da Vinci’s gaze, in Lacan’s terms, 
the flattened, idealized iconicity of the portable map of Eelam, may be decipher-
able as an object that never was and never will be, one always already lost as it 
is loved. This is best seen in the map of Tamil Eelam, which appears as a tear.5
I owe to Sigmund Freud’s classic 1917 (1957) essay “Mourning and Melan-
cholia” the idea that psychic investments in objects – and I see objects here, as 
both ideal and material – can be worked through. In Freud, there are two sharply 
juxtaposed ways of working through investments. What he calls “normal affect 
of mourning”, is seen as a working through an investment, so that the attachment 
to the lost object is finally severed ([1917] 1957: 267). This is contrasted with 
melancholia where cathartic energies turn inwards from that lost object, forming 
a narcissistic identification that can itself be ambivalent: raging and loving, hating 
and desiring, euphoric and abjecting (Ibid). An identification that can “change 
around into mania” (Ibid: 253). In this view, mourning is transformative, pro-
ductive, psychic work, that lets go of the object, while melancholia is work that 
becomes its own object.
In thinking of ways to blur this sharp distinction made by Freud, I have found 
helpful a concise intervention made by Jennifer Radden (2002), who has pointed 
out that melancholy and melancholia are terms that are indeed quite different, 
both in a socio-historical and conceptual sense. Radden reminds us that mel-
ancholy was a state that could be moved in and out of, through and between; 
it was eminently Elizabethan and would be a better descriptor of Freud’s only 
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example in his text, Hamlet. Melancholia is rarely used today in clinical prac-
tice; it has been folded into the completely normalizing concept of “depression”. 
Depression, in the way the term is used today, of course, lies quite outside that 
context. In fact, if one were to return to Foucault with Radden, one finds his 
half chapter “Mania and Melancholia” in Madness and Civilization (1988) most 
instructive on this point. My point is not to reinforce a sharp distinction between 
the terms melancholy and melancholia but, rather, to use Radden’s work to ques-
tion Freud’s own distinction between mourning and melancholia. This is not a 
quibble for me as I am concerned with thinking melancholia simultaneously with 
melancholy so that I can conceptualize the work of melancholia, as both psychic 
and social, as ongoing, and perhaps even as productive.
I should underline, that in attempting to think of melancholia as work, I am not 
attempting to configure it as the work of recovery or getting beyond loss, which 
would be but a return to mourning. It is rather the kind of work, which after 
Veena Das’s formulation I will call “inhabitation” as in the work of “[inhabiting] 
… a world made strange by the desolating experience of … loss” (1997: 67). 
In fact, it is Judith Butler (1997) who, in a characteristically insistent recursive 
reading of Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia”, shows that Freud is not quite 
true to the conditions of possibility of his own terms; that the temporal logic of 
his terms leads to their own undoing so that the ego that turns back, inward, and 
may not be said to securely pre-exist the lost object; that as such, the distinction 
between “normal affect of mourning” and melancholia itself is rendered suspect. 
And even though the phrase “the work of melancholia” appears only three times 
in one passage in Freud’s 1917 essay, almost as a wall of refusal that he cannot 
think beyond, it is Butler who elaborates the term as one that can map the bounds 
between the psychic and the social and that it can be work on one’s self and work 
upon the world, at times of extraordinary loss.
It is instructive then to turn to Freud’s reformulation of his ideas of 1917, in 
The Ego and Id ([1923] 1962). It is in this text that Freud suggests that he did 
not, in this earlier exploration of the question, appreciate the full significance of 
“melancholia”, its frequency, and its typicality. In fact, we see that he has now 
moved to the view that such a loss and its refusal, in early childhood, through the 
ego’s identification with the lost object, is fundamental to the “character of the 
ego” which he describes as “ally precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes” that 
“contains the history of those [previous lost] object-choices” ([1923] 1962: 29). 
However, in this essay, Freud is particularly concerned with such abandonment 
and identification which occurs in early childhood and then becomes central to 
the “Oedipal Complex” and the elaboration of the ego itself. Therefore, while 
this movement in his own thought, which is really a suggestion that the ego can 
be always already melancholic in his previous terms, is not taken up as such. 
It is Butler, who in a series of textual readings of Freud, suggests that one can 
read this abandonment and identification, if hetero-sexualization is not a given 
disposition, as producing gender “as a kind of melancholy” (1997: 102). Here I 
want to extend this argument that Butler has made in several ways over time, to 
think the “character of the ego”, in Freud’s terms, as being constantly made and 
remade in relation to the refusal of loss (melancholia) and the acceptance of loss 
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(normal grief) as attachments and abandonments of ideal and material objects. 
This work, which, on one hand, is a suturing of melancholy and melancholia and, 
on the other, about investments in objects which have a irreducible sociality, is 
what I wish to call the “work of melancholia”, not in the sense of Butler’s melan-
cholic agency but as a form of inhabitation that maps the horizons and intensities 
of a person’s simultaneous psychic and social investments in what is loved and 
what is lost.
Let me return, to where I began, attempting to regain what I may not have been 
able to touch in the description of my return to that forever-lost place, “Saravana 
Villa”, the dwelling of my ancestors. In doing so, I leave behind the idealized 
iconic map of Eelam with which I have been pre-occupied and, at the same, 
the dense indexicality of interactive webspace, however considered. Rather, now, 
I move to a consideration of the micro regions of the migrant, lived, ruled, and 
mapped in an entirely different way.
Thamotharampillai Shanaathanan, in a complex, creative and truly painstaking 
aesthetic project, which resulted in a very innovative graphical book The Incom-
plete Thombu (2011), which invokes Dutch rule and capitalization through the 
very idea of the land registry and the associated file, the land deed, replete with 
survey maps and architectural drawings, triangulates among those documents – 
maps of rule, of a micro region, if you like – and displaced persons’ maps of 
memory of lost dwellings, with his own aesthetic account of what lies in between. 
Here then is a very different set of maps of “migregion” that navigates the space 
and time between the “has been” and “no longer” in Barthes’s terms, which I’ve 
been trying to juxtapose with Freud’s distinction between the object of melancho-
lia, which is never let go, and the object of mourning, which is released, given that 
both sets of distinctions are disturbed, as oppositions.
In an interview with his publisher, Shanaathanan puts it in his own words:
In The Incomplete Thompu book project my task was to respond to the diverse 
stories of completely different individuals. Hence the stories demanded a dif-
ferent kind of articulation; that reshaped my own drawing practice because the 
stories were not fully mine. This experience led me to make work in this form 
using a variety of styles. It is like telling my own story in other’s voices that 
refer to different times, places and memories, using a collage of painting styles.
(Pereira, 2014)
In speaking of lending his hand to the voice of the other, of reshaping his own 
practice to capture what may be lost, that which we may never fully know, for we 
may not ever know what precisely is lost, Shanaathanan describes, in the most 
elegant terms, what his aesthetic practice demonstrates so viscerally: the many 
inflections of the work of melancholia, catalysed by displacement and loss, a kind 
of “migregion”, if you can bear with my neologism.
If one thinks in terms of objects – taking the iconic map of Eelam and the 
densely indexical maps of dwellings in Shanaathanan’s work – and juxtaposing 
them, leaving behind index and icon and the idea of representation that comes 
with it, and staying simply with the idea of investment in the objects, what shows 
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up in stark relief, I would suggest, is the interior structure of the objects them-
selves in relation to these investments.
Notes
 1 Photographed by Prof. Pradeep Jeganathan.
 2 “All Is Falling” (2002). Thamotharampillai Shananthanan. Mixed media on canvas. (Dr. 
Malathis de Alwis and Prof. Pradeep Jeganathan, private collection).
 3 See https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2274706/.
 4 See https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4082068/.
 5 See http://www.salem-news.com/articles/november232011/tamil-eelam-rr.php.
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